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Abstract 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
 
An Empirical Analysis of Accessibility and Impact of Microcredit: the 
Rural Credit Market in the Mekong River Delta, Vietnam 
 
by 
Dinh Khoi Phan 
 
This study examines the characteristics of Vietnam rural credit market, credit accessibility and 
impact of microcredit programme at the household level. The Vietnam rural credit market is 
imperfect and developing whereby market imperfection creates credit rationing and limits 
credit access to rural households (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), and market development leads to 
different credit sectors interacting to serve the clients (Bardhan & Udry, 1999). Since the 
development of the Vietnam Bank  for Social Policy (VBSP) microcredit programme in 2003, 
rural credit accessibility has been improved. However, credit remains insufficient to meet the 
needs of a large number of rural population. 
 
This study investigates the determinants of households‟ borrowing decisions in terms of 
formal and informal microcredit and microcredit accessibility. The results show that informal 
microcredit alters the households‟ decisions to obtain a formal microcredit. If this interaction 
is ignored when estimating households‟ borrowing decision for formal microcredit, the results 
will be biased. The results show that ease of access to informal microcredit can compensate 
for their high interest rates in the credit market. The positive factors influencing formal 
microcredit accessibility include being a local government employee, having credit group 
membership and a poor certificate, educational attainment, working skills and village road 
access.  
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The results consistently show a positive impact of the VBSP microcredit programme however 
data and evaluation methods were analysed. The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
estimators show a positive significant impact of the microcredit programme on household 
consumption. When the analysis is restricted to only the poor, greater impact estimators were 
obtained. The fixed effect models with instrumental variables and the PSM both confirm a 
positive impact of the formal microcredit programme and its loan amount on household per 
capita consumption and income. If programme exogeneity holds, the microcredit programme 
impact for the Mekong River Delta is greater than the country average.  
 
In terms of policy implications, education and working skills build credit worthiness and road 
access enhances credit availability. Supporting programmes (e.g., vocational and job training 
programmes) and incentive policies (i.e., attracting investment to remote rural areas) are 
helpful to improve credit access to the microcredit programme. Government intervention is 
necessary to improve formal credit accessibility; however, re-defining microcredit strategies 
is needed to improve the microcredit programme impact.  
 
Keywords:Vietnam, Mekong River Delta, microcredit, accessibility, programme impact, 
ruralhousehold 
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The rural credit market plays an important role in agricultural production and rural 
development in developing countries. Typically characterised by excess demand, the rural 
credit market is only accessible to a certain number of borrowers regardless of the borrowers‟ 
repayment capacity. In fact, credit shortage is not simply attributed to excess demand but to a 
core economic problem – asymmetric information. The presence of information asymmetry 
creates adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which lead to banks reluctant to give out 
small loans. This is because commercial banks find it costly to deal with small loans since 
small or large loans either has to go through the same standard lending procedures. Moreover, 
including all transaction costs in lending interest rates to charge more for small is not 
possible. If borrowers default banks loose profit. Therefore, these commercial banks always 
requires collaterals to secure their loans. However, not many rural households posses valuable 
assets for collaterals, particularly in developing countries agricultural land is the only 
collateral but it is not always valued at the market price. This explains why rural households 
have limited access to credit from banks (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Lack of credit access is 
even more severe in low income and poor families who are normally considered to have fewer 
opportunities to borrow from banks due to insufficient valuable assets for collateral. These 
low-income households face limited opportunity to acquire new technology and working 
capital for agricultural production; they tend to fall behind. As a result, providing access to 
finance to low-income rural households has been considered an important component of rural 
development strategy. However, many developing countries still have difficulty providing 
appropriate rural credit at reasonable costs to a large rural population (Morduch, 1999).  
 
According to Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2008), the poor face two main problems in 
accessibility to bank credit. Poor households have no collateral and they are not able to 
borrow against their future income. Meanwhile, dealing with small credit transactions, such as 
microloans, is costly for financial institutions. Without any external support, the rural poor 
can never gain access to microloans. Hence, they seek alternative sources of credit. The 
development of microcredit is perceived as a strategic tool to provide credit accessibility to 
the poor. Although government intervention in the rural credit market is controversial, this 
external support to the poor is widely accepted because it can overcome the rural credit 
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market‟s failures. Aghion and Morduch (2005) provide a number of reasons for the 
government to intervene to expand credit access to rural households rather than not do so. 
However, most rural credit markets have been governed in one way or another towards 
delivering credit for the rural sector.  
 
In Vietnam, the government has integrated microcredit into the National Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Strategy by utilising the state-owned banks to provide credit to the rural credit 
market, such as providing credit access to the rural poor at a preferable interest rate
1
. Different 
forms of credit are available to the rural credit market such as individual lending, group 
lending, and village banking. In particular, many microcredit programmes have been 
developed to provide greater credit accessibility to rural households. These include the 
provision of formal microcredit through the Vietnam Bank for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (VBARD), Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), and others. Other 
programmes have been implemented through semi-formal credit providers, such as the 
Women‟s Union, Farmers‟ Association, and Youth Union, which are organised at national, 
provincial, commune, or district levels. Informal lenders exist to provide an alternative source 
of credit to a large proportion of the market. This mixture of different credit channels to serve 
rural households promises not only greater credit accessibility for rural poor households but 
also greater competition among the different forms of microcredit providers in the rural 
market. However, the Vietnam rural credit market shows many weaknesses in the lending 
process along with the market development. 
 
Although the Vietnam rural credit system has been focussed on providing credit for low-
income households, information asymmetry persists and creates problems related to screening 
in microcredit lending practice. Consequently, a large proportion of rural households was 
excluded from the formal credit market. For example, Pham and Izumida (2002) reveal as 
much as 30% of farming households were rejected by formal lenders. As farming households 
apply for loans to finance agricultural production subject to a collateral requirement, the result 
raises concerns about the inability to access formal credit for rural poor households in 
Vietnam. In the rural lending practices, Pham and Lensink (2007) indicate various strategies 
employed by different lenders to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In the 
adverse selection problem, formal credit providers tend to associate the probability of default 
with contract-related items, such as interest rate and loan repayment, as a part of the client‟s 
                                                 
1
 Decision No 67/1999/QĐ on March 30th, 1999 of the Prime Minister 
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previous credit history. In the moral hazard problem, informal lenders tend to link default risk 
to household related characteristics, particularly the presence of the lender-borrower 
relationship and social norms. As a result, there is always a proportion of rural households 
unable to obtain credit. 
         
Lack of ability to obtain credit from the formal financial sector has long been viewed as the 
biggest obstacle to improving households‟ livelihood (McCarty, 2001; Pham & Lensink, 
2002). To fulfil credit demand, rural households have to seek informal sources of credit at 
higher interest rate to support their production and consumption. This informal debt is 
believed to marginalise household income and likely leads the borrower into a cycle of debt 
and poverty. This market failure is eminent in many developing countries where the rural 
financial market is not functioning well (Musinguzi & Smith, 2000). Therefore, credit 
inaccessibility in rural areas impedes the development of the rural sector, which potentially 
decelerates the development of Vietnam‟s rural economy. 
 
To increase credit access for rural households, the Vietnamese government has implemented 
credit policies targeting agricultural and rural areas nationwide. The policies aim to assist 
rural poor households access to microcredit through banks at a preferable interest rate. In 
addition, the government has recognised microcredit as a strategic tool to provide cheap credit 
to rural households. Different forms of microcredit are available such as individual lending, 
group lending and village banking. Particularly, microcredit programmes have been 
developed to provide rural households with greater credit accessibility. These include formal 
credit providers such as VBARD, VBSP, and others. Other programmes have been 
implemented through semi-formal credit providers such as mass organisations of women, 
farmers and youth.  
 
1.2 Agriculture and Poverty in Vietnam and the Mekong River Delta 
Vietnam has been known as the world‟s rice granary since the country became a leading rice 
exporter for the last decade
2
. Located in Southeast Asia, Vietnam shares land borders with 
China from the North, Laos and Cambodia from the West;the country possesses a 3,200 km 
long coastal line in the east. Geographically, Vietnam is divided into seven regions: Northern 
                                                 
2
 According to Vietnam Food Association, Vietnam rice export volume reached 7 million tons by December, 
2011. This export volume is ranked the second after Thailand (VFA, 2011). 
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Uplands, Red River Delta, North Central, Central Coast, Central Highlands, South East and 
Mekong River Delta (MRD). The total land area is 305,000 km
2
 and the population reached 
87 million in 2010; the country is among the highest population density countries in Asia and 
in the world. The population is distributed unevenly between rural and urban areas although 
there has been a decline in the rural population. For example, Table 1.1 shows that over 73% 
of the population resided in rural areas in 2006 but this proportion had slightly reduced to 
71% in 2010. Declining rural population has largely been attributed by urbanisation and 
industrialisation as a part of economic growth. According to the World Bank (2010), in 2010, 
Vietnam GDP per capita was over $USD1,200 and its GDP per capita growth was above 5% 
in 2011; this is the sixteenth year the Vietnamese have enjoyed an income growth rate over 
5% in the past 20 years (see Table 1.1).     
 
Table 1.1   Gross Domestic Product and Population Indicators of Vietnam (2006-2010) 
Indicator Unit 2006 2008 2010 
GDP per capita (current price) USD 731.14 1,070.15 1,224.19 
GDP per capita growth  % 7.03 5.19 5.66 
Total population  Million 83.31 85.12 86.94 
Population density  People/km
2 
268.69 274.53 280.38 
Population growth rate % 1.11 1.06 1.05 
Rural population proportion % 73.12 72.16 71.20 
Source: The World Bank Data, 2010 
Note: Offical exchange rate in 2010, 1USD = 19,000VND 
 
The Vietnam economy has relied on agriculture for decades, however, the „Reform‟ in 1986 
has brought a transition to the economy. Government efforts have been proposed to boost 
industrialisation in the economic transition that aims to shift the economy from an agriculture 
based one to an industrial one. As a result, agriculture‟s contribution to national economic 
development in terms of share of GDP has been declining while there has been an increase in 
the industrial and service sectors‟ shares over the past 20 years. Table 1.2 shows agriculture 
accounted for over 40% of GDP in 1986 before the reform; agriculture‟s share had reduced to 
24.5% in 2000 and accounted for only 20.6% in 2010. The industrial and service sectors 
contributed equally to a 41.1% share of the total GDP in 2010 (see Table 5.2). 
 
Although agriculture‟s share of GDP has been declining, rural areas are still home to over 
70% of the population and agriculture provides jobs for over half the country‟s labour force. 
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According to World Bank data, 51.7 % total employment were engaged in agricultural 
activities in 2006. This sector continues to create an increasing value added for the economy. 
For example, in 2006, agriculture contributed 199 trillion dong value added to GDP; this 
contribution doubled to 400 trillion dong, equivalent to 20.9 billion USD, in 2010. The 
agriculture sector is still one of the main elements in the development strategy in Vietnam 
(see Table 1.2).   
 
Table 1.2   Value and composition of the Gross Domestic Product in Vietnam  
(2000-2010) 
  Agriculture Industry Services 
Year GDP Value Share Value Share Value Share 
 (Bil. VND) (Bil. VND) (%) (Bil. VND) (%) (Bil. VND) (%) 
2000 441,646 108,356 24.5 162,220 36.8 171,070 36.8 
2001 481,295 111,858 23.2 183,515 38.1 185,922 38.1 
2002 535,762 123,383 23.0 206,197 38.5 206,182 38.5 
2003 613,443 138,285 22.5 242,126 39.5 233,032 39.5 
2004 715,307 155,992 21.8 287,616 40.2 271,699 40.2 
2005 839,211 175,984 20.9 344,224 41.1 319,003 41.1 
2006 974,266 198,798 20.4 404,697 41.5 370,771 41.5 
2007 1,143,715 232,586 20.4 474,423 41.5 436,706 41.5 
2008 1,485,038 329,886 22.2 591,608 39.8 563,544 39.8 
2009 1,658,389 346,786 20.9 667,323 40.2 644,280 40.2 
2010 1,980,914 407,647 20.6 814,065 41.1 759,202 41.1 
Source: GSO, 2011. 
Note: Offical exchange rate in 2010, 1USD = 19,600VND 
 
Poverty is one of the biggest challenges that Vietnamese government faces during the 
economic transition. Poverty alleviation programmes have reduced the poverty rate 
remarkably, the proportion of people with a per capita expenditure under the poverty line 
dropped from 58.1% in 1993 to 37.4% in 1998. The poverty rate continued to decrease to 
28.9% and 19.5% in 2002 and 2004, respectively, and poverty has been reduced in all regions. 
However, a higher rate of poverty remains in some regions, especially remote and isolated 
areas (Nguyen, 2007). Table 1.3 also shows a declining trend in some poverty indicators in 
2006 and 2008. Using the national poverty line, the poverty headcount was reduced 
significantly. However, the poverty head count ratio at $2 a day was considerably higher, 
48.24% and 38.45% in 2006 and 2008, respectively. In other words, if the national poverty 
line is adjusted to align with the world poverty line, then over 21 million people are likely 
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revealed as living under poverty line. This shows the new challenges for the government to 
deal with poverty issues in the forthcoming changes.  
 
Table 1.3   Poverty Indicators of Vietnam  
Indicator Unit 2006 2008 Changes/annum 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day % 48.24 38.45 -4.90 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day % 21.31 13.07 -4.12 
Poverty gap at $2 a day % 16.11 10.85 -2.63 
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day % 4.57 2.29 -1.14 
Poverty gap at national poverty line % 3.80 3.50 -0.15 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line % 16.00 14.50 -0.75 
Poverty gap at rural poverty line % 4.90 4.60 -0.15 
Poverty headcount ratio at rural poverty line % 20.40 18.70 -0.85 
Source: The World Bank Data, 2010 
 
The MRD region, one of seven geographic regions, is located in the south of Vietnam; the 
MRD consists of 13 provinces. It is the main agricultural production region in Vietnam due to 
fertile soils and abundant water resources. With a natural land area of 40,518.5 km
2
 and 
population of 17.27 million habitants in 2010, the MRD has 12.24% of the total land area and 
19.87% of the total population of the country (GSO, 2010). The population density is 426 
persons/km
2
, which is much higher than the country‟s average population density. The 
population is distributed unevenly between urban and rural areas as well as among provinces 
in the MRD. The high but unevenly distributed pupulation density leads to ineffective 
utilisation of human and natural resources which, in turn, creates unfavorable conditions for 
economic development. 
 
Table 1.4 shows that agriculture plays an important role in the MRD economy despite its 
share having been reduced as the shares of the industry and service sectors have become 
dominant. For example, agriculture accounted for over 43.9% of GDP of the MRD in 2006; 
this share was reduced to about 34.7% in 2010. However, the growth rate of the agriculture 
sector is still higher than the country‟s average, which is largely due to a structural shift from 
traditional rice farming towards aquaculture (Lensink & Mai, 2008 pp.33-34). In addtion, the 
reduction in agriculture has been largely subsituted by industry as a result of the 
industrilaisation trend in Vietnam. However, the transition process has taken place at a slower 
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pace than the country average. Overall, the agriculture sector remains a major sector in the 
MRD economy.  
 
Table 1.4   Some selected economic indicators of the MRD and Vietnam 
 2006 2008 2010 
 MRD Vietnam MRD Vietnam MRD Vietnam 
Population 
†
 17.0 83.3 17,1 85.1 17,3 86.9 
Labour force 
†
 9.7 44.2 10.0 46.1 na na 
Population density 
††
 na 269.0 na 274 426.0 280.0 
Composition of GDP        
Agriculture 43.8 20.4 39.2 22.2 34.7 20.6 
Industry 23.7 41.5 30.4 39.8 33.1 41.1 
Services 32.4 38.1 30.4 38.0 33.2 38.3 
Source: VCCI Can Tho, 2010 and GSO of 13 Provinces 
Note:  
†
   Million people  
          
††
  People per square km 
             †††
 1994 fixed price, exchange rate 11,045VND/USD 
 
The MRD is the largest national rice granary and is also the heart of agricultural and 
aquacultural production in Vietnam. Its rice production was reported at 17 million tons 
annually, contributing over 50% of the annual rice output and 90% of rice exports for decades 
(GSO, 2010; Lensink & Van Nam, 2008). In addtion, the MRD has played a key role in 
aquacultural production since 1994. The region also produces 50% of fishery products, of 
which 60% is exported, and contributes 80% of shrimp exports from the country (Nguyen & 
Sumalde, 2008). The region is also the country‟s main supplier of fruit (sugar cane, mangos, 
grapefruit, etc.) and livestocks.    
 
The Khmer, Chinese and Cham are the main minority groups living together with a larger 
Kinh soceity in the Mekong River Delta. The Khmer typically reside in rural areas in the 
MRD mostly concentrated in Soc Trang, Hau Giang, Vinh Long, Tra Vinh and An Giang 
provinces. Representing a smaller percentage of the population than the Khmer, the Chinese 
highly populate urban areas in Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, Ca Mau, Kien Giang provinces and Can 
Tho city. A smaller proportion of Cham people inhabitat the border of Cambodia and 
Vietnam in An Giang province. The Kinh people comprise 86% of the total population and 
the remaining groups account for 14% (GSO, 2010).  
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Although the MRD has many advantages in agricultural production, the region also faces  
subtantial disadvantages such as poor human resource development and natural disasters. 
Particularly, lower education and a lack of work skills in the labour force due to a neglect of 
human development strategies and low investment in education in the past are the key 
weaknesses of human development in the region (Nguyen, Vo & Mai, 2007). In addition, 
region-wide flood yearly continues to threaten agricultural and aquacultural production as 
well as the livelihood of the MRD people. These downsides coupled with the large population 
living under the poverty line poses challenges to policy makers and local government. In the 
economic development process, the Mekong River Delta is confronted with conflicting 
demands. On the one hand, the demand for economic growth focussing on industrialisation 
and modernisation and, on the other, a sustainable development policy to deal with poverty in 
order to improve the livelihood of the poor households in the rural areas of the MRD.  
 
1.3 Research Problems and Questions 
Microcredit is an important part of Vietnam rural finance. Focussing on low income and poor 
households, microcredit provides small loans as working capital for income generating 
activities at individual, household and microenterprise levels. Microcredit is also used as a 
tool of the government in many poverty reduction programmes. However, providing 
microcredit to a large proportion of rural households remains a difficult task because of the 
nature of the rural credit market as well as the lending mechanisms which are highly regulated 
by government intervention.  
 
The Vietnam rural credit market has been characterised as fragmented whereby different 
types of credit providers (e.g., banks, credit funds, money lenders and advance input 
suppliers) exist to supply credit for a variety of rural clients. Poor physical infrastructure (e.g., 
roads, bridges, public transports and communication) in rural areas, especially in remote 
areas, associated with market fragmentation doubles the limited outreach of credit delivery. In 
addition, formal credit providers, represented by the specialised banks and peoples trust funds, 
were established to provide rural households with collateral-free loans. Delivering loans to 
poor households can be quite challenging because of risk management and transaction costs 
associated with asymmetric information. Lenders are supposedly able to obtain and use 
information about the potential creditworthiness of the borrower in specifying credit contracts 
for each transaction. Hence, rationing of credit demand becomes necessary for formal lenders; 
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and, rural households often face limited access to credit (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). To 
circumvent the problems, many government microcredit programmes involve the local 
Peoples Committees in their lending process. The linkage between the microcredit provider 
and the local authorities theoretically reduces the level of information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders that promises to reduce the risk of collateral-free lending. Meanwhile, 
the linkage creates another bias and incentive problems that are likely to hinder the poor 
group‟s access to microcredit. Furthermore, supply-driven formal credit providers who deliver 
microcredit with a subsidised interest policy tend to adjust slowly to the changing needs 
among their clients. All lead to a situation where a large number of rural households, 
particularly the rural poor, lacks access to microcredit. Limited accessibility to capital in the 
formal credit sector leads rural households to rely more on informal credit sources. The 
poorest household and those living in remote areas have no access to formal microcredit; 
hence borrow from relatives, friends, traders and money lenders. Without access to 
microcredit, rural households are not able to invest in new equipment and inputs for 
production, which may prevent them from generating an income for a living.  
 
The purpose of this study was to address the problem of access to microcredit programmes by 
rural households in the MRD. As the government microcredit programme has been 
significantly expanded after its official establishment, credit accessibility is often presumed to 
increase with microcredit expansion and the behaviour of households‟ credit demand is 
typically assumed unchanged. In addition, as the Vietnam rural credit market is developing, 
market development leads to different credit sectors interacting to serve the clients. The 
mixture of credit supply may change the way that the rural household decides to borrow from 
a certain type of credit provider. Given accessibility to formal microcredit, impact evaluation 
of the microcredit programme was further examined. Research on microcredit programme 
impact on households remains ambiguous because there is no standard methodology to assess 
the true impact. Therefore, a study to identify the impact of the microcredit programme helps 
re-define the scope and target of future microcredit programmes. To investigate the addressed 
problems, the following questions need to be answered: 
 
Research question 1. What factors influence microcredit accessibility for rural households 
in Vietnam, particularly the rural households in the Mekong River 
Delta?  
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Research question2. Does access to a microcredit programme and loan amount of formal 
microcredit really have an impact on rural households?   
Research question 3. What particular factors can be improved to enhance more microcredit 
access and programme impact?     
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
To answer the research questions, the objectives of this study include the following: 
 
- to provide an overview of the Vietnam rural credit market and the microcredit 
programme targeting rural households; 
 
- to identify the determinants of accessibility to formal microcredit, loan amount of 
formal microcredit and loan amount of informal microcredit by rural households; 
 
- to evaluate the impact of the microcredit programme on rural households, in terms of 
consumption and income; and 
 
- to identify the policy implications towards improving accessibility to microcredit by 
and its impacts on rural households in Vietnam.  
 
1.5 Contribution of the Thesis 
The contribution of this study to microfinance literature is twofold: microcredit accessibility 
and microcredit programme impact. First, it is vital to gain an understanding of the demand 
for microcredit from clients before expanding and improving credit accessibility. Empirical 
studies about credit accessibility are vast, however, studies on credit accessibility typically 
assume that the rural credit market includes both formal and informal sectors but these studies 
often ignore the interaction between them. Clearly, including the interaction in defining 
factors influencing accessibility provides a different way of looking at accessibility to 
microcredit in the rural credit market. Hence, this study advances our understanding of the 
dynamic nature of household‟s accessibility to the rural credit market. 
 
Secondly, improving access to microcredit is the main aim of many microcredit programmes 
targeting rural households and the poor because credit is believed to improve rural 
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households‟ livelihood by improving productivity, and smoothing consumption and income. 
In Vietnam, most microcredit programmes are managed by the VBSP. Since its official 
establishment in 2003, studies evaluating the impact of the VBSP microcredit programme on 
the target households have sporadically been done at national, regional and local levels; to our 
knowledge, studies on impact evaluation particularly for the MRD are few. Therefore, this 
study is expected to fill the literature gap of microcredit programme impact evaluation for the 
MRD and to enrich the field of microcredit programme impact evaluation.   
 
1.6 Data and Methods of Data Analysis 
Two main sources of data were used in this study. The 2010 MRD survey data obtained 
through a rural household survey using a structured questionnaire was used for research 
Objective 2 and 3. In addition, the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) 
2006 and 2008 panel data, conducted by the General Statistic Office of Vietnam, were used 
for impact evaluation of the microcredit programme in research Objective 3.  
 
Different techniques were applied to analyse the data. To account for selection bias due to 
observed and unobserved factors in the rural credit market (in research Objective 2), the 
selection, probit with continuous endogenous variable at right hand side (RHS) and Tobit 
models were applied using the 2010 survey data. Propensity Score Matching method (PSM) 
and Difference-in-Differences (DinD) approach were either independently or dependently 
employed using the datasets to produce unbiased impact estimators of the microcredit 
programme evaluation. Particularly, Kernel and Radius matching were applied on the 2010 
survey data and fixed effects models with instrumental variables and PSM were used for the 
VHLSS in the DinD approach.  
 
1.7 Definitions of terms 
The following terms used in this thesis need defining for consistency. First, the working 
definition of „microcredit programme‟ includes all small-scale formal and semi-formal 
financial lending to rural households either directly or through a group. Microcredit 
programmes are largely under the management of the VBSP, which is the formal credit 
provider, the microcredit programme is mainly referred to in the text. This definition excludes 
direct income transfers to households, such as pensions from the Ministry of Labour, Invalids, 
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and Social Affairs (MOLISA), schemes or other aids from non-government organisations 
(NGOs), and informal loans. The choice of households in the rural area not only complies 
with the addressed problems of the rural credit market but also reflects the rural poverty as the 
rural poor largely constitute the poverty class in Vietnam. Next, the working definition of 
„rural household‟ is referred to the target household defined by the microcredit providers and 
the „rural poor household‟ strictly follows the definition of „poor‟ provided by MOLISA and 
implemented by the local authorities. Other definitions of poor are also referred to for 
comparison purposes but are not applied in this study. Unless otherwise defined, the terms 
„borrower‟ and „borrower group‟ refer to a rural household and a group of rural households 
borrowing from the microcredit programme, respectively.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the rural credit 
market in Vietnam, including credit supply and demand, credit accessibility, credit policies 
and the microcredit programmes. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the theory of credit 
rationing, households‟ demand for credit, accessibility to microcredit and the impact 
evaluation of microcredit programmes at the household level, including empirical models and 
their main findings. Chapter 4 presents the research methodology. Chapter 5 explains the 
survey data and respondents in the MRD.  
 
Discussion of the results is presented in the following two chapters. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
determinants of accessibility to informal and formal microcredit under the condition that the 
two sectors coexist in the rural credit market. The probability of access to formal microcredit 
is explained given that the  households‟ decisions to borrow from one sector might alter the 
probability of participation in the other sector. Chapter 7 assesses the impact of the VBSP 
microcredit programme on rural households. Two approaches were used to address the main 
sources of bias, observed and unobserved bias, in impact evaluation. Finally, Chapter 8 
concludes the study, proposes some relevant policy implications, and outlines future research  
based on the research findings and limitations. 
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    Chapter 2 
The Rural Credit Market in Vietnam 
This chapter describes the Vietnam rural credit market, including credit supply, credit demand 
and credit accessibility by rural households, credit policies and the VBSP microcredit 
programmes. Due to geographical heterogeneity, the MRD rural credit market may differ 
from its umbrella, the Vietnam rural credit market. However, the credit market in Vietnam is 
highly regulated and the formal financial institutions are vertically controlled and monitored 
wherein bank branches strictly follow unique policies from their headquarters. Thus, the 
MRD rural credit market resembles the characteristics of the Vietnam rural credit market. 
This chapter describes the Vietnam rural credit market and reviews credit policies at the 
national level. The chapter consists of four sections and is organised as follows. Section 2.1 
provides an overview of Vietnam‟s rural financial system including the formal, informal and 
semiformal sectors. Section 2.2 discusses credit supply and demand in the rural credit market. 
Section 2.3 discusses the policies and events that influence the development of the rural credit 
market. Section 2.4 discusses the government microcredit programme targeting poverty 
reduction in Vietnam. Section 2.5 summarises the chapter. 
 
2.1 Rural Financing in Vietnam 
The development of the Vietnam rural credit market is historically marked by the „Reform‟ in 
1986. Before 1986, under the central planning model, the rural credit market played a minimal 
role in supplying capital for the agricultural sector. As the State did not recognise private 
investment, it ignored the need for capital investment. Official credit was delivered by the 
State Bank to communes, cooperatives and state farms (Fallavier, 1998). In the late 1980s, the 
Vietnam rural credit market was established to supply capital to the agricultural sector. The 
establishment of the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture (VBA) in 1988 was the first step in 
lending for private investment in agriculture. After its official establishment, the formal credit 
market has been developed to serve rural clients. Meanwhile, non-government organisations 
(NGOs) and donors have joined to increase the credit supply through microcredit schemes in 
the rural credit market (Le, 2011).  
 
The Vietnam rural credit market is documented as segmented and dual structured where the 
formal and informal credit sectors prevalently exist (McCarty, 2001; Pham & Lensink, 2007). 
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For years, the formal credit sector, led by the VBA, mainly provided credit for agricultural 
production with a collateral requirement. The poor were mostly excluded from VBA credit. In 
1995, the establishment of the Vietnam Bank for the has driven the credit supply to cover the 
unreached segment. McCarty (2001) documented a steady formal credit expansion so that the 
share of formal credit increased from 28% in 1993 to 46% in 1998 and to 70% in 2001. A 
proportion of unnerved households seek alternative credit from the informal sector such as 
friends, relatives, moneylenders at excessively high interest rates. The average interest rate 
charged for informal loans in 1993 was 80% per annum, which was over double the rate of 
formal loans.  
 
At present, the Vietnam rural financial system consists of three sectors: the formal credit 
sector, semi-formal sector and informal sector. Figure 2.1 shows the types of lenders in each 
credit sector in Vietnam‟s rural financial system.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Le, 2011 
 
Figure 2.1 The Vietnam Rural Financial System 
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2.1.1 The Formal Credit Market 
The formal credit sector is characterised by the dominance of the three state-owned 
commercial financial institutions, namely the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBRAD), the Vietnam Bank for the Social Policies (VBSP) and the People‟s 
Credit Funds (PCFs). According to the World Bank (2002) report, the formal credit sector 
accounted for as much as 73.5% of the total lending to the economy. Heavily regulated by the 
State Bank of Vietnam, the formal credit sector was designed to cover the overall rural credit 
market but its operations fall short of achieving the defined objectives.  
 
(1) The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development formerly known as the Vietnam 
Bank for Agriculture, was separated from the State Bank of Vietnam in 1988. The VBRAD is 
the largest supplier of credit to rural households, providing credit for all types of agricultural 
activity in rural areas (BWTP, 2008). The share of rural households having access to credit 
under VBRAD management increased rapidly from 9% in 1992 to about 30% in 1994 (Wolz, 
1999). Although the VBRAD is by far the most important financial institution in rural areas, 
its lending coverage is still underdeveloped to serve the entire rural credit market, particularly 
the rural poor. Microcredit lending is dominated by larger loans in the VBRAD total 
outstanding loans. Of the total loans in 1998, small loans below 5 million VND
3
 represented 
about 50% whereas the loan amount of microcredit (at an average of 1 million VND) was 
recorded only 16% (World Bank, 2007). A collateral requirement is another constraint in 
VBRAD‟s lending practices providing rural credit. VBRAD requires collateral such as 
residential property, movable assets, goods and land rights, when granting loans. Thus only 
about 30% of the households with a “red certificate” on land use rights have access to credit. 
Most rural households are unable to meet the lending requirements and are excluded from the 
supply of rural credit. 
 
Bias in risk assessment and complicated procedures in the lending process have also 
contributed to the underdevelopment of VBRAD‟s operation. The VBRAD branches prefer to 
provide credit to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) due to the low risk of default. SOEs are 
often considered zero risk clients because the government is expected to bail them out in the 
case of default. Lending to SOEs also incurs relatively low transaction costs for significantly 
                                                 
3
 Exchange rate: 1USD = 16,000VND 
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large credit amounts compared with many small amounts of microcredit to a large number of 
households (Putzeys, 2002). Dealing with small loans and microloans is considered costly in 
terms of time and money because of the complexity in processing the loan applications. 
Often, VBRAD credit can be used only for specific agricultural investments but not for those 
activities that are the priority needs of the borrowers. 
 
(2) The Vietnam Bank for Social Policies 
The state-owned Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP), the second largest rural bank, was 
established in 1995 in the framework of the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy. It officially started operating in 1996, providing credit at low interest rate to the rural 
poor who did not qualify for individual loans because of limited collateral. The VBP utilises 
the VBRAD‟s branch network is at the district level and, to a limited extent, at the commune 
level, where loan officers visit the communes on a weekly basis. This coverage and lending 
practice further reach the segment currently not served by the VBRAD in the rural credit 
market. The existing network was believed to have limited outreach to the poor in the most 
remote and rural communes. In 1999, only 2.3 million poor households were recorded as 
having obtained loans. Due to strong demand for microcredit, 8.3 million rural households 
were recorded by VBRAD and VBP in 2001. Of this, VBRAD accounted for 60% of the total 
number of loans and provided an average loan size of 6.45 million VND and 40% were from 
VBP with an average loan size of 2 million VND (World Bank, 2003).  
 
In 2003, the Vietnam Bank for the Poor was renamed the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies 
(VBSP). Its operations have been modified to focus on the poor. The VBSP closely 
cooperates with local organisations in lending procedures in which the local People‟s 
Committees help VBSP to identify the poor and socially disadvantaged groups. Meanwhile, 
other social mass organisations in villages such as the Women‟s Union and the Farmers‟ 
Associations help the bank to monitor the loans. Collateral is not required for loans but the 
social mass organisations provide a Guarantee Fund to the bank. If the borrowers default, the 
bank will take a portion of the Guarantee Fund. To ensure repayment, the social mass 
organisations organise the borrowers in credit groups. Joint-liability groups were also formed 
in the initial stage of microcredit lending but this lending practice has been moved to the more 
flexible group lending (Bhole & Ogden, 2010) in which the individual is liable only for her or 
his loan but not for those of other group members. According to the VBSP 2009 report 
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(VBSP, 2009), the total outstanding loans reached 72,660 billion VND, providing loans for 
7.5 million active borrowers. The 2009 outstanding loans increased 38.4% (20,149 billion 
VND) compared with 2008. Of this, loans to poor households are highest at 32,542 billion 
VND for over 3.7 million clients. 
 
(3) The People‟s Credit Funds 
After the collapse of the rural credit cooperatives, VBP was entrusted with reorganising the 
rural credit cooperative system. This resulted in a network of People‟s Credit Funds (PCFs) 
whereby PCFs‟ branches have been created in nearly all provinces of Vietnam. To restore 
public confidence in the formal rural finance system, the term „cooperative‟ has been 
deliberately excluded from the name of this newly established finance institution (Putzeys, 
2002). The PCFs‟ system has been set up as a member-owned organisation that aims to 
mobilise savings from its members. The system is managed according to the economic 
principle of cost covering, i.e., no easy money is available.  
 
The PCFs‟ network has been established predominantly in those areas that are economically 
better off and have a better developed infrastructure. Therefore, the PCFs‟ system plays a 
limited role with respect to reducing rural poverty. Its major role is to provide a viable rural 
finance system to farm and small entrepreneurial households to stimulate economic 
development, which indirectly contributes to poverty eradication (Putzeys, 2002).   
 
(4) The Postal Savings Company 
The Vietnam Postal Savings Company (VPSC) was established in 1999 with the principal 
objective to mobilise idle money from the public for economic development. Postal savings 
services include a wide range of individual savings and postal related savings accounts. As 
VPSC is not allowed to provide credit, it plays a minor role in supplying credit to rural 
households. 
 
2.1.2 The Informal Credit Market 
Knowledge of the informal credit sector in Vietnam is primarily based on anecdotal evidence 
but its important role as the informal credit provider in rural credit market has recently been 
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well documented (for details, see Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Pham & Izumida, 2002; Pham & 
Lensink, 2007). Typically, rural households can borrow money from different types of 
informal loan sources such as relatives, friends and neighbours; Rotating Savings Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs); or private money lenders, with greater flexibility than they can 
borrow from formal credit providers.   
 
(1) Relatives, Friends and Neighbours 
Relatives, friends and neighbours are the first alternative sources of credit; loan size and 
interest rate are determined by individual relationships and reputations. Taking advantage of 
personal relationships, relatives and friends, in general, provide loans without collateral or any 
other written loan contract. Recorded interest rates are low for loans by the neighbours and, in 
many cases, loans from relatives and friends are interest free. The loan amount varies 
according to the loan purpose such as emergency, consumption for illness, funerals, and 
weddings, etc. Although, these loans are rarely sufficient to finance agricultural production, 
they partially reflect the prevalence of informal loans in the rural credit market in Vietnam 
(Pham & Izumida, 2002).  
 
(2) Rotating Savings Credit Associations 
Rotating Savings Credit Associations have been traditionally known as an informal credit 
channel for rural households in Vietnam. Although they have existed for many generations, 
these financial arrangements have never been recognised as business contracts under the Law 
of Credit. These groups are referred to as „Hui‟ in the South and „Ho‟ in the North (Pham & 
Lensink, 2007). ROSCAs promote periodic savings which, in turn, are rotated as funds among 
a limited group of members who trust each other. Members of these associations come mainly 
from the same hamlet or are organised on the spot among colleagues and friends at work. In 
general, membership averages 12 or more persons
4
. Decisions on interest rate, number of 
members and loan amounts are made either jointly by all members, by a bidding process or 
solely by the organiser. The life cycle of a ROSCA ends when every participant has obtained 
the total funds collected at least once. Most ROSCAs are set up to bridge short-term needs but 
                                                 
4
Twelve people is an ideal matching number to the 12 months of the year. 
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they can also be set up to finance long-term investments. However, as ROSCAs are not 
regulated by the Law on Credit Institutions, defaults are commonly associated with either 
ROSCA members or organisers due to the weak screening process among members and weak 
social sanctions.     
 
(3) Private Money Lenders 
Private moneylenders are widespread and seem to be an important source of loans for most 
rural households. Putzeys (2002) revealed that, in 1997-1998, 51% of credit to farm 
households was provided by informal channels such as private moneylenders and individuals. 
Private money lenders are usually rich households in rural areas with surplus money and 
goods. The informal interest rate is normally higher than the formal rate; in some extreme 
cases, the interest rates are as high as 10% to 30% per month (Putzeys, 2002). Despite the 
high interest rates, there are many reasons why people borrow from moneylenders. Flexibility, 
both in getting the loan and repayment, as well as simple lending practices are documented as 
being far more important than the interest rates (Pham & Izumida, 2002). Generally, 
moneylenders do not ask for collateral and have no complicated screening steps to determine 
the loan.  
 
Some moneylenders are traders who give cash in advance on the basis of the promise to 
receive or buy the products at harvest time. Others can be suppliers who provide credit as 
input for agricultural production at the beginning of the season then receive the principal 
payment plus interest at the end. This type of lender has emerged during the last few years as 
the agricultural products market became more developed. Therefore, it is widely accepted and 
assumed that it will become an important source of informal credit in the rural credit market.   
 
Similar to other rural financial markets in developing countries, the informal credit sector 
remains controversial in Vietnam ‟s rural credit market reconstruction. There are opponents 
who traditionally regard informal credit as a violation of financial discipline despite its 
contribution to meeting farmers‟ financial needs. This is because the Vietnamese government 
does not recognise the legal existence of the informal sector and the development of informal 
credit is out of the government‟s supervision. Therefore,  informal credit should be excluded 
from the rural credit market by improving the lending operations of formal financial 
institutions to expand outreach in favour of rural households, which is crucial in establishing a 
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sound rural credit market and maintaining the sustainable development of the rural economy. 
However, according to the development finance‟s view, supported by the persistence of 
informal credit, suggests a better regulation for both formal and informal credit sectors would 
tap more financial resources from informal sector which would work towards improving more 
credit access to the rural credit market. The existence of informal credit reflects the 
imperfections of Vietnam‟s formal rural credit system, which is characterised as fragmented 
and unable to meet the diverse credit demands of the rural households. In terms of rural credit 
development, the existence of informal credit should be re-addressed in both rational views in 
order to facilitate credit accessibility to household in the rural credit market.   
 
2.1.3 The Semi-formal Credit Market 
The semi-formal credit sector was established through microfinance programmes in late 
1990s, managed by international programmes and NGOs in partnership with local 
organisations at the provincial level. This sector consists of various structures of decentralised 
financing that offer microfinance services that try to reach that part of the population excluded 
from formal credit channels. Initially, the semi-formal credit sector was mainly funded by 
international and national donors who saw this channel as a means to provide more efficient 
aid to poor families in rural areas and thus combat poverty. Gradually, this microcredit 
scheme has become the central concern of many international poverty reduction programmes 
(World Bank, 2000, p.110).  
 
Like other Asian countries, the semi-formal credit sector has a significant role in the provision 
of microcredit to the poor but at a smaller scale in Vietnam (see McCarty, 2001 for a survey). 
The key actors in the semi-formal credit sector are official mass organisations such as the 
Women‟s Union, Farmers Associations, Youth Union, and War Veterans, who play a crucial 
role in the implementation of donor-supported microfinance schemes. These organisations are 
usually represented at four administrative levels: national, provincial, district and commune. 
This structure enables the mass organisations to have direct contact with the local level and to 
establish a connection with the national level. The legal framework covering microfinance 
services in Vietnam was established in 2010; hence, the semi-formal credit sector was left 
outside the Law on Credit Institutions in recent years (a further review of credit policies is 
presented in the next section). Due to incomplete information, the semi-formal credit sector 
will not be included in this study. 
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2.2 Credit Policies and Microlending Practice in the Vietnam Rural Credit 
Market 
A summary of the empirical studies providing information about the sources of credit supply 
and the purposes of credit demand in Vietnam is presented in Table 2.1. Like rural credit 
markets in other Asian countries, the formal credit sector fails to cover the credit demand for 
the production and consumption of rural households, hence, the informal sector exists in the 
rural credit market. Rural households are likely to borrow from different credit sources for 
different purposes. For example, McCarty (2001) and Pham and Izumida (2002) showed that 
the predominant purpose of formal loans reported by the surveyed households was for 
financing current production such as cultivation, livestock and handicrafts but most informal 
loans were obtained primarily for personal consumption and expenditure such as house 
repairs, weddings and funerals. Recently, Pham and Lensink (2007) showed a mixed 
contribution of the formal and informal credit sectors to households‟ credit demands in 
Vietnam. Rural households borrow from either the formal credit sector, largely to support 
their agricultural production such as purchasing chemical fertilisers and raising livestock, or 
they borrow from friends or relatives to supplement their consumption including house 
building, medical treatment and children‟s education. Evidence of the association between 
formal credit and informal credit for production and for consumption loans in the rural credit 
market in Vietnam has been documented but partially explained.  
 
Table 2.1 Main Sources of Supply and Demand for Rural Credit 
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McCarty (2001) D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
Pham & Izumida 
(2002) 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
Ho (2004) D 
F 
D 
F 
D 
F 
D 
F 
D 
F 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
D 
IF 
 
Pham & Lensink 
(2007) 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
D 
F/IF 
Note: D:  Demanded for 
           F:   Supplied by formal credit sector 
           IF: Supplied by informal credit sector 
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As the [Vietnam] agricultural input and product markets have developed, the demand for rural 
credit, particularly the demand for microcredit, has also changed (World Bank, 2007). Rural 
households have increasingly demanded more sophisticated loans. For example, a crop 
producer and a small trader have very different demands for loans. A crop producer might 
prefer a loan at the beginning of each crop planting and the loan repayment after harvest 
whereas a small trader requires a loan at any time for cheap stocks with a flexible repayment 
period. In addition, the loan size also differs between the very poor and less poor households 
based on their income generating activities. Though a small loan can certainly make a 
significant impact in raising the income-generating capacity of a crop producer, a medium-
scale trader would demand a large loan for her or his business. Thus, under a supply-driven 
and subsidised credit policy, the provision of credit to poor households needs to be re-
addressed in order to identify the changing demand for credit from clients as well as improve 
the formal lending practices.  
 
2.3 Credit Policies in the Rural Credit Market 
After the country‟s Reunification in 1975, the Vietnam economy was strictly regulated by the 
central planning model, which decelerated growth and created fewer incentives for economic 
agents to be involved in economic activities (Fan, Huong, & Long, 2004; McCarty, 2001). 
Before the 1980s, the economy was characterised by: i) state or collective ownership; ii) the 
centralisation of physical input and output supplies; iii) the absence of factor markets and 
highly regulated markets of goods and services; iv) a concentration on heavy industries; and 
v) a passive one-tier banking system in which the state bank performed as a commercial as 
well as a Central Bank in order to allocate the capital to designated projects rather than to 
mobilise domestic savings (Fan et al., 2004). Consequently, the average national income 
growth rate per annum during the period 1976 – 1980 was estimated at 1.4%, far below the 
targeted rate of 13% to 14%. Severe food shortages, trade deficits, aid cuts and budget 
deficits, high inflation and a declining per capita income imposed high pressure on policy 
makers in the early 1980s (Pham, 2009; Vo, 1987).    
 
Faced with severe inflation and a budget deficit in 1986, the Vietnamese government 
reformed a number of macro policies, starting with decentralisation of SOEs, to control fiscal 
and monetary policies. The economic reform had a significant impact on the economy, 
particularly controlling inflation in the late 1980s. Within 10 years, the near hyperinflation in 
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1986 was reduced to a single-digit level, facilitating economic growth (Pham, 2009). In 1990, 
that financial reform started with separating the State Bank monopoly into the two-tier 
banking system with the State Bank functioning as a typical Central Bank and the commercial 
banks specialising in providing banking services. The newly established banking system 
opened the door for lending to the private sector. Currently, the commercial banking system 
consists of the state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, credit funds, joint-venture banks and 
foreign banks. Interest liberalisation, flexible management of the exchange rate and the 
application of indirect monetary measures in market management have also been 
implemented. The implementation of innovative monetary policies has contributed 
significantly to macroeconomic stabilisation, inflation control and an increasing supply of 
credit to all sectors of the economy. Table 2.2 summarises some key policies and events that 
particularly influenced the rural credit market in Vietnam.  
 
Table 2.2 Key Policies and Events Influencing the Vietnam Rural Finance 
Year Policy/Event Solution 
1988 VietnamBank for Agriculture was 
established 
To provide financial services to agriculture and rural 
sectors 
1993 People‟s Credit Funds (PCFs) 
were re-established  
To mobilised savings from rural households 
1995 VietnamBank for the Poor was 
established 
To provide credit to poor households at favourable 
interest rate 
2001  Decree No.48/ND-CP/2001 of 
the Government to PCFs 
To improve PCFs‟ organization and operations 
2002  The Bank for Social Policies 
(VBSP) was established 
To provide cheap credit to the poor and rural 
households  
2005 Decree No.28/ND-CP/2005 of 
the Government 
To direct the organization and operations of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
2008  Resolution 26-NQ/TW/2008 on 
“Tam nong” of the Party 
Congress 
To continue to provide favourable credit to the rural 
sector, and encourage the MFIs to lend to the rural 
sector 
2009 National Microfinance Steering 
Committee was formed 
To develop a market-based microfinance sector 
2009 Decision No.497/QD-TTg/2009 
of the Prime Minister  
To provide the interest support for farmers within the 
Demand Stimulus package 
4/2010 Decree 41/ND-CP/2010 on Credit 
Policy for developing agriculture 
and rural sector 
To increase non-collateral loans for farming 
households, non-farm households, farming 
cooperatives, farming enterprises 
6/2010 The New Law on Credit 
Institutions (CIL) was amended 
to replace the CIL in 1997 
To incorporate non-bank MFIs into the formal 
financial system and to liberalise the banking 
operations including rural finance 
Source: adapted from Le (2011) 
 
Despite a number of limitations, the rural credit market‟s development has significantly 
contributed to the rural development of Vietnam in terms of the expansion of outreach and 
35 
 
increasing credit access (Le, 2011; McCarty, 2001). The establishment of VBRAD in 1988 
and the PCF in 1993 played a major role in supplying rural credit. They built a countrywide 
network for the specialised rural credit provider to expand its services. In 1995, the VBP was 
established under the control of VBRAD with the purpose of providing poor households with 
favourable credit, i.e., the poor could borrow collateral-free low interest loans. The 
establishment of VBSP in 2003 further expanded social policy lending to the target group to 
ensure the inclusion of the poor as well as further establishing the microfinance sector in the 
rural credit market.  
 
Government policies have deliberately encouraged the microfinance sector‟s development. 
Several policy initiatives are implemented to ensure microfinance institutions‟ operations to 
work in the rural financial market as well as to include the microfinance sector in the rural 
development process. Particularly, Decree No. 28/ND-CP/2005 provided the primary legal 
framework to open up the MFIs‟ operations to service clients. Resolution 26/NQ-TW/2008 
re-emphasised rural development based on three main actors – agriculture, farmers and the 
rural sector. The policy indicated a further need to continue providing favourable credit to the 
rural sector by encouraging financial institutions to lend to the rural sector. In 2009, the 
National Microfinance Steering Committee was formed to develop a market-based 
microfinance sector. Subsequently, two rural credit policies have been implemented. Decision 
No.497/QD-TTg/2009 of the Prime Minister aims to provide interest support for farmers 
within a demand stimulus package and Decree 41/ND-CP/2010 on Credit Policy for 
agriculture and rural sector development increases non-collateral loans for farming 
households, non-farm households, farming cooperatives and farming enterprises. In particular, 
non-collateral loans increased up to 50 million VND for farming households, 200 million 
VND for non-farm households and 200 million VND for agricultural cooperatives and 
farming enterprises.  
 
Although the MFIs have been formally directed by Decree No. 28, the Law on Credit 
Institutions amended in 2010 has legislatively integrated the MFIs as a subset of the formal 
financial system. As the landmark legislation for MFIs to operate in the rural financial market 
has been established, on-going efforts to formulate the Microfinance Strategy are major tasks. 
Le (2011) indicated the paradox of defining the Microfinance Strategy that ensures the MFIs 
performance meets the social objectives while pursuing market-oriented rural finance. On one 
hand, the maximising profit behaviour of the banks could drive the vast majority of poor and 
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low-income households away from accessing a wider range of financial services, not just 
microcredit. In addition, the dominance of the subsidy from VBSP burdens the government 
budget and discourages the development of market-oriented rural MFIs.  
 
2.4 Microcredit Programmes Targeting Poverty Reduction in Rural 
Vietnam 
Despite a number of key policies established over the past two decades in the rural credit 
market to support poverty reduction, Vietnam is still home to over 12 million people (14.2% 
of the population) living in poverty
5
 (World Bank, 2008). Currently, the majority of poor 
households in rural areas live in poor conditions such as temporary houses, lack of fixed 
assets, low and unstable income. Accessibility to credit has remained one of the critical issues 
of the country‟s poverty reduction and rural development strategy.  
 
The VBSP microcredit programme has been designed to target the poor who face 
disadvantage in living conditions and have limited access to finance sources.  Since its official 
establishment in 2003, the VBSP provides the poor with preferential microcredit through a 
„group-based lending scheme‟. To borrow credit from VBSP, a household should join a credit 
group in its locality. A credit group consists of 5 to 50 members residing in the same village. 
If in a village the number of members is lower than 5, they should join a credit group in 
another village. Each credit group sets up a management board, which is responsible for the 
borrowing and credit use of its members. According to the VBSP‟s lending policies, to 
become a member of a credit group a household should meet the following criteria: 
- The household has a long-term residence permit at the locality in which the credit 
group is located. 
- The household has someone who is able to work (working force). 
- The household is classified as poor by a commune authority. 
- The household has a demand for credit. The credit needs to be used in production or 
for consumption necessary for subsistence. 
- Total loan size is not more than 30 million VND (VBSP lending policies in 2012). A 
household can borrow many times, but the total outstanding loans may not exceed 30 
million VND. 
                                                 
5
 In 2006, the national poverty line was set at 260,000 VND (16 USD) per month per person in urban areas and 
200,000 VND (12 USD) per month per person in rural areas.   
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Standard lending procedures for a member of a credit group applying for VBSP loans are as 
follows. First, applicants send a formatted letter to their credit group. In the letter, the 
applicants specify the amount and purpose of the loan that they intend to take. Upon receiving 
the applications, the credit group leader arranges a meeting of all members to consider the 
relevance of the loans. During the meeting, the credit group, based on the consensus of 
members, determines which households are able to borrow and the amount and terms of each 
loan. A list of the successful applicants is prepared and sent by the credit group leader to the 
People‟s Committee in that commune. Once the list is ratified by the People‟s Committee, it 
is sent to a VBSP branch for final approval. It often takes from one to four weeks to obtain 
credit (Nguyen, 2008; Quach, 2005).  
 
„Group-based lending‟ has been popular in making loans to rural poor households since the 
start of the VBSP microcredit programmes. However, it is worth noticing that this lending 
practice does not strictly follow the joint-liability principle. The borrowers are required to 
form a group, including a number of certified poor members and a group leader, but no joint-
liability is specified. The group leader‟s tasks are: (i) to provide information of group 
members to credit officers; (ii) to collect loan applications from group members and disperse 
the loans, and (iii) to convince members to repay their loans. In the case of a default, the 
responsibility for dealing with default borrowers is the credit officer; the group leader helps 
persuade the defaulters to repay. It is simply, according to Quach (2005), a „lending through a 
group‟ mechanism that adopts a „group-based lending‟ to reduce transaction costs rather than 
to reduce default risk. However, lending through a group is more effective in dealing with 
asymmetric information than in individual lending. At the commune and microcredit 
institution levels, the process of lending and monitoring VBSP credit is rather stringent 
(Nguyen, 2008). To ensure high repayment rates in the system, the VBSP monitors 
outstanding loans and overdue outstanding loans from its local branches. It corresponds to the 
overdue outstanding loans with fund allocation every year, i.e., less funding to VBSP 
branches with large overdue loans. In addition to the credit groups the People‟s Committee is 
also administratively responsible for the repayment of credit group members in their 
commune. Often, when the applicants list is ratified, the People‟s Committee tends to exclude 
very poor households who might not be able to repay loans but non-poor or even better-off 
households can get loans (Dufhues, Pham, Ha, & Buchenrieder, 2001). Therefore, the poverty 
targeting of the VBSP program remains questionable.  
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Nguyen (2008) employs the World Bank–GSO poverty line to investigate how well the 
microcredit programme reaches the households. The results revealed that, in 2004, only 12% 
of the poor households with a favourable credit record obtained loans from the microcredit 
programmes provided by VBSP. The evidence strikingly indicates that the lending rate of 
microcredit programmes was significantly low. In addition, the poor usually receive smaller 
amounts of credit than the non-poor. The loan size per poor borrowing household was 3.174 
million VND, which was rather lower of 3.715 million VND that a non-poor household 
borrowed on average.  
 
Two main reasons explain why microcredit programmes did not reach the targeted poor 
households. First, the poverty targeting issue has difficulty in identifying the real poor. In 
Vietnam, the poverty definition is not consistent between the GSO-WB approach
6
 and local 
authorities (Nguyen, 2008). At the commune level, a household is classified as poor if it is 
considered lacking food or is living in a damaged house while its income lies below the 
income poverty line constructed by the Ministry of Labour and Invalid Social Affairs 
(MOLISA). The criteria are set up by each commune and they can differ from one commune 
to another. Because of the inconsistent definition of poverty, the only way to differentiate the 
poor from the non-poor is principally the instinctive judgement of local officers who often 
have an obscure and varied understanding of the poverty line set by the government. Thus, it 
is difficult to monitor the delivery of the subsidised loans to ensure that the loans actually 
reach the poor.  
 
In addition, the non-targeting issue, in which much of the benefit from the subsidised 
microcredit program is enjoyed by the non-poor rather than the poor, has also contributed to 
the failure of these programmes. Nguyen (2008) showed that the VBSP programme‟s 
coverage rate for middle and high income groups was 7.3% and 2.3%, respectively. The non-
targeting issue in Vietnam was similar to that of China‟s subsidised loan programmes in the 
early 1990s. Rozelle, Zhang and Huang (2003) revealed that over 90% of loans in China in 
the early 1990s were invested in industrial production instead of agricultural production. Bias 
in loan allocation and profit concerns are the main reasons that prevented  banks from 
delivering subsidised loans to the poor from microcredit programmes (Li, 2010).   
 
                                                 
6
GSO-WB approach follows the international poverty line which set a minimum income 1.25 USD a day per 
person.  
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The second reason related to asymmetric information in selecting the borrowers in a poverty 
targeted microcredit programme is reported in Dufhues et al. (2001) study. The authors 
reported that due to high costs related to lending and monitoring process, credit groups and 
commune heads are reluctant to include poor households in the list of credit applicants. Since 
commune heads are involved in the screening process and they receive incentives based on 
the credit volume and repayment rate in the commune, the commune heads also involve in the 
reinforcement of the repayment of overdue loans. This is an unpleasant duty which the 
commune heads try to avoid. Therefore, they are more likely to select households that may 
not be poor according to the national criteria but have a credit demand with potential 
repayment. The poor are excluded because they are assumed to have a low repayment 
capacity. Meanwhile, non-poor households find it easier to obtain credit because they are 
expected to be more reliable in using credit effectively and repaying credit. In addition, the 
poor often have low levels of education, limited production skills and market information. 
They also tend to apply for smaller credit amounts than the non-poor. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
The rural credit market in Vietnam is characterised as a segmented and emerging market 
wherein the growing demand for credit by poor and low-income households is unmet. Three 
forms of credit providers, namely formal, informal and semi-formal, exist. The formal credit 
sector was driven by series of institutional changes and credit policies designed to cover the 
credit demand of rural households, particularly the rural poor. More credit access has been 
documented, however, a large portion of the poor are unable to borrow from the formal credit 
sector hence seek an alternative source of credit. The informal credit sector, traditionally 
known as an alternative source of formal credit, is prevalent as the alternative for many rural 
households; it seems to exist with the existing formal one. The semi-formal credit sector, 
dominated by NGOs and donor support funds, participated in the market in late 1990s, and 
has an increasingly important role in providing microcredit and microfinance services to the 
poor but on a small scale.  
 
In the development of the rural credit market, government policies targeting the poor have 
overcome the obstacle of collateral loan for a loan for the poor. Many credit policies in favour 
of the poor have been implemented; however, the asymmetric information inherently prevents 
the poor from having access to credit. Persistently, the subsidised microcredit policies appear 
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to be a paradox for the Vietnam government to perform its social objectives in a market-
oriented rural finance market. On one hand, the dominating subsidised microcredit 
programme ensures a wider outreach of microcredit to the rural household, particularly the 
poor; however, it burdens the government budget and hampers the development of the 
market-oriented rural finance. On the other hand, to maintain the market-oriented rural banks 
with profit maximising behaviour, carrying a subsidised credit policy could drive the majority 
of poor and low-income households from accessing credit. 
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    Chapter 3 
Review of the Literature 
This chapter addresses two areas of microcredit literature; it consists of three sections. Section 
3.1 reviews the literature on accessibility to microcredit, including the theory and empirical 
models for microcredit accessibility, and the empirical findings of households‟ access to 
microcredit. Section 3.2 reviews impact evaluation of microcredit programmes, including 
impact evaluation methodologies and impact evaluation of microcredit programmes at the 
household level. Section 3.3 summarises the review. 
 
3.1 Theory of Credit Rationing and Household Demand for Credit in the 
Rural Credit Market 
3.1.1 Theory of Credit Rationing 
Credit is a scarce resource by its nature and the availability of credit differs among borrowers 
due to risk assessment by lenders. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) introduce the credit rationing 
theory based on two main assumptions: i) lenders cannot differentiate degrees of risk 
associated with safe and risky borrowers, and ii) loans are subject to the limited liability of 
borrowers to repay loans at the end of the investment period (i.e., if the project returns are less 
than the debt obligations, the borrower bears no responsibility to pay out of pocket). Because 
of the presence of asymmetric information, lenders judge borrowers‟ creditworthiness based 
on the available information before and after a loan is offered. The imperfect information 
creates at least two types of problem in microcredit - adverse selection and moral hazard. The 
adverse selection problem arises in the screening process where transaction costs involve 
differentiating between good and bad borrowers as reflected in the cost of borrowing, that is 
interest rate. Increasing interest rate to compensate for high transaction cost in small loans 
may drive out good borrowers from the pool of borrowers, hence, only bad borrowers with 
high risk project are able to borrow but not the target group. The moral hazard relates to the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism where the borrowers may not make every effort to 
repay after receiving the loan since they know their lenders are sharing part of the risk (Pham 
& Lensink, 2007). In general
7
, lenders decide whether credit is granted and how much is 
granted based on a set of information that they obtain, i.e., not all borrowers will receive the 
                                                 
7
 The case of asymmetric information is different from the case of perfect information where borrowers are able 
to borrow the desired money that they want for their production or consumption.   
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credit they apply for. This credit rationing leads to the problem that households and small-
scale enterprises face credit constraints regardless of their repayment capability (Aghion & 
Morduch, 2005). 
 
A model of credit rationing 
A simple ex-ante asymmetric information model consisting of households and banks is used 
to illustrate how credit rationing exists in a credit market. Each household, referred to as a 
borrower, has an investment opportunity to generate income but he or she lacks capital. The 
opportunity cost of the investment for the borrower is assumed to be his or her own labour, 
which is tradable in the labour market. The borrower therefore seeks funds from the credit 
market in which the bank acts as a lending agent. Both agents are assumed to seek their own 
interests, i.e., to maximize their own objectives.  
 
Since information asymmetry is persistent in the credit market, we follow the model of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), which assumes that the projects have an identical expected return   
( i ) but different probability of success ( i ) and the borrower makes a decision based on a 
risk averse attitude. The returns in the cases of success and failure are therefore denoted by     
( s
i ) and (
f
i ), respectively. The bank avails itself of information of the projects‟ expected 
return but not the probabilities of the success of each project. The bank therefore offers the 
same contract at interest rate ( r ) and amount of loan ( B ) to every borrower with the proposed 
expected return.   
 
The expected return to a project depends on its probability ( i ). In the case of success, the 
return is assumed to be greater than the repayment to the bank, (1 r)B , but the return in the 
case of failure is assumed to be lower than that of the case of success and the borrower loses 
his labour as an opportunity cost ( iC ). The project is launched if the expected return to the 
borrower is not lower than the opportunity cost in the case of success (Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981). Hence, the expected return to a project and to a borrower can be expressed as follows: 
 
s f
i i i i i(1 )                                    (4.1) 
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s
i i i i( , r) [ (1 r)B] C                                   (4.2) 
 
Substitute equation (4.1) into (4.2) and rearranging the terms, we obtain: 
 
f f
i i i i i i( , r) [ (1 r)B] C                                   (4.3) 
 
Differentiating equation (4.3) with respect to i , yields: 
 
fi
i
i
( , r)
(1 r)B 0
 
    

                            (4.4) 
 
Since f
i <
s
i  and 
f
i  is assumed to be lower than the repayment to the bank (1 r)B , 
equation (4.4) implies that the expected return to a borrower is a decreasing function of the 
probability of success i . Hence, at a certain interest rate, the least risky projects have the 
lowest break-even point and the most risky projects have the highest one.  
 
To establish the relationship between interest and probability of success, differentiating r  
with respect to i  in equation (4.2) using the implicit function theorem yields: 
 
i i
i i
( , r)r
0
( , r) r
  
  
   
                             (4.5) 
 
Thus i i( , r) / 0     and i( , r) / r 0     and equation (4.5) imply that an increase in 
interest rate r  leads to a decrease in probability of success. Evaluating this effect similar to 
Quach (2005), we consider marginal borrowers who satisfy the zero expected return condition 
*
i( , r ) 0   . An r >
*r  would induce these marginal borrowers to withdraw and the pool of 
remaining borrowers becomes riskier if the interest rate increases. The borrowers have to seek 
projects that promise higher returns but lower success rates. This effect is well established in 
the classical paper of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The idea is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Source: adapted from Quach, 2005 
 
Figure 3.1 Expected Returns to Borrowers and Probability of Success 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the effect of a change in interest rate on expected returns to the borrower 
and the effect of an increase in opportunity cost. The line   in equation (4.3) depicts the 
expected returns to a borrower when the probability of success varies; m
i  is the probability of 
success of marginal borrowers. Since the return of failure is negative, i.e., f
i (1 r)B 0    , 
an increase in the interest rate, r , moves the expected return to the borrower from   to ' . The 
expected return to a marginal borrower is then lower than the opportunity cost, and marginal 
borrowers drop out of the market. New marginal borrowers now confront the probability of 
success m'
i , which is lower than 
m
i , implying that the pool of borrowers becomes riskier. 
Additionally, an increase in opportunity cost from iC  to 
'
iC  will also cause the same effect 
(Quach, 2005).  
 
From the perspective of the bank, the bank always expects full repayment of (1 r)B  in the 
case of success but there are also chances that the bank might encounter a lower return to 
project f
i  in the case of failure. Thus, the expected return to the bank can be written as 
follows: 
'
iC
f
i
i( , r) 
' 
i
m
i
m'
i
Borrowers with 
m' m
i i i( , )     
drop out of the 
market 
iC
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f
i i i i( , r) (1 r)B (1 )                                   (4.6) 
 
Differentiating equation (4.6) with respect to i  gives  
 
fi
i
i
( , r)
(1 r)B
 
  

                            (4.7) 
 
Since (1 r)B 0  , equation (4.7) implies that the expected return to the bank is an increasing 
function of the probability of success. If the interest rate increases, there are two effects on the 
expected return to the bank: i) an increase in the value of the component f
i(1 r)B  , which 
is an increase in interest income; and ii) a decrease in i  (established in equation. 4.5), which 
leads to a lower expected return to the bank as lower-risk borrowers drop out of the market 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).  
 
Hence, there exists a critical equilibrium interest rate ( rar ) where, if the current interest rate r  
is lower than the critical equilibrium interest rate rar , the bank can increase the interest rate 
without any significant withdrawal of lower risk borrowers (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) and the 
expected return to the bank increases. However, if the interest rate increases beyond rar , lower 
risk borrowers drop out of the market and the new pool of riskier borrowers decreases the 
expected return to the bank. In such a case, the bank would prefer to allocate credit at the 
critical equilibrium interest rate rar  and there exists a problem of underinvestment.  
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the overall relationship between returns to the bank and credit rationing 
through the demand and supply curves and interest rate in rural credit market. The upper right 
part of Figure 4.2 shows that credit rationing exists as the bank maximises its expected returns 
through the interaction between demand and supply via the interest rate. If at rar , the supply 
of loans meets the demand for loans, there is no rationing and the market is at equilibrium, 
and the bank maximises its expected return. However, if there is an excessive demand for 
credit, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that it is better for the bank to ration credit rather than 
to increase the interest rate to meet the excess demand for credit.  
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cD
Credit rationing observed in the market is a general aggregation of two components: internal 
credit rationing and external credit rationing. Internal credit rationing, associated with the 
demand for credit by households, is the borrowers‟ self-assessment of risk on the applied loan 
demand. According to Barry, Ellinger, Hopkin and Baker(1995), internal credit is a function 
of the borrowers‟ level of risk aversion and a set of factors determining the financial risk of 
the investment project. This perceived risk level varies across individual households and may 
change over time according to changes in assets, experience and household characteristics.  
 
                                        c c
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Source: adapted from Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 
 
Figure 3.2  Returns to the Bank and Credit Rationing 
The external credit rationing, on the other hand, is related to the supply side of credit. In the 
lending transaction, external credit rationing happens when lenders decide to grant or not 
grant the amount of credit requested by the borrowers. Creditworthiness involves in the 
external rationing process that the lender considers the borrower has sufficient liability to 
account for the entire risk of debt in case of default. Collateral has proven to play an 
important role in this process in that collateral acts as a tool that allows a lender to value the 
Credit rationing 
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r
rar ir
47 
 
creditworthiness of the borrower. In other words, collateral solves the adverse selection 
problem in the ex-ante loan contract (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Consequently, collateral helps 
reduce the level of external credit rationing. Hence, loan contracts occur in different levels of 
external credit rationing such as completely, partly, or no rationing at all. In other words, non-
borrowers, due to the lack of creditworthiness, can actually borrow a loan conditional on their 
collateral.  
 
External credit rationing on a household is not only conditional on the household‟s internal 
credit rationing but also is influenced by a set of lender‟s characteristics such as scales, capital 
and equity, business operations, and also by the legal structure and regulatory environment in 
which the lender operates (Barry et al., 1995). This credit constraint, from the development 
finance point of view, can be reduced by reducing the transaction costs of lending in the credit 
market. In the other words, access to credit is more likely to be improved by improving 
investment in physical and institutional infrastructure before adding more financial services to 
the market (Fenwick & Lyne, 1998; Krahnen & Schmidt, 1994). Generally, the level of 
external credit rationing is referred to as the credit constraint condition in various economic 
models of households.  
 
3.1.2 Household Demand for Credit 
To derive the household demand for credit, we assume that an individual household 
maximises its level of satisfaction via the consumption function under the underinvestment of 
credit rationing as discussed earlier. We set up the standard Ramsey model for the household 
consumption over time. The thi household chooses a stochastic consumption plan to maximise 
the expected value of the lifetime utility function. We will show that borrowing an amount, in 
general, will increase consumption over time through increasing output under credit 
constraint. The household‟s production function comprises labour L and own capital K , under 
constant return to scale. Due to the credit constraint, a diminishing return to private capital 
reflects capital that is not perfectly mobilised between households. The general production 
function is in the following form: Y F(K,L) . Define 
Y
y
L
  and
K
k
L
 , the production 
function can be written in per capita terms as average product of capital KAP y (k)    and 
marginal product of capital KMP y (k)     that possesses the following properties: 
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(k) 0   and (k) 0    for all k 0                      (4.8) 
 
and 
k
lim (k) 0

   and 
k 0
lim (k)

  
 
 
The total output Y  is assumed to be allocated either to consumption C  or gross 
investment Ig . When depreciation   is taken into account, net investment I  is expressed as: 
 
I K Ig K Y C K                                   (4.9) 
 
Equation (4.9) can be expressed in per capita term as: 
 
k (k) c (n )k      where 
C
c
L
  and 
dL / dt
n
L
                       (4.10) 
 
Equation (4.10) describes how the capital-labour ratio ( k ) varies over time, in relation to 
population growth rate ( n ), depreciation rate ( ), and per capita consume ( c ) at the 
household level. The level of per-capita consumption, in turn, determines the utility and hence 
welfare of household at any time. Therefore, the household utility, U(c) , is assumed to be in 
the following form:  
 
1
(t )C
U(c)
1



   (0 1)                         (4.11) 
 
where U  is increasing and concave in c  and possesses the following properties:  
 
(t )U (c) C 0
    and (1 )(t)U (c) C 0
      for all c 0           (4.12) 
 
and 
c 0
lim U (c)

     and  
c
lim U (c) 0

 
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We follow the standard Ramsey model in that the household maximises an inter-temporal 
additive utility integral. The integrating process of utility maximisation attained at any time 
should take into account the population growth, n , and a discount rate,  . The total utility 
measures the instantaneous average per capita utility, which depends only on per capita 
consumption at a discounting rate   at any period t . The higher the  , the subjective rate of 
time preference  , implies the lower the contribution of a future generation‟s utility (Stiller, 
2000). In other words, a higher rate of time preference means current consumption matters 
more to the household under capital constraint. Given that the rate of returns to savings r is 
the difference between  and n, the inter-temporal additive utility function in a reduced form 
as follows: 
 
1
(t ) ( n)t
0
C
e dt
1

 

 where  (r n 0)                       (4.13) 
 
A system of equations (4.13) and (4.10) and a set of assumptions form the standard optimal 
consumption growth. Following the methods for dynamic optimisation, derivation of the 
optimal rate of household consumption satisfies the Euler equation:  
 
 
U (c)
c (k) (n r)
U (c)

    

                         (4.14) 
 
Defining the optimal rate of consumption growth as (t )
dC / C
g(t)
dt
  and d n   as the rate 
of depreciation plus labour augmenting technical progress, we can show the relationship 
between the rate of consumption growth, g(t)  and the marginal product of capital y (k)    
is as follows: 
 
   (t ) K K
1 1
g(t) d ln C MP (n r ) MP (r d)       
 
                     (4.15) 
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The key feature of equation (4.15) is that the rate of consumption growth, g(t) , is a function 
of the marginal product of capital, y (k) , the subjective rate of time reference,  , the rate 
depreciation, d , and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution,  . However, only the KMP  
and d  are induced by external capital. In the other words, under credit rationing and credit 
constraint, the household‟s demand for credit in order to improve its utility either via 
increasing the marginal product of capital through the production cycle or to directly finance 
some basic needs through decreasing constraint of current obligation is in terms of the 
depreciation rate.  
 
The first reason explains itself but the latter may need more specification in the light of the 
household‟s demand for rural credit because the (r d)  term enters the process as the 
coefficient of per capita expenditure for production in equation (4.10). Typically, agricultural 
production evolves from cultivation to harvesting, which may require large cash expenditure 
for inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, etc., but may take weeks or months to generate cash 
income. Many households cannot afford such large expenditure without external capital but 
producing with its own capital is insufficient to ensure consumption growth. In addition, the 
household‟s expenditure and consumption must be in cash. Due to sporadic income, poor 
rural households need credit to maintain their basic consumption while they face the 
constraint of obligations to machinery‟s depreciation and maintenance. Depreciation can be in 
the form of input credit and maintenance might be in the form of the cost of fixing or repair to 
keep the machine functional. All these obligations again can be in the form of advanced credit 
that the households are liable to repay. If the current obligation is repaid by an amount of 
micro credit, i.e., smoothing current consumption, whereby consumption growth can still be 
attained.  
 
In short, disregarding the criticism against microcredit provision, the demand for microcredit 
is crucial for households in rural areas and access to credit is a key requirement for economic 
growth and rising living standards in less developed rural areas (Petrick, 2005).  
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3.2 Accessibility to Microcredit 
3.2.1 Previous Studies of Accessibility to Microcredit 
Rural credit is vital for agricultural development and accessibility to rural credit has an 
undeniable impact on agricultural production. The availability of rural credit helps the rural 
households to invest in new technology, improve productivity and hence increase outputs, 
income and consumption. Understanding the factors that affect accessibility to credit is 
important not only for improving credit access to households from credit suppliers in the rural 
credit market but also for the implementation of policies that aim to provide more credit 
accessibility to the targeted rural households under the poverty reduction policy. The credit 
rationing theory and theory of choice are briefly reviewed as guidelines for the credit 
accessibility model in this study.   
 
Accessibility to credit starts with the demand theory for credit where an individual or a 
household wants to maximise his or her expected utility in borrowing money from credit 
providers. Every unit of money has its own opportunity cost, that is, the interest rate and, 
therefore, the decision to obtain any amount of loan is a rational choice based on demand 
theory. However, Stiglitz and Weiss(1981) show that demand theory alone cannot explain the 
behaviour of accessibility to credit where credit is rationed under asymmetric information. 
Credit providers, as the suppliers, do not only rely on market price or interest rate alone to 
charge the borrowers based on the amount of loan. Since the lenders have insufficient 
information on the default risk of the borrowers and the lenders cannot increase the 
equilibrium interest rate in the credit market, they tend to ration every loan they make to the 
borrowers. In other words, the flow of credit does not simply follow the supply and demand 
theory; it also follows a rationing process where the individuals apply for credit then the 
lenders determine how much credit is allocated to the borrowers, based on the lenders‟ 
perception of the borrowers‟ credit worthiness (Aleem, 1990). Lamberte and Llanto (1995) 
observing lending in the rural financial market in the Philippines, say that banks go through 
three stages in lending: the screening stage, the acceptance/rejection rationing stage, and the 
quantity rationing stage. In general, the flow of credit depends on its market structure and the 
nature of imperfect information. Adams and Vogel (1986) argue that in the credit markets 
where economic management is centralised, lending decisions tend to be rigid and 
concentrated, high transaction cost is associated with imperfection information in the lending 
process. On the other hand, markets where production decisions and information are 
dispersed, financial market must be flexible and transaction cost can be reduced. 
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Empirical studies either explicitly or implicitly use McFadden‟s (1972) discrete choice theory 
to discuss credit rationing with the credit demand theory. The discrete choice theory 
establishes the relationship between a utility and the discrete choice of individuals where an 
individual maximises his or her utility corresponding to a choice set
8
. This theoretical 
foundation has been applied in a wide range of fields including consumer choice, 
transportation and housing choice, and nonmarket goods (see McFadden, 1978, 1980; 
McFadden & Train, 2000 ). Choice theory can also be expanded to model the choice 
behaviour of households in the credit market. Under the assumption that borrowers obtain 
credit to maximise their utility, the demand for credit is derived from the attributes of choices 
that are specific to the borrower‟s decision and his or her socio-economic characteristics. 
Particularly, the borrowing decision is specified as a function of the household‟s demand for 
credit, which consists of the observable outcomes, i.e., loan amount and the determinants of 
these outcomes, i.e., the individual and household‟s characteristics. A binary choice model to 
describe the individual‟s decision to borrow or not to borrow has been applied in a number of 
studies using the logit model. Logit and probit models are preferred over the linear probability 
model because they better describe the arbitrary choice and their predicted probability of 
choice fits into a feasible range between zero and one (Aldrich & Nelson, 1992; Gujarati, 
2004; Maddala, 1983). 
 
Zeller (1994) conceptualises the sequential process of lending with credit rationing into two 
stages that facilitate empirical studies and enables empirical models to be estimable. The two- 
stage process simplifies the borrowing behaviour of borrowers and the lending process from 
lenders since the borrowers and lenders might simultaneously make their decision and the 
lending process may take place at any stage. In the first stage, a household or its member 
decides to apply for a loan. In the second stage, based on information that the borrower 
provides, the lender screens or decides whether to grant the applicant the entire loan amount 
he or she asked for, to partially reduce the loan amount, or fully reject the demand amount. 
This conceptualisation is prevalent as a standard framework for empirical research in 
microcredit accessibility.    
 
                                                 
8
 See McFadden (1972, 1978, 1980) and McFadden & Train (2000) for more details on discrete choice theory 
corresponding to the logit specification and its applications.  
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Following the above economic theory of microcredit and the econometric theory for model 
estimation, three main streams of empirical research in determining factors affecting 
accessibility to microcredit under credit rationing are reviewed in this section. The prominent 
stream of empirical studies aims to identify factors explaining the borrowing decision of 
households applying a binary or polychotomous choice model that depends on the nature of 
the choice specified in the dependent variable. This stream contributes extensively to the 
theory of choice and discrete dependent econometric models. Particularly, the probit and logit 
models for binary choice, whether access to credit is observed or otherwise, are normally 
found in this stream. Given the defined problem, the probit and logit models have high 
predictive power of the probability for a choice made. Choosing between the probit and logit 
models depends on the assumption of the error terms in each model. If the error terms are 
assumed to follow a normal distribution then the probit model is selected and if the error 
terms are assumed to follow a logistic distribution then the logit model fits better (for details, 
see  Gan, Nartea, & Garay, 2007; Li, Gan, & Hu, 2011; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2009; 
Mohamed, 2003; Pham & Lensink, 2007).  
 
The next stream of studies considers a two-stage lending framework to explain both the 
decision to borrow and loan in the lending process. For example Pham and Izumida (2002), 
Okurut, Schoombee and Berg (2005) and Swain (2002) consider the problem of sample 
selection bias in estimating the loan amount equation simultaneously with the selection 
equation. Implicitly, these studies treat different types of credit in the rural credit market 
separately and apply the standard Heckman two-step model or Tobit model depending on the 
nature of the selection bias in the model. Their findings advance our empirical understanding 
of the borrowing decision under the theory of choice and the determinants of loan under the 
credit rationing theory. Moreover, the findings reveal the nature of selection bias of 
households participating in a microcredit programme that, aside from the observed household 
characteristics, other unobserved factors significantly influence the households to self-select 
in a microcredit programme. Ignoring this self-selection in the lending process might lead to 
biased estimates in determining the loan amount. 
 
For the third stream, Zeller (1994), among the pioneers, provides a conceptualised framework 
to analyse the determinants of credit rationing in formal and informal credit markets. 
Although no empirical evidence has jointly determined a household‟s borrowing behaviour 
from formal and informal credit, Zeller‟s framework significantly simplifies the modelling 
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interaction between the formal and informal sectors. This view is further supported by Kochar 
(1997b), Diagne (1999) and Swain (2002) whose studies attempt to capture in the model the 
dynamic interaction among different types of credit providers, using different underlying 
assumptions to estimate the determinants of credit access and the credit demand of the rural 
credit market. Despite some limitations, as well as the conceptual difficulties in analysing the 
determinants of credit rationing (Petrick, 2005), their findings marked a milestone in 
enriching empirical research in the rural credit market.  
 
Studies applying the binary choice model to obtain the determinants of household access to 
microcredit include Mohamed (2003) and Gan et al. (2007). The logit model is used to 
determine factors influencing an individual‟s ability to access microcredit. The common 
factors in their models include age, years of education, gender, income and degree of 
awareness on the availability of microcredit services. Mohamed (2003) shows the complexity 
in the credit rationing model that information about credit availability also affects the 
accessibility to microcredit by households in Zanzibar. On the other hand, Gan et al. (2007) 
conclude that young farmers and poor fisherfolk have low accessibility to formal microcredit 
in the Philippines. Hence, the authors recommend that formal microcredit should be 
encouraged to increase the accessibility of small farmers and fisherfolk to microcredit, 
especially those who reside in adversely disadvantaged remote areas. Their findings also 
emphasise the important role of informal microcredit in meeting small farmers‟ demand for 
finance since formal and informal microcredit inevitably coexist in the rural credit market. 
 
Recent studies that explore the issue of access to credit by poor households include Okurut 
(2006) in South Africa and Pham and Lensink (2007) in Vietnam. Using the Income and 
Expenditure Surveys of 1995 and 2000 in South Africa and applying the multinomial logit 
model, Okurut investigates the determinants and marginal effect of factors that influence the 
probability of access to different sources of credit in the two periods. For example, age of 
household head has an inconclusive effect on informal credit because the coefficient is 
negative and significant in 1995 but positive and significant in 2000. In a similar approach, 
Pham and Lensink (2007) use the Vietnam Living Standard Survey to analyse the 
determinants of households access to credit. The authors‟ study attempts to explore how 
different types of lenders try to account for adverse selection and moral hazard problems in 
the lending process. Given that the semi-formal and informal credit sectors exist in parallel 
with the formal credit sector, different determinants of household access to credit were 
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obtained for each sector but the interaction among them was ignored. Despite their 
limitations, these studies provide generic results regarding the lending practices of different 
types of lenders in the rural credit market.  
 
In an attempt to capture the coexistence phenomenon, Pham and Izumida (2002) study the 
determinants of formal and informal credit in Vietnam using a household survey. Following 
the argument that rural households may borrow from the formal or informal sector, it is also 
possible for households to borrow from both sources at the same time. Since loans are derived 
from demand and supply, a reduced form of loans was used in the Tobit model. In estimating 
the borrowing function, the sample was decomposed into two main borrowing sources: formal 
and informal lenders. These borrowing functions were subsequently estimated separately. 
 
The formal and informal credit providers coexist in the rural market but not many studies 
include both in their analysis. In trying to consider the dynamic interaction among different 
types of credit providers in the model, Kochar (1997b), using reservation costs as the supply 
for credit and transaction costs for credit demand under a set of assumptions, employed three 
models to capture different conditions of the rural credit markets. Importantly, Kochar 
provides empirical evidence that access to informal credit plays a role in determining 
participation in the formal credit sector. Similarly, Swain (2002), following Kochar (1997b), 
reconfirms the evidence reported earlier. In addition, Diagne (1999) provides estimates of 
formal and informal credit in a simultaneous system of equations under the assumptions that 
formal and informal credit have imperfect substitutability and unobserved factors are assumed 
to be freely correlated in his model. Although no statistical results have been determined for 
the simultaneous interaction, Diagne‟s (1999) critical findings shed light for further research 
in this narrow field.  
 
Another issue emerging from the review of the literature is that, given the credit providers in 
the rural credit market, in which order a household chooses to resort to these types of credit? 
In other words, which credit sector does a household come to seek for a loan first? There are 
two possible theories to answer this question. First, under credit constraint, rural households 
will initially demand formal credit but some of them are excluded from the screening process 
due to insufficient collateral or lack the accountability to repay a loan. These households then 
resort to an informal lender as an alternative source of credit. Advocates of this view such as 
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Bell, Srintvasan and Udry (1997), Kochar (1997b) and Guirkinger (2008), strongly believe 
that an informal loan is the last resort the households can seek.   
 
Another view suggests that informal lenders have a comparative advantage over formal 
lenders in offering loans to households because informal lenders have better information to 
monitor and manage their clients (Jain, 1999). This implies that informal lenders can have 
more control over the moral hazard and enforcing contracts. According to this view, informal 
lenders are preferred to formal lenders because informal loans may be cheaper than formal 
loans (Chung, 1995). The theory highlights that high transaction costs related to loan 
participation from the formal sector may discourage farmers from taking formal loans. If the 
transaction costs associated with informal credit are less than those of formal credit, 
households will resort to the informal credit sector first. In short, the simple screening 
mechanism that informal lenders use in the lending decision and informal contracts that do 
not require pledging collateral from the borrowers explicitly supports this view.   
 
The literature shows that households‟ access to credit is derived from a determinant of many 
social economic factors that influence their decision to borrow a loan. Ignoring the correlation 
between the decision making and the loan amount, several studies focus on defining factors 
that explain the accessibility to formal and/or informal credit. Their findings therefore are 
insufficient to answer the question about the extent of the household‟s decision to access 
credit affects the loan amount. On the other hand, the literature also consistently emphasises 
the complexity of the rural credit market where formal and informal credit sources coexist and 
interact to serve their clients in various ways. Many studies focus only on the determinants of 
accessibility and the determinants of loans, treating informal credit separately from formal 
credit in the rural credit market, therefore failing to account for the economic interaction 
between both credit sectors. An investigation of this gap in the literature is essential to 
provide a better understanding of the rural credit market in developing countries.  
 
Table 3.1 summarises the key factors influencing the households‟ borrowing decisions and 
their credit demand. These factors are not only used to analyse the determinant of credit 
accessibility and microloans but they also to control for the differences in households in 
evaluating the impacts of a microcredit programme at the household level. The factors that 
empirically explain lending practice can be categorised into four main groups: individual 
57 
 
characteristics, household characteristics, rural credit market‟s factors (including formal and 
informal credit sectors), and geographic factors. As the formal and informal credit sectors 
coexist, these groups of factors simultaneously influence the borrowing behaviour of 
households as well as the loan amount. For example, underhousehold characteristics, Pham 
and Izumida (2002) show that farm size is likely to affect the absolute loan amount because 
farm size determines the total demand for credit. On the other hand, an increase in farm size 
tends to increase the credit worthiness of the household, which increases the chance of getting 
a loan either from the formal or informal sector.  
 
Table 3.1 Key Factors Affecting Household Access to Rural Credit 
Factors 
 
Accessibility to 
formal credit 
Formal 
loan 
Informal 
loan 
Authors†† 
 
Individual level    
Pham & Izumida (2002) 
Gan et al. (2007) 
Ho (2004) 
Li et al. (2011) 
Mohamed (2003) 
Age of household head +/- +  
Gender (female) + +  
Head‟s ethnicity + + + 
Head‟s education + + + 
Household level    Gan et al. (2007) 
Ho (2004) 
 
Land ownership +   
Family size +   
Member of credit group +   
Li et al. (2011) 
Pham & Lensink (2007) 
 
Membership requirement +   
Family income level +   
Expenditure +   
Credit market level     
Pham & Izumida (2002) 
Kochar (1997b) 
 
Agri. Loan + + - 
Trade loan +  + 
Loan duration +   
Geographic level    Coleman (1999) 
Kochar (1997b) 
Li et al. (2011) 
Pitt & Khandker (1998) 
 
Urbanised commune + + - 
Road access + + - 
Distance to nearest bank + +  
Note: +/- indicate a positive or negative effect on the dependent variable 
          †  applied only to microcredit programmes   
          †† Individual authors might not include all factors in their studies  
 
In addition, while household and credit market factors directly explain borrowing decision of 
the household or household head, geographic factors relate to the physical environment, 
where the household is located also affects their borrowing decision (see Table 3.1). 
Empirically, these geographic factors serve as a set of instruments to control for geographic 
differences at the village and commune levels (Coleman, 1999; Pitt & Khandker, 1998). 
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Three variables namely urbanised commune, direct road access at village level, and ethnic 
concentration in the commune are considered to be exogenous to the household‟s decision to 
borrow from the formal credit sector.  
 
The urbanised commune variable is defined as a commune that is located in a rural but 
adjacent to city or town where industrial zone(s) are present. Travel distance from the 
commune to the industrial zone(s) is not more than 10 kilometres. Kochar (1997b) indicates 
that urbanised districts have more concrete roads that are likely to improve access to formal 
credit. In addition, households living in urbanised communes may have a higher incidence of 
employment from non-farm commercial enterprises in these industrial zone(s) that entails a 
higher income from non-farm sources and ensures stable consumption for the households. 
Therefore, they are less likely to borrow from the informal credit sector (see also Coleman, 
1999; Ho, 2004;  and Li et al., 2011).   
 
3.3 Impact Evaluation of Microcredit Programmes 
The primary goal of a microcredit programme is to provide credit to the poor by extending 
small collateral-free loans that purposely enable the borrowers to actively generate a range of 
improvements in economic conditions (World Bank, 2010). Islam (2007) hypothesised that 
microcredit can create a circle of growth for poor borrowers that „low income households 
need credit for investment to create more income and more credit and more income‟. In other 
words, microcredit enhances income growth, which increases a household‟s consumption 
level, hence, contributes to an immediate welfare improvement. For example, an enhanced 
income from borrowing encourages the poor to increase investment in working capital as well 
as physical assets. Capital and physical asset accumulation attributed to microcredit reinforces 
the income generating capabilities of borrowers (Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Hossain & Diaz, 
1999). Hulme (2000) further illustrates that a conventional microcredit programme provides 
microcredit that lead to changes in household income, which leads to changes in economic 
security, educational and working skill levels. Ultimately, these changes lead to modification 
in household welfare and social political relations and structures. Thus, providing loans 
through microcredit programmes is a tool to create a desired impact on the target group of 
poor and low income households.   
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However, the extent to which the desired impact of microcredit on the poor is achieved is 
difficult to measure due to an incomplete information problem
9. The question “How does a 
microcredit programme actually impact on the target group of borrowers?” has been raised 
but never been fully answered. In trying to give the best answer to this question, it is essential 
to measure the extent to which microcredit has changed the outcomes of the targeted 
households who received microloans as a treatment. This process is referred to as „impact 
evaluation‟10. Since assessing the impact of a microcredit programme is subjective to the 
design methods and data, the following subsections describe the framework of impact 
evaluation and its problems in defining the impact of a microcredit programme on the rural 
poor in this study.  
 
3.3.1 Impact Evaluation Methodologies 
3.2.1.1 Impact Evaluation Framework 
Inference about the impact of a programme on the outcome of an individual in the labour 
market involves speculation about how this individual would have performed if he or she had 
not participated in the programme. The analytical method used to evaluate the programme 
impact is widely referred to as „the potential outcome approach‟ introduced by Fisher (1935) 
and Neyman & Iwaszkiewicz (1935) and subsequently developed theoretically and 
empirically by Roy (1951), Quandt (1972, 1988) and Rubin (1974). The approach was 
originally applied to evaluate programme impact in the labour markets and has been 
commonly known as the Roy-Rubin-Model (RRM) in the labour economic literature. The 
RRM has been expanded from the labour market to other fields such as health care, education 
and rural financial markets.  
 
Like the labour market, the rural credit market is subject to intervention by many policies 
from government. Microcredit is among the policy interventions in which the government 
provides credit through microloan schemes to the poor in rural areas. Hulme (2000) provides 
an extensive review of impact assessment studies and the constructive framework of „impact 
                                                 
9
The incomplete information problem persists in non-experimental or observational studies where data are not 
derived in a process that is completely under the control of the researcher. Instead, one has to rely on information 
about how individuals actually performed after the intervention. That is, we observe the outcome with 
programme participation for participating households and the outcome without programme participation for non-
participating households (Caliendo, 2006).  
10
 The terms „impact assessment‟, „impact evaluation‟ and „programme evaluation‟ imply the same thing. 
However, for convenience the term “impact evaluation” is used in this study. 
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Mediating Process 
Agent Behaviours and practices 
over a period 
Outcomes for the agent 
and/or other agents 
Agent 
Mediating Process 
Behaviours and practices 
over a period 
Outcomes for the agent 
and/or other agents 
Programme 
intervention 
The difference between 
outcomes is the impact 
assessment‟ in the microcredit literature. The idea of impact assessment is to define the 
difference between the outcomes of „agents‟, i.e., individual, enterprise, household, 
community, etc., which have experienced a policy intervention, against the outcomes that 
would have occurred without any intervention. Based on this framework, the process of 
impact evaluation includes three steps: defining „agents‟ as the assessment units, defining 
„outcomes‟ as the assessment indicators and assessing methods (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hulme (2000) 
Figure 3.3 The Framework of Impact Evaluation 
 
To illustrate the definition of impact evaluation, suppose that there is a microcredit 
programme assigned to a target group of households. For a single microcredit programme, 
denote D  as the binary choice variable of programme participation, i.e., 1D   if a household 
participates in the programme, and 0D   otherwise. Next, let Y  denote the observed value of 
the outcome 
11
. This variable receives two values depending on the participation variable, i.e., 
1Y Y  
if 1D  , and 0Y Y  if 0D  . The outcome is considered at a point or over a period 
after the programme is implemented. The impact of the programme on the outcome of the i
th
 
household is measured by:  
 
1 0i i iY Y                       (3.1) 
                                                 
11
Y can be a set of outcomes, but for simplicity a single outcome of interest is considered. 
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This impact is equal to the difference in the outcome between the programme state and non-
programme state. However, the problem in equation (3.1) is that i1Y  and i0Y  are mutually 
exclusive and receive values depending on the participation state, i.e., both outcomes cannot 
be observed for the same household. In other words, for households that participated in the 
programme, we can observe only 1iY , and for those that did not participate in the programme 
we can observe only 0iY . An outcome that cannot be observed is called „counterfactual‟.   
 
It is impossible to estimate the programme impact for an individual household because the 
counterfactual outcome is not exactly known (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997). If we were 
to construct an estimator for individual effects, the associated standard error would be very 
large. In fact, programme impact can be estimated for a group of people by finding an 
adequate comparison group
12
. In the impact evaluation literature for microfinance 
programmes, the Average Treatment Effect ( ATE ) and the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated ( ATT ) are commonly used because they provide a direct measure of the desired 
impact of the microcredit programme on the target group
13
. 
 
ATE is the expected impact of a programme on a person who is randomly selected and 
assigned to the programme. ATE  is similar to the average partial effect APE  of the switching 
model in econometrics because its parameter of impact is the difference between the observed 
outcome of participants and non-participants in the programme (Abbring & Heckman, 2007). 
To illustrate, write the switching model (Quandt, 1972) for the observed outcome of each 
individual as: 
 
1 0(1 )i i i i iY DY D Y                      (3.2) 
 
                                                 
12The term „comparison group‟ or „control group‟ refers to a group of individuals who did not participate in the 
programme. The terms „treatment effect‟ refers to the effect that an individual benefits from „being treated‟ or 
participated in the programme.  
13
Other parameters such as local average treatment effect, marginal treatment effect, or effect of non-treatment 
on non-treated may be used for specific purposes of impact evaluation (Heckman et al.,1997).  
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Where, Yi is the observed outcome, which is equal to 1Y  and 0Y  for participants and non-
participants in the microcredit programme, respectively. Since equation (3.2) can never be 
estimated for individual effect with confidence, the average effect is estimated by taking the  
expectation of the outcomes over the population (Heckman et al., 1997). Rewriting APE  we 
arrive at: 
1 0( | 1) ( | 0) ( ) ( ) iAPE E Y D E Y D E Y E Y ATE                      (3.3) 
 
In fact, most microcredit programmes are targeted at a particular group of households, 
therefore the interest is the programme impact on those who were carefully selected to receive 
credit (Islam, 2007, p. 223). If the programme has a positive impact, it would be beneficial to 
expand the programme to similar groups. The true programme impact on the participants is 
ATT : 
 
1 0 1 0( | 1) ( | 1) ( | 1) ( | 1)ATT E D E Y Y D E Y D E Y D                       (3.4)   
 
In general, ATE  and ATT  are different from each other because the potential outcomes 
depend on the programme participation status, i.e., 1 1( ) ( | 1)E Y E Y D  and 
0 0( ) ( | 1)E Y E Y D  . Estimation of the ATT  parameter is not straightforward because some 
components cannot be observed directly. Since our objective is to evaluate the impact of a 
microcredit programme on rural poor households, ATT  is the main parameter of interest. The 
next subsection discusses the associated problems and underlying assumptions in estimating 
the impact evaluation parameter.   
 
3.2.1.2 Problems of Impact Evaluation 
The major obstacle in assessing the impacts of microcredit programmes is the difficulty in 
determining the „counterfactual‟ (Baker, 2000; Hulme, 2000; Islam, 2007). This problem 
results in bias arising from the three steps of the process in the impact evaluation framework. 
In defining the „agent‟ to be evaluated, there are concerns about the method used to identify 
the target group as the „treated group‟, i.e., the unity of the target group over the entire 
population. There are also concerns about defining a „control group” as a comparison group. 
This step is crucial in impact evaluation because different strategies used to construct the 
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control group lead to different evaluation methods, different data requirements and their 
potential biases. For example, if a microcredit programme is particularly designed for poor 
and low-income households, there is little interest in the effect of that programme on high-
income and rich households because the policy‟s interest is in the effect of the programme on 
the targeted participants not those for whom the programme was never intended (Heckman, 
1997). On the other hand, if the treated group is correctly selected but the control group is 
mis-selected for comparison then the result of such an impact evaluation will also be biased 
(Hulme, 2000; Islam, 2007).      
 
Attributing specific effects to specific causes during the mediating process is another problem 
of impact evaluation. The main interest, how observed impacts are attributed to microcredit or 
what would have happened in the absence of microcredit, is at the core of impact evaluation 
(Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Mosley, 1997). Islam (2007) argues that impacts following a 
project intervention of a microcredit programme, in fact, may have been affected by other 
factors that are irrelevant to the particular project being evaluated. This argument makes more 
difficult the attribution of an observed change or impact to the project under evaluation. For 
example, the impact could not possibly assess the impact of microcredit on household income 
if the loan is not used for income generating activities but for gambling such as buying a 
lottery ticket. Including a lottery winner in the target group shifts the impact upward but this 
is not the desired impact of the microcredit programme.  
 
Since impact evaluation is subject to the missing data problem, estimating programme 
impacts by ordinary least squares often results in biased estimators. To illustrate this, we 
estimate equations (3.4) and (3.4) under the assumption that the non-participant can be used 
as an adequate control group.  
 
 0 0( | 1) ( | 0)E Y D E Y D                     (3.5) 
 
The assumption in equation (3.5) is likely to hold in randomised experiments but not likely to 
hold for non-randomised experiments. Consequently, estimating ATT  by OLS using the 
different in sub-population means of participants 1( | 1)E Y D  and non-participants 
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0( | 0)E Y D   will therefore lead to selection bias (Caliendo, 2006). Rewriting the OLS 
estimator for ATT  then adding and subtracting the counterfactual terms, we have: 
 
 1 0( | 1) ( | 0)OLSATT E Y D E Y D     
 
 1 1 1 0( | 1) ( | 0) ( | 0) ( | 0)OLSATT E Y D E Y D E Y D E Y D         
 
 1 0{ ( | 0) ( | 0)}OLSATT ATT E Y D E Y D                    (3.6) 
 
Equation (3.6) suggests that OLS produces the true programme impact if and only if equation 
(3.5) holds. This means one is able to select the non-participants to construct the 
counterfactual group. Therefore the term in the bracket of equation (3.6) approaches zero. 
However, the selection of the control group to resemble the counterfactual group provides no 
guarantee that the term in the bracket of equation (3.6) is equal to zero hence potential 
selection bias emerges. Selection bias arises because participants and non-participants are 
selected groups with different outcomes, even in the absence of the programme. The selection 
bias might arise from observable factors such as age or skill differences. A good example is 
where the programme group consists of unskilled individuals in the microcredit group and we 
compare their mean outcome with the mean outcome of a group of skilled individuals. 
Clearly, we would expect different outcomes even in the absence of the microcredit 
programme. Additionally, selection bias in a programme evaluation arises when unobservable 
factors such as motivation or entrepreneurship might also play a role in determining the 
participation decision. For example, if highly motivated individuals are more likely to 
participate and are more likely to have a higher outcome without treatment, we might again 
have a selection bias (Baker, 2000).  
 
3.2.1.3 Impact Evaluation Methods 
To overcome the incomplete information problem, different methods have been developed in 
order to minimise bias in impact evaluation and to derive the intended impact of a 
programme. Hulme (2000) provides a review of various methods to evaluate the impacts 
focussing on the strategies of data collection and the level at which the programme impact is 
65 
 
evaluated. These methods include sample survey design, rapid appraisal, participant – 
observation, case studies and participatory learning and action, including a description of the 
key features of each method (see Table 3.2). As each method has its own strengths and 
weaknesses, Hulme (2000) suggests that impact studies should adopt pluralistic approaches 
instead of a single method to avoid the weaknesses of individual methods.  
 
To focus on the sample survey, different empirical economic strategies can commonly be 
used to resolve the problems of impact evaluation (see Table 3.3). The first is randomisation 
of the design. The idea of this method is to overcome the missing data problem by assigning 
the programme randomly to the agents. Non-participants will form the control group under 
the absence of the programme. Given the programme assignment is independent of the 
potential outcomes, the coefficients of programme impacts can be consistently estimated 
(Caliendo, 2006; Heckman et al., 1997). According to Baker (2000) and Blundell and Dias 
(2000), randomised data suffer from several drawbacks due to unethical and political issues. 
In microcredit programmes, randomisation means exclusion of some eligible households from 
the credit programme. It is unfair to deny or delay a programme that provides support such as 
health care or education programmes, for the eligible households. As a result, the microcredit 
policy will be criticised by the public (Nguyen, 2008). Nevertheless, this approach may suffer 
from the attributing effect since it is impossible to ensure the control group to be completely 
unaffected by the presence of the programme. Further, such experiments are often expensive 
to implement (Blundell & Dias, 2000). 
 
A second approach is the matching method. The basic idea of the matching method is to find 
a control group that has the same or similar observable factors as the treated group. Heckman 
et al. (1997) show that by selecting sufficient observable factors that any two individuals with 
the same values of these factors will display no systematic differences in their reactions to the 
programme. The implied condition for the matching method to work hinges on finding the 
common support, which allows a reliable comparison. The difference in outcome of the 
control group and treated group defined from the common support region is attributed to the 
programme impact. The common support region can be constructed by using various 
matching techniques such as propensity score matching, nearest neighbour matching, Caliber 
and Radius matching, and Kernel matching (for technical notes, see Abadie, Drukker, Herr, & 
Imbens, 2004). 
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The selection model, on the other hand, can be an alternative to the matching methods if one 
believes that programme participation is subject to unobserved bias (Heckman, 1979; 
Heckman & Robb, 1985, 1986). This approach relies on an exclusion restriction, which 
requires a variable that determines participation in the programme but not the outcome of the 
programme. In contrast to matching, the selection model accounts for the unobserved factors 
that determine the programme participation. If the assumption of selection on the observables 
fails, i.e., the conditional independent between the potential outcomes and programme 
assignment no longer holds, the alternative assumption that there is at least an unobserved 
factor that affects both the potential outcome and programme participation. Programme 
impact can be identified using the sample selection model in the presence of sample selection 
bias because of non-random missing data (Heckman, 1979). Since the two approaches rely on 
two competing assumptions, a comparison of these two approaches can be extremely 
informative in understanding the advantages and drawbacks of these methods (Blundell & 
Dias, 2000).  
 
Other methods such as the regression discontinuity design and instrumental variable (IV) 
identification strategy can also be used in impact evaluation. The main idea of the IV method 
to handle selection in the basis of unobserved factors is to find a variable that determines 
programme participation but does not influence the outcome. The instrumental variable 
affects the observed outcome only indirectly through the participation decision, hence causal 
effects can be identified through a variation in this instrumental variable (Imbens & Angrist, 
1994; Rubin, Imbens, & Angrist, 1996). Blundell and Dias (2000) and Caliendo (2006) show 
that a valid instrument has to satisfy the following three conditions: i) the instrumental 
variable determines programme participation; ii) the instrumental variable is uncorrelated 
with the programme outcomes; and iii) the instrumental variable is not completely determined 
by the observable factors in the model.  
 
Regression discontinuity design (RRD), on the other hand, can be seen as a particular type of 
IV identification strategy because RRD uses discontinuities in the selection process to identify 
causal effects. In RRD, programme participation depends on some observed instrumental 
variable, Z , according to a known and deterministic rule such as 1D   if Z Z  and 0D   
otherwise (Heckman, LaLonde, & Smith, 1999). Similar to IV method, RRD requires that Z  
has an indirect impact on the outcome through D . This indirect impact is the causal effect to 
be identified. Caliendo (2006) notes that RRD relies on the assumption that selection is on 
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observable characteristics only and there is no common support for participants and non-
participants making matching impossible. Moreover, the selection rule is assumed to be 
deterministic and known, therefore the variation in the relevant variable Z  is exogenous 
(Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001).  
 
Another popular evaluation method, which requires data before and after the programme 
implementation, is named „Difference-in-Differences‟ (DinD). This approach can be used to 
recover the average effect of the microcredit programme on those individuals who entered the 
programme. Under the critical assumptions that there is a common time effect across groups 
and no compositional changes within each group, DinD allows one to estimate the coefficient 
of the average effect of the treatment on the treated, ATT (Blundell & Dias, 2000). The main 
advantage of this method is that it allows for the selection bias of the programme based on 
some unobservable factors. However, the method has two disadvantages. The first is the 
requirement of the data set. Panel data that are collected before and after the programme are 
required. The second is the time invariant assumption of the unobservable variables that affect 
the programme selection that are unchanged over time and the programme states. This 
assumption might be violated under non-experimental data in which the households in both 
groups are systematically different and unbalanced in the pre-programme attributes, which are 
possibly related to the outcome (Ashenfelter & Card, 1985; Athey & Imbens, 2006). Violation 
of the time invariant assumption is likely to happen when income growth differs across 
household groups due to the initial endowments such as physical capital or human capital. For 
example, given capital constraint, households that borrow a microloan to generate income 
expect to have higher income growth than non-borrowing households. Borrowing households 
have to generate the income that is expected at least to cover the loan plus interest at the 
repayment time, but non-borrowing households may not expect their income to grow at the 
same rate as the borrowing household. As a result, there are some changes over time in the 
unobserved factors that affect the households‟ participation in a microcredit.  
 
In general, impact evaluation methods confront numerous possible biases due to the 
incomplete information problem and the fact the coefficients of the programme impacts rely 
on their own assumptions and data availability in order to become consistent estimates. Smith 
(2004) notes that matching methods make no sense without rich data, IV methods make no 
sense without good instruments, and the DinD method makes no sense when the treatment 
selection depends on transitory rather than permanent shocks. Therefore, given the available 
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data of an intervention programme, the estimates of programme impacts are sensitive to the 
methods and the inferences about the impacts have to be justified with their own assumptions. 
A summary of impact evaluation methods and a summary of impact evaluation methods using 
survey data are documented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
3.3.2 Impact Evaluation at Household Level 
Studies on impact evaluation of microcredit programmes in the rural credit market have been 
recently documented, and compared with the well-established programme evaluation in 
labour markets. However, the essence of evaluating the impacts of microcredit programmes 
has increasingly drawn the attention of researchers due to its importance in providing inputs 
to policy makers in designing poverty reduction strategies in developing countries. As Pitt and 
Khandker (1998) note, very few studies have attempted to identify the causal effects of 
programme participation in microfinance in Bangladesh in late 1980s. Currently, the number 
of impact evaluation studies has expanded across developing countries where microfinance 
programmes exist. This section reviews the impact evaluation of microcredit programmes 
focusing on studies of impact evaluation at the household level that applied one of the related 
impact evaluation methods described in the earlier section.     
 
In an attempt to assess the impacts of microfinance, the Assessing Impact Microenterprise 
Services Project (AIMS) funded by USAID‟s AIMS Project, seeks to produce a complete 
picture of the overall impacts of microfinance programmes at individual, household and 
community levels (Hulme, 2000; Mosley & Hulme, 1998). Given large financial and human 
resources, the AIMS project aims to provide longitudinal impact assessments of 
microenterprise credit as well develop a low-cost impact assessment tool to keep track of 
microfinance impact (Alexander, 2001). Using a wide range of panel data for qualitative and 
quantitative assessment methods, the project‟s coverage includes the Lima, Peru, Ahmedabad, 
India, and Zimbabwe rural credit markets. In addition to testing the hypothesis of microcredit 
programme impacts at different levels, the AIMS project further introduces the concept of 
household economic portfolio model, which allows one to seek the overall impact of the 
social programme (Hulme, 2000).  
 
In obtaining the programme impact, the AIMS projects collected data at several points of time 
that  allows for “before versus after” comparison. The procedures followed two steps. First, 
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the team selected clients randomly from the lists provided by the programmes. Then they 
identified the control group. Different selection methods of identifying the control group were 
applied for different microcredit programmes. Following this method, researches conducted in 
India and Peru used the control group as a random sample drawn from non-participants in the 
same regions who met programme eligibility criteria. In Zimbabwe, the control group was 
selected by a „random walk procedure‟ in which they set off in a given direction to find non-
client households for the control group (Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 211). A wide range of 
impact indicators was obtained from calculating the difference between the baseline data and 
the survey data two years later; the approach is believed to adequately control for both non-
random participation and non-random programme placement. However, if the programme 
placement is ill-controlled the programme impact will be subject to bias due to unobservable 
variables that possibly change over time.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of Impact Evaluation Methods 
Method Key features Strength/Weakness 
Sample survey Collect quantifiable data through questionnaires. A 
random sample and a matched control group are used 
to measure predetermined indicators before and after 
intervention. 
High scale of applicability and representative 
High quantification and data standardisation 
High ability to isolate and measure non-project causes of change 
High cost and time scale 
High human resource requirements 
High ability to capture diversity of perceptions and negative impacts 
Rapid appraisal A range of tools and techniques developed originally 
as rapid rural appraisal (RRA). It involves the use of 
focus groups, semi-structured interviews with key 
informants, case studies, participant observation and 
secondary sources. 
Low scale of applicability and representative  
Low quantification and data standardisation 
Low ability to measure project causes of change 
High ability to capture qualitative information and causal processes 
High skilled resource requirements 
Participation observation Extended residence in a programme community by 
field researchers using qualitative techniques and mini-
scale sample surveys. 
Low scale of applicability and representative 
Low quantification and data standardisation 
High ability to capture diversity of perceptions and negative impact 
High time scale and medium cost range 
Case studies Detailed studies of a specific unit (group, locality, 
organisation) involving open-ended questions and the 
preparation of histories. 
Low scale of applicability and representative, quantification 
High ability to capture diversity of perceptions and negative impact 
Participatory learning and 
action 
The preparation by the indented beneficiaries of a 
programme of time lines, impact flow charts, village 
and resource maps, well-being and wealth ranking, 
seasonal diagrams, problem ranking and institutional 
assessments through group processes assisted by a 
facilitator. 
Low scale of applicability and representative, quantification 
Low ability to measure project causes of change 
High ability to capture diversity of perceptions and negative impact 
Sources: adapted from Hulme (2000) and Montgomery, Davies, Saxena and Ashley (1996) 
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Table 3.3 Summary of Programme Impact Evaluation Methods Using Survey Data 
Method Key features Strengths/Weaknesses 
Randomisation design Experimental type of data  
Programme impact can be calculated directly from the control 
and treated groups 
Randomisation can solve missing data problem 
Randomisation design still suffers from attribution problems 
Matching Non-experimental type of data 
Programme impact can be recovered from the coefficients 
under common support region 
Various matching techniques developed can be used to obtain 
the impact coefficient 
Matching require relatively rich data to construct the common 
support region 
Sample selection Non-experimental type of data 
Programme impact can be estimated under selection of 
unobserved factors that determine participation decision 
Sample selection model can solve selection bias of participating 
decision of unobserved factors due to non-experimental 
sampling design 
 
Instrumental variable Non-experimental type of data 
Programme impact can be estimated under selection of 
unobserved factors that affect participation decision 
Instrumental variable can solve bias of participating decision 
based on unobserved factors due to non-experimental sampling 
design 
 
Regression discontinuity Non-experimental type of data 
Programme impact can be recovered from the coefficients 
under observed factors that determine the selection rule 
Regression discontinuity can solve bias of participating decision 
based on observed factors affecting the decision rule  
Difference-in-Differences Non-experimental and panel type of data 
Programme impact can be calculated from the control and 
treated groups under time invariant assumption and no 
compositional changes within each group 
Difference-in-difference method can solve problems related to 
selection bias and attribution 
Difference-in-difference method requires two period data and 
relies on two underlying assumptions 
Sources: adapted from Hulme (2000) and Montgomery et al. (1996)
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Pitt and Khandker (1998) provide a major study of microcredit programme impacts on poor 
households in Bangladesh, the world‟s prevalent and extensive microfinance programme 
operations. To address the sample selection bias such as non-random programme placement 
bias and self-selection bias, the authors constructed a quasi-experimental design survey, 
which is based on the interaction between participation eligibility and programme availability 
to provide identification for the estimation strategy. Hence the survey design alternates the 
instrumental variable approach. Following this, the impacts of group-based microcredit 
programmes on a set of household behaviours such as labour supply, children‟s schooling and 
intra-household distribution of resources such as household consumption, were estimated 
using the sophisticated econometric method called WESML-LIML-FE
14
. The results indicate 
that microcredit not only has a direct and significant effect on households‟ material poverty 
by increasing the households‟ annual consumption, but also indirectly contributes to the 
households‟ well-being by improving children‟s schooling and the labour market supply 
including self-employment. Moreover, the impacts of microcredit are more favourable to 
empowerment because credit provided to women seems to influence all the outcomes 
investigated more significantly than credit provided to men. 
 
In a similar quasi-experimental design, Coleman (1999) makes use of a unique survey to 
address selection bias in assessing the impact of microcredit programmes in Northeast 
Thailand. The method drew on the fact that most microcredit activities operated by village 
banks start in a narrowly defined area and then expand their coverage to similar villages 
elsewhere. The author first compared the household outcomes between the participants and 
non-participants in „treatment villages‟ where the microcredit programmes were already 
available. Following this, the author then compared between the participants and non-
participants in „control villages‟ where the programmes would be introduced later. 
Controlling for village fixed effect to identify the treatment and the control groups, the idea of 
including non-participants in the sample and combining with the use of village fixed effects is 
to control for possible endogenous programme placement. Following this, the impact is 
obtained by comparing the outcome of households with microcredit access to the outcomes of 
households that are eligible but not living in a treatment village. Contrary to Pitt and 
Khandker (1998), Coleman (1999) provides remote evidence of microcredit programme 
impacts on the poor households. The impact is insignificant on a set of outcomes such as 
                                                 
14
WESML-LIML-FE stands for Weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood, Limited information 
maximum likelihood and village fixed effects. 
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physical assets, savings and expenditure. In fact, the impact is significant and negative on 
expenditure for men‟s health care, and positive and significant on women‟s high-interest debt.    
 
A comparison of the Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Coleman‟s (1999) studies provides useful 
insights into the impact evaluation of microcredit programmes. Unable to identify reliable 
instrumental variables, both studies applied a quasi-experimental design based on the 
interaction between the programme‟s participation eligibility and programme availability to 
correct for programme placement and self-selection bias. These studies, however, provide 
contradictory conclusions of the programme impacts. Unlike Pitt and Khandker (1998), who 
estimated marginal impacts using a cumulative amount of borrowing variable and conclude a 
positive impact of microcredit programme on outcomes care and education, Coleman (1999) 
estimated average impacts using a membership dummy and found no significant impact of the 
microcredit programme. Not only has Pitt and Khandker‟s (1998) study been criticised 
because the „exogenous‟ eligibility criterion is violated in many cases, for example, 
households that should not have been eligible for loans are actually programme participants 
(Morduch, 1998), Coleman‟s (1999) study also faces similar limitations. However, under 
certain conditions of microcredit programme implementation, both methods can be 
appropriately applied to investigate impact.  
 
Khandker (2005) does not rely on a quasi-experiment but makes use of the panel data
15
, that 
combines two time periods to strengthen identification. The availability of panel data helps to 
eliminate the potential source of bias, the unobserved but fixed household and individual 
characteristics that simultaneously affect microcredit borrowing and outcomes in Pitt and 
Khankder (1998). Khandker (2005) points out that individual and village level effects may not 
be fixed hence sources of endogeneity likely remain. Therefore, the author included 
interactions of a pair of dummies differentiated along the time dimension, i.e., whether 
household members of either gender could borrow in 1991/1992, and the same for 1998/1999, 
like the eligibility to borrow criterion. The findings of the household-level fixed-effects 
suggest that male borrowing has no significant effect, but female borrowing has a significant 
positive effect on the per capita consumption outcome. Despite strong arguments and 
evidence proposed by Roodman and Morduch (2009), Pitt and Khandker (1998) and 
                                                 
15
Khandker (2005) constructed the panel data from the World Bank 1991/1992 survey and a follow-up survey in 
1998/1999. Not all households in 1991/1992 survey were revisited because of attrition and split households 
found in 1998/1999 survey. 
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Khandker (2005) remain the most visible empirical evidence of microcredit programme 
impacts on the poor at the household level. 
 
A follow-up study of Coleman (1999) by Coleman (2006) attempts to improve his own 
estimation to better control for self-selection bias by dividing the participants into rank-and-
file (from poorer households to richer households) and committee members. Relying on the 
same survey strategy, but with more variables introduced to control for village fixed effects to 
identify the treatment and the control groups, the idea again is to include nonparticipants in 
the sample and to combine these with the use of village fixed effects to control for possible 
endogenous programme placement. The author finds a significant difference between ordinary 
and committee participants. The impact of microcredit on ordinary members‟ welfare was 
either insignificant or even negative, but the impact on committee members‟ outcomes such 
as income and production expenses, was positive, implying that most benefits of microcredit 
programmes were captured by the less poor rather than the poorest.  
 
Other studies of microcredit impacts include Alexander (2001) in Peru, Copestake, Bhalotra 
and Johnson (2001) in Zambia, Mosley (2001) in Bolivia. Although different methods of 
quasi-experimental design survey and different estimation strategies were used, the authors‟ 
empirical results produce evidence that all the programmes studied had positive impacts at the 
household level such as incomes, physical assets and expenditure, hence on poverty reduction. 
For instance, Copestake et al. (2001) use multiple data collection methods involving 
questionnaires, focus group interviews and key informant interviews to mitigate selection bias 
in impact evaluation. The authors conclude that the positive impacts of microcredit on the 
borrowers‟ business profits or household income are strictly associated with the receipt of a 
second loan. In addition, Mosley (2001) indicates that microcredit might be successful in 
reducing the poverty of those close to the poverty line but inefficient in reducing extreme 
poverty.  
 
Some studies applied the Heckman two-step technique to tackle selection bias problems by 
simultaneously estimating the outcome regression equation and participation equation. Zaman 
(1999) assesses the impact of the Bangladesh microcredit programme on reducing 
consumption poverty in Bangladesh. Following Heckman‟s (1978) model, Zaman first 
identifies factors driving participation with the probit estimate, which helps to construct a 
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household-specific selectivity variable. Subsequently, the selectivity variable is added to the 
outcome equation to control for selection bias. The empirical analysis reveals that the impact 
of microcredit on consumption poverty is a function of borrowing beyond a certain loan 
threshold and is contingent on how poor the household is at the beginning of borrowing. 
Similarly, Sarangi (2007) employed Heckman‟s two-step technique to examine whether 
microcredit programmes in India can increase the borrowers‟ income and both studies show 
that microcredit has such potential. Sarangi (2007) showed a positive effect of programme 
participation by an increase in the income of the poor household as the participants in the 
programme get easy access to credit from the group savings fund. However, the impact is 
negligible for households at the lower end of the income distribution.  
 
Though microcredit programme impacts on poor households have been thoroughly examined 
in Bangladesh, Thailand, India and some African countries, few attempts have been made to 
evaluate the desired impacts of microcredit programmes in Vietnam. Most studies on 
microcredit elaborate on the issues of development and regulations; a few studies focus on the 
programme impact on target households and hence poverty reduction. Nguyen  (2008) applies 
the instrumental variable approach to estimate the impact of the microcredit programme 
provided nationwide by VBSP. The empirical findings show that the programme has a 
positive and significant impact on total expenditure per capita, expenditure on health care and 
expenditure on education of the participating households. The programme also helps to 
increase household income and income from crop production. As the instrumental variable 
approach is subject to identification problems, Nguyen‟s (2008) findings still leave room for 
studies to investigate the robustness of the impact of microcredit programmes in Vietnam. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
Understanding the factors influencing credit access both from the borrower and lender helps 
improve households‟ accessibility to credit. Asymmetric information complicates the lending 
process in the credit market as lenders judge borrowers based on the borrowers‟ 
characteristics. This is even true when empirical studies showed that under collateral-free 
lending, the observed characteristics such as household head‟s age, gender, education and 
land holding status, etc., are significantly defined in the determinants for credit accessibility. 
The lending practice is even more complicated when considering the rural credit market in 
which the formal and formal credit sectors coexist to provide more choices for the borrowers. 
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While formal and informal credit‟s coexistence is prevalent in the rural credit market, their 
interaction is often ignored, particularly in the Vietnam rural credit market. Consequently, 
studies recognised the influence of the informal credit sector to credit accessibility in the 
formal sector but few studies adequately address the issues in the literature.  
 
Empirical studies also showed that accessibility to microcredit programmes undeniably has 
the programmes‟ desired impacts on the poor. However, the empirical evidence indicates that 
the impact of microcredit programmes is controversial because of the missing data problem. 
Impact evaluation inferences are subject to their evaluation methods and assumptions; 
different impact evaluation methods depend on their own specific assumption to resolve the 
missing data problem. This also implies different methods of data collection to encounter the 
missing data problems whereby a chosen econometric evaluation method performs better than 
others for programme impact assessment. This is one reason why inconsistent results of 
impact evaluation for microcredit programmes across countries arise. In Vietnam, few 
empirical studies have documented a positive impact of microcredit programmes; however, it 
is necessary to re-evaluate the impact as many time varying factors influence households‟ 
behaviours in using microloans and their outcomes.  
 
Our study will contribute to the existing microcredit field in twofold. First, it explicitly 
addresses the accessibility to microcredit of rural households under conditions that formal and 
informal credit sectors interact in the credit market. Secondly, our expected findings will add 
more evidence to enrich the field of impact evaluation for microcredit programmes.   
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    Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
This chapter provides the theory of the credit rationing and credit demand for households. The 
chapter consists of three subsections. Section 4.1 begins with the standard assumptions of 
credit rationing in Stiglitz and Weiss‟s (1981) model to determine how asymmetric 
information creates the problem of credit rationing in the market. Given credit constraint, the 
household demand for credit is derived using the standard Ramsey growth model to show that 
external credit can improve a household‟s utility via production and consumption, and hence 
increase household welfare. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 discuss the empirical models on accessibility 
to microcredit and the impact evaluation of microcredit programmes, respectively. In 
addition, estimation strategies and hypothesis testing are presented in each section in order to 
facilitate the research findings.  
 
4.1 Determinants of Accessibility to Microcredit 
4.1.1 Model Specification 
To link the credit rationing and credit demand ideas above, we exploit McFadden‟s (1972) 
discrete choice theory. The rural market is generalised by a demand for and a supply curve of 
credit in which the households under credit constraint want to obtain a loan from the credit 
suppliers. Though the central idea of credit rationing caused by information asymmetry 
persists, the rural credit market also has its specific characteristics such as the segmented 
coexistence of the formal and informal sectors and highly subsidised interest rate. To model 
the rural credit market under credit rationing, first the demand for credit is derived from 
attributes of choices that are specific to the borrowers‟ decisions and the household‟s socio-
economic characteristics. Next, the supply of credit is defined as a screening procedure in 
which the credit providers use the available information about the applicants to decide 
whether to grant all the credit that the applicant applied for or partially reduce the credit 
amount, or totally reject the application (Zeller, 1994). The idea of credit rationing in the rural 
credit market can be established in the following model.   
 
 1 1 1 1 = f( , , , ) FL X H M G                            (4.16) 
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Where the formal loan amount, FL , underlying a reduced form of demand and supply credit, 
is a function of vectors of individual characteristics 1X , household characteristics 1H , micro-
credit institution characteristics 1M , and geographic factors 1G . The estimable form of (4.16) 
is linearly specified as follow: 
 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = + + + +  u        FL X H M G                          (4.17) 
 
The reduced form of the loan amount (equation 4.17) is rarely estimated in empirical research 
because the expected loan amount is a conditional function of the probability of participation 
in the lending. That causes the estimated results for FL  for less desirable properties, 
particularly the estimators, to be significantly biased due to sample selection (Heckman, 
1979). To overcome the problem, a binary choice variable B  is introduced into the model to 
capture the effect of the probability of participation in the formal credit. Equation (4.17) is 
rewritten as:    
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = + + + + +  B u         FL X H M G               (4.18) 
 
where 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , and 1  are estimators of the exogenous vectors defined earlier, the error 
term 1u  is assumed to be normally distributed, and   is the estimator of the choice 
variable B . The choice variable of the credit demand equation (4.18) is derived from the 
utility theory in the following steps.  
 
First, the individual‟s decision to apply for a loan, where B  takes the value of 1 if one choice 
is made (borrowed) and 0 otherwise. Let i0U  and i1U  denote the utilities of the two choices, 
z‟i0 and z‟i1 vectors of characteristics of the alternatives as perceived by the 
thi individual and 
g‟i  a vector of socio-economic characteristics of the 
thi  individual. The utility functions can 
be expressed in linear forms with the error terms as follows: 
 
i0i0 i0 0 i0 i 0 i0U =U +e =a +z d+g t +e                          (4.19a) 
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i1i1 i1 1 i1 i 1 i1U =U +e =a +z d+g t +e                          (4.19b) 
 
Next, let iP represent the probability that B  takes the value 1; the individual‟s choice is made 
if i1 i0U U  and B  is 0 otherwise. The probability of a household‟s access to microcredit can 
be expressed in probability terms as follow: 
 
    i1 i0Pr B=1   Pr U U  = 1 0 1 0 1 0 i1 i0Pr[(a a ) ( ) ( ) (e e )]i i i       z z d g t t    (4.20) 
 
Then, let *B  denote the unobserved utility that an individual makes a decision. Though *B  is 
unobservable, it can be used to explain the relationship between an individual‟s choice and a 
set of variables that contribute to that choice. *B can be expressed as follows: 
 
*
*
i1 i0=
=
B 1 if B =U U >0
B 0 otherwise
={B 
                             (4.21) 
 
Equations (4.19) and (4.20) can be rewritten as follows:  
 
 *
i 1 0 i1 i0 i 1 0 i1 i0a a e ez z d g φ φB ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )                                (4.22) 
  
Rewriting equation (4.22) in a short form by replacing the terms in brackets and specifying 
different factors namely individual, household, microcredit and socio-geographic factors 
influencing the household decision as follows:  
 
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 = + + + +  B u        X H M G               (4.23) 
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Subsequently, we can express the equation of the formal loan amount ( FL ) via the latent 
variable, *B  as follows: 
 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = + + + + +  B u         FL X H M G               (4.24) 
 
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 = + + + +  B u        X H M G  
 
 * = 1 if 0B B   
 
 = 0 otherwiseB  
 
The Heckman (1979) two-step method is able to resolve the problem of selection bias 
possibly present in the system of equations (4.24). Using the inverse Mills ratio hence yields 
unbiased and consistent estimators. However, demand theory suggests that there are other 
complementary and/or substitute sources of credit that might likely alter the demand of formal 
microcredit of the households. Hence one should take into account the economic impact of 
other sources of credit in the household decision making. The most conventional alternative 
for formal microcredit is generally considered as informal credit although this alternative 
takes different forms in different countries. In Thailand, for instance, informal credit can be 
found in the form of small collateral-free and interest-free loans between friends and relatives 
or loans from moneylenders with no collateral requirements but a relatively high interest rate 
(Giné, 2005). Other types of informal credit in the form of agricultural inputs such as seeds, 
fertilizers, animal feeds, etc., provided by local suppliers are prevalent in the rural financial 
market in Vietnam (Pham & Izumida, 2002; Pham & Lensink, 2007). Madestam (2009) 
further puts this idea into a more sophisticated theory for informal finance that provides 
direction for empirical researchers in finding policy recommendations for rural finance 
development. This motivated our study to include the informal sector in our model based on 
the common notion that credit rationing in the formal sector nurtures the existence of the 
informal form of credit in the rural credit market.  
 
The fact that a large proportion of the households that are unable to access the formal form of 
microcredit are likely to seek sources of finance elsewhere is persistent (Bell et al., 1997). The 
demand for other sources of credit, so called informal credit, exists in almost every rural 
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credit market in developing countries as documented in a number of studies
16
. This implies 
that households choose the formal source first before resorting to the informal one as an 
alternative. This view is particularly true where the formal sector is designed to supply cheap 
credit to the rural market and the rural area is characterised as good infrastructure but the 
transaction cost is considered relatively low compared with the informal one. By contrast, in 
Vietnam and some Asian countries where the rural area is characterised by poor infrastructure 
and the rural market seems to be segmented, the transaction cost is considered high for 
households to obtain a loan hence the prevalence of the informal sector as the alternative. As 
Kochar (1997b) argues, informal loans particularly loans from friends and relatives, may be 
cheaper than formal loans in rural India hence the author suggests that the informal sector can 
also be the sector of choice for households.  
 
Another reason for informal credit to coexist is when the formal microcredit provider imposes 
a credit limit on the loan contract. If the actual loan is less than the amount demanded, 
households find themselves with insufficient capital for agricultural production or other 
economic activities; borrowing more money from informal lenders is the conventional 
solution. The existence of informal credit is inevitable in the rural credit market and it is 
argued that, despite its importance, the coexistence of formal and informal credit markets has 
not received much attention because there has been little theoretical and empirical work on 
this field of microfinance (Madestam, 2009). Therefore, research on formal credit in the rural 
credit market should take into account the effect of informal credit. 
 
The basic argument on specifying the econometric model is based on the fact that formal 
credit is systematic and mandated in the credit market but informal credit is discrete and 
prevalent at the local level hence the rural credit market mechanism is on the side of the 
greater formal sector. Therefore, modelling the formal as an endogenous part of the informal 
may lead to a false interpretation of generalisations about the market mechanism. Given the 
specific characteristics of the rural credit market in the MRD in Vietnam, the informal loan is 
considered an intangible endowment of rural households and the informal credit takes various 
forms hence there are no corresponding specifications for the formal credit compared with its 
counterpart. In addition, the informal loan is believed to be less constraining than the formal 
loan therefore its reduced form is able to reflect the informal credit without imposing the 
                                                 
16
For more evidence, see Udry(1990, 1994) in Northern Nigeria; Okurut, et al. (2005) in Uganda and Okurut 
(2006) for cases in Africa; Aleem (1990) and Kochar (1997b) in the Middle East; Pham & Izumida 
(2002),Giné(2005), and Pham & Lensink (2007) in Asia. 
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selection equation. This means rural households normally hold a certain amount of formal 
credit at any period of time but their desire to obtain a loan from the formal sector depends on 
the formal regulation in the credit market.  
 
To account for informal credit in the model, the informal loan amount is included in the 
system of equations (4.22). Without losing generality, the informal loan amount is allowed to 
alter the household‟s decision to borrow formal microcredit but not alter the amount of formal 
microcredit. The reason is that formal lenders practically do not consider informal loans in the 
lending process and this belief proves that the informal credit is treated more often 
exogenously or separately from the formal loan in many studies (see Gan et al., 2007; 
Mohamed, 2003; Petrick, 2005; Pham & Izumida, 2002; Zeller, 1994). On the other hand, 
allowing these two credit sectors to interact directly with each other under a rationing process 
produces problems in deriving a joint distribution assumption for their correlated error terms. 
It also helps to relax the trivariate distributions of the error terms in our model. However, if 
these two credit sectors were completely separate, treating them separately one actually 
ignores the fact that formal and informal sources of microcredit coexist in the rural credit 
market. Some empirical evidence documented that an informal loan influences the 
determinants of access to formal microcredit that allows us to have more control over the 
unobserved factors in the informal loan and these unobserved factors are actually directed 
toward the determinants of access to the formal loan equation
17
. This consideration makes the 
empirical model in this study differ from the other empirical studies in the microcredit 
literature and particularly a microcredit study in Vietnam. Since informal lenders do not use a 
screening mechanism as formal lenders do, it is reasonable to assume that the informal credit 
is a function of a household‟s characteristics that the informal lender can observe. The amount 
of informal credit ( IFL) function takes the form:  
 
 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 = + + + +  u        IFL X H M G                                 (4.25) 
 
Incorporate equation (4.25 in to the system of equations (4.24), we have (4.26) as follows: 
 
                                                 
17
There is another possibility to model the direct interaction between formal and informal that we include formal 
in informal loans in a system of simultaneous equations. However, more assumptions and specifications are 
required for the model to be empirically estimable.   
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 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = + + + + +  B u         FL X H M G                             (4.26-1) 
 
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 = + + + +  B u          X H M G IFL                            (4.26-2) 
 
 
*1  0B if B   
 
0 B otherwise  
 
 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 = + + + +  u        IFL X H M G                            (4.26-3) 
 
The above model possesses some economic interpretation. First, the amount of informal credit 
is specified to capture the flexibility of informal credit in which the screening mechanism is 
rather informal, therefore no selection bias is involved in this process. Next, the informal 
credit is considered as an intangible endowment of the household and it is believed to be less 
constraining therefore it can be represented in a reduced form. On the specification issue, the 
model can capture different phenomena of economists‟ interest. It encounters selection bias in 
determining the determinants of the formal microcredit under a credit rationing condition. It 
also allows informal and formal microcredit to interact via the latent function of the 
household‟s choice.  
 
The model specification provides two main advantages over how the household makes a 
choice among credit sectors. First, the model facilitates the estimation strategy that a 
particular choice is rather conditional on the other choice. For example, households borrow 
from informal because they are not able to borrow from banks for some observed and 
unobserved factors. This is particularly true in the Vietnam rural credit market where poor 
households often lack working capital and most likely face credit constraint. Taking that into 
account, the model gives a better explanation of the household choice by specifying a 
conditional relationship between the formal loan decision and informal loan. Second, the 
model also overcomes the difficulty of multi-choice modelling that tries to capture more than 
two choices, e.g., borrowing from formal, borrowing from informal, borrowing from both 
credit sectors and non-borrowing. Because the estimation strategy for the multi-choice model 
needs the relationships among the choices to be defined, this task is very complicated and 
may not be possible, in practice, due to multi-loans, which the households may have 
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borrowed over a period of time. In fact, studies trying to estimate a multi-choice model based 
on an assumption that choices are irrelevant to other sets of choices tend to ignore the 
coexistence of and interaction among formal and informal credit in the rural credit market.  
 
4.1.2 Estimation Strategies 
The system of equation (4.26) is rewritten as follows: 
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 = + + + +  u        IFL X H M G                  (4.27-1) 
 
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 = + + + +  B u          X H M G IFL                            (4.27-2) 
 
 
*1  0B if B   
 
0 B otherwise  
 
 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 = + + + + +  B u         FL X H M G                 (4.27-3) 
 
Since IFL  is an endogenous variable in the equation (4.27-2), this simultaneous equation 
system is referred to as the probit model with continuous endogenous variable at the right 
hand side (probit with continuous endogenous variable RHS), therefore, the standard probit or 
OLS method can give biased estimates and joint estimation of this equation system is needed 
in order to obtain consistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). River and Vuong propose a useful 
two-stage conditional maximum likelihood method to estimate this system. Their method 
provides some advantages over the standard 2SLS since it is more efficient and it gives direct 
estimates of the parameters of interest and their correct asymptotic standard error (Pham & 
Izumida, 2002; Pham, 2009). The standard statistical test can be applied to test whether the 
endogeneity problem exists by testing the correlation of the 3u and 2u in equation systems 
(4.27-1 & 4.27-2). On the other hand, since B is an endogenous variable in equation (4.27-3), 
this binary endogenous variable in a simultaneous equation system (4.27-2 & 4.27-3) is  
known as the model of selectivity (Heckman, 1979; Lee, 1983). Therefore, the coefficients i , 
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i , i , i , i  (i=1,3),   and λ  in the system of equations (4.26) can be estimated using the 
following steps: 
Step 1. Regress IFL  on exogenous variables to obtain the residual  . 
Step 2. Plug  in to equation (4.27-2) as a regressor and run the standard probit to get 
the vectors of consistent coefficients 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , and  .  
This method also provides a simple test for the endogeneity of IFL  by conducting the familiar 
t-test for the coefficient   where the null hypothesis 0H : 0  . If 0H  holds, this means 1u  
and 2u  are uncorrelated, endogeneity is not a problem and IFL  is an exogenous variable. 
Once all the coefficients 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , and   in the probit model are well treated, we 
estimate the sample selection model using the following procedures:   
Step 3. Estimate the probit model for the probability of borrowing from formal credit, 
then calculate the inverse Mills ratio of the probit model.  
Step 4. Take into account the inverse Mills ratio in the loan amount, equation (4.27-3) 
and run the regression to obtain the coefficients and the coefficient, λˆ of the 
inverse Mills ratios.    
 
Using the inverse Mills ratio to correct sample selection bias yields consistent coefficients for 
the determinants of access to the credit model. In addition, White‟s heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors will also be used in the weighted least square regression to correct 
for asymptotic bias in λˆ  in step 4. Again, a t-test for the presence of sample selection is 
applied similar to the endogeneity problem in step 2.  
 
Equation (4.27-3) is the main equation of interest in which the formal loan amount in log 
form is explained by a set of independent variables and the error term, 1u . The error term 1u is 
assumed to be normally distributed. Selection equation (4.27-2) is called the latent equation 
because its dependent variable is unobservable. Only the choice variable B  is observed when 
the latent value is believed to be positive, i.e. a choice is made. This system of equations can 
be estimated by the standard sample selection Heckman model if the latent equation is well 
specified. 
 
Since IFL  is assumed to be endogenous, which influences the borrowing behaviour of the 
household in the formal credit market, IFL  has to be treated before the above equations are 
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estimated. This problem forms another system of equations (4.27-1) and (4.27-2) to be 
estimated. Cameron and Trivedi (2009) suggest estimating the two equations (4.27-1) and 
(4.27-2) simultaneously using instrumental variables for IFL , so called ivprobit model. 
Equation (4.27-2) might be refered to as the “structural” equation in this system. This 
structural equation is the main interest and the other equation, called the reduced-form 
equation, serves only as a source of identifying instruments for IFL . The reduced form 
equation explains the variation in the endogeneous variable by including instrumental 
variables that are excluded from the structural equation.  
 
In general, the model can be estimated by different methods depending on its distributional 
assumptions. Since access to formal credit is a binary variable and an informal loan is a 
continuous variable, their covariate error terms can be normalised to 1. Consistently, the 
model can be estimated by the conditional maximum likelihood method where the likelihood 
function is derived from the joint distribution of the error terms. Under a bivariate normal 
distribution, the conditional maximum likelihood method outperforms the ordinary 2SLS for 
two reasons. First, there is no requirement for the functional forms to be specified for the 
model as long as there are valid instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity and to 
achieve identification in the simultaneous equations. Second, the conditional maximum 
likelihood method fits the model by recursive algrorithms to obtain the coefficients with full 
observations in the sample hence more information will be included in the covariates in the 
model for the ordinary 2SLS method
18
.  
 
The bivariate normal distribution of the error terms in equations (4.27-1) and (4.27-2) can be 
specified following the standard procedures introduced by River and Vuong (1988) and 
explained in detail in Wooldridge (2002). Since 2u and 3u  are correlated and form the 
bivariate normality of 2 3( , )u u  in a form 2 3 23 3 1|u u u e  , and 1e  is normally distributed and 
independent of 2u  and 3u , a test for exogeneity of the endogeneous variable, which is 
equivalent to testing the null hypothesis 0 23: 0H    of the error terms can be performed 
using an asymptotic t-test (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002). This type of model 
can be estimated using IV probit model. The valid instruments must significantly explain IFL  
but not for the selection equation. To find the covariate that not only serves as the instrument 
                                                 
18
Roodman (2009) introduces the cmp command which provides a flexible way to estimate different types of 
econometric models in Stata using the maximum likelihood estimation method.  
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but also helps determine the dependent endogenous IFL , we include more exogeneous 
variables into the reduced equation then estimate the simultaneous equations by the 
conditional recursive mixed process (Roodman, 2009).  
 
Under similar assumptions for the joint distribution of 2u and 1u , the correlation between 2u  
and 1u  can be estimated following the Heckman (1979) twostep method. First, run a probit 
model of selection equation (4.27-2) using all obsevations in the sample. The estimates of the 
probit model are then used to construct consistent estimates of the inverse Mills ratio term. 
Next, using OLS to estimate the outcome equation, which is the equation (4.27-3), with the 
inverse Mills ratio term substituted for B  to obtain consistent and asymtotically normal 
estimators for the coefficients and  , expressing by this relationship 12 1   . The sign of 
12  indicates the correlation between the unobserved factors in the selection equation and 
outcome equation. A standard t-test of the null hypothesis that 0 : 0H   , i.e. 12 0  , can be 
carried out to test whether selection bias is present in the model (Vella, 1998; Wooldridge, 
2002).  
 
4.2 Impact Evaluation of Microcredit Programme at Household Level 
External capital can improve a household‟s utility through consumption growth hence the 
main objective of microcredit is to provide an opportunity for the households to improve their 
consumption growth over a lifetime. The remainder of this section discusses the methods of 
impact evaluation for the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) microcredit programme. 
The empirical model for impact evaluation of the VBSP microcredit programme starts with 
the derived impact model in equation (4.15) of the theoretical model. The motivation of our 
estimating strategy for the empirical model is threefold. First, appropriate measurements for 
the outcome variable are defined for the empirical models. Next, the empirical models are 
specified for the defined outcomes and the explanatory variables are modified to capture the 
effect of participation in a microcredit programme as well as the value of the microloan on the 
outcome variables. Finally, the estimation strategies and justifications are provided in order to 
establish the desired results from the empirical models.  
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4.2.1 Outcome Indicators of Impact Evaluation 
The main purpose of impact assessment of a programme is to measure the extent to which the 
programme has changed the outcomes of the agent, where the agent can be defined as group 
of individuals, households, firms, cities, etc. The outcomes of interest are theoretically derived 
from the utility function of the agent; however, utility is an unrealistic measurement to 
measure the outcomes and utility represents a broad sense of the outcomes of impact 
evaluation. To evaluate the economic impact of a programme, two common indicators have 
been widely used (Hulme, 2000). First, income indicators, including all sources of income, 
are considered indicators to changes in the outcomes of programme intervention. Although 
income captures all possible sources of the household economic activity, such as income from 
farming, non-farm, and wages, using the changes in the households‟ income as a measure of 
welfare impact may be misleading due to possible measurement error in income data 
(Coudouel, Hentschel, & Wodon, 2002).   
 
Alternatively, expenditure is considered as a set of indicators for the outcomes of a 
programme. Expenditure directly reflects the real term of the consumption function, which is 
theoretically derived from the utility function in the household consumption and growth 
model, therefore using expenditure as an indicator for the outcome is more reasonable than an 
income indicator. Moreover, consumption takes place in the daily needs of the households and 
better reflects the households‟ living standard. In this study, consumption is used as the first 
indicator of the outcome variable. Additionally, the income function is also included to 
investigate the impact of microcredit on income generating activities (such as farm and non-
farm income) of the households. 
 
4.2.2 Empirical Model 
In assessing the impact of the microcredit programme, this study follows the impact 
evaluation framework by setting participation in a microcredit programme similar to 
participation in a job training programme (Heckman & George, 1980) and a health care 
programme (Ahn & Schmidt, 1995). Generally, an individual household is defined to be 
exposed to a ditchonomous treatment state, corresponding to participating or not participating 
in a microcredit programme. This participation results in two potential outcomes for the 
individual household. Let 1D   if a household is a programme participant; 0D   otherwise. 
Let i1Y  denote the potential outcome for participants and i0Y  denote the potential outcome for 
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the other. i1Y  and i0Y  are mutually exclusive and receive values depending on the 
participation state and hence only one outcome can be observed while the other, called 
„counterfactual‟, is not. The estimated impact of the programme on the outcome of the 
i
th
household in a sample is defined as follows: 
 
1 0-i i iY Y                               (4.27) 
 
The actual observed outcome for an individual subject to the mutually exclusive nature of the 
counterfactual and independently distributed assumption (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Rubin, 
1990) can be described as follows:  
 
 i i i1 i i0Y=DY +(1-D )Y  
 
or i i0 i1 i0 i i0 iY=Y +(Y -Y )D=Y +δD                          (4.28) 
 
As discussed section 3.2, estimating equation (4.28) to obtain the coefficient of impact   
using OLS would produce a biased result due to self-selection and endogeneity problems. In 
addtion, the literature indicates that there is more than one impact estimator for any outcome 
indicator. Because our research interest is to provide relevant policy implications for the 
targeted poor households that need microcredit, we restrict our focus to estimating the 
programme impact using only the average treatment effect on the treated ( ATT ) proposed by 
Heckman et al. (1997). Following this, two types of programme impact estimator are used to 
evaluate the impact of the microcredit programme. Estimation strategies and techniques of 
these two impact estimators are discused in the following subsection.       
 
4.3.2.1 Impact Estimator for Cross-section Data: Propensity Score Matching Approach 
a) PSM estimators and assumptions 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a widely-used method in drawing causal inferences in 
programme evaluation studies. It is based on the idea of contrasting the outcomes of 
programme participants with the outcomes of „comparable‟ non-participants wherein 
differences in the outcomes between the two groups are attributed to the programme 
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(Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998). This approach has been extensively applied in impact of 
job training and education programmes (see Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Heckman et al., 1997; 
Titus, 2007). One advantage of this approach as Dehejia and Wahba (2002) pointed out that it 
can be invaluable for cross-sectional survey data because, given the nature of survey data, 
resurveying thousands of units at a later period might be costly.  
 
The PSM method matches a participant from the treatment group with a participant from the 
control group with similar observable characteristics to infer the intervention impact 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). However, there likely exist some observations of participants 
in the treatment and control groups that cannot be matched due to significant differences in 
their observable characteristics. The differences of the participants such as rich households 
with significantly high income in the control group and non-income or isolated households 
with self-subsistence characteristics in the treatment group, are called outliers. These outlier 
participants cannot be matched using their income. Including these unmatched participants in 
evaluating the impact may produce misleading interpretation. An important feature of the 
matching method is that, after the treated and control participants are matched, the unmatched 
participants in the matching process are discarded and not directly used in estimating the 
programme impact (i.e., matching is performed within the overlapping or common support 
region). Therefore, the matching algorithm can significantly reduce bias in programme 
evaluation studies (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, & Todd, 1996; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; 
Setboonsarng & Parpiev, 2008).  
 
The matching approach can be applied to estimate the impact of a microcredit programme. 
Under similar settings as in job training programmes, the PSM method first estimates the 
propensity score for each participant and non-participant in a microcredit programme on the 
basis of observed characteristics and then compares the mean outcome of the participants with 
that of the matched (similar in terms of scores) non-participants. In other words, the purpose 
of PSM is to select comparable non-borrowing households among all non-borrowing 
households to generate a control group, and then compare the outcome of the treatment and 
matched control groups. The PSM relies on the crucial assumption that, among non-
borrowers, those with the same or similar characteristics to borrowers should have the same 
outcomes as what the borrowers would have had without credit participation. This assumption 
is called „unconfoundedness‟ or „conditional independence assumption‟ (CIA) (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983). The underlying point of this assumption is that the control and treatment units 
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with the same propensity score have the same probability of assignment to the treatment as in 
randomised experiments (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). The assumption that outcome Y  is 
independent of treatment D , conditional on some covariate X  following Dawid‟s (1979) 
notation:   
 
Assumption 1. Unconfoundedness: 0 1, |Y Y D X               (4.29) 
 
Assumption 1 enables us to define the outcome distributions of participant and non-
participant groups as follows: 
 
 0 0( | , 1) ( | , 0)E Y X D E Y X D                    (4.29 a) 
 
and 1 1( | , 1) ( | , 0)E Y X D E Y X D                          (4.29 b) 
 
Equations (4.29a and 4.29b) imply that the participant outcomes have the same distribution 
that non-participants would have experienced had they participated in the programme. Like 
randomisation, matching balances the distributions of all relevant covariates X  in the 
treatment and comparison groups. Heckman et al. (1997) show that the missing counterfactual 
means can be constructed from the outcomes of non-participants and participants as follows: 
 
 0 0 0( | , 1) ( | , 0) ( | )E Y X D E Y X D E Y X                               (4.30 a) 
 
and 1 1 1( | , 1) ( | , 0) ( | )E Y X D E Y X D E Y X                               (4.30 b) 
 
In order that both sides of equations (4.30a and 4.30b) are simultaneously defined for all X, it 
is additionally assumed that:  
 
Assumption 2. Overlap: 0 <1Pr(D= 1| X) , for all X             (4.31) 
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Assumption 2 implies that the support of X is equal in both groups, i.e., 
( | 1) ( | 0)S Support X D Support X D    . This assumption prevents X from being a 
perfect predictor in the sense that one can find for each participant a counterpart in the non-
treated population and vice versa. If there are regions where the support of X does not overlap 
for the treated and non-treated individuals, matching has to be performed over the common 
support region only (Lechner, 2000). Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005) suggest that 
interpreting the estimated effects has to be redefined as the mean treatment effect of those 
individuals falling within the common support.   
 
Assumptions 1 and 2 are called „strong ignorability‟ in practice (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Heckman et al. (1997) provide an alternative assumption for estimating ATT under the 
matching method. 
 
Assumption 3. Mean Independence: 
 
 0 0( | , 1) ( | , 0)E Y X D E Y X D                               (4.32 a) 
 
and 1 1( | , 1) ( | , 0)E Y X D E Y X D                                (4.32 b) 
 
Based on the above assumptions, the mean impact of treatment on the treated can be written 
as: 
 
 
1 0( | , 1)
ATT
PSM E Y Y X D     
 
 
1 0( | , 1) [ ( | , 1) | 1]
ATT
PSM XE Y X D E E Y X D D       
 
 
1 0( | , 1) [ ( | , 0) | 1]
ATT
PSM XE Y X D E E Y X D D                            (4.33) 
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The first term in equation (4.33) can be estimated from the treatment group and the second 
term from the mean outcomes of the matched comparison group. The outer expectation is 
taken over the distribution of covariates X in the treated population (Caliendo, 2006, p. 33). 
 
According to Dehejia and Wahba (2002), the PSM method produces estimates with low bias 
if the datasets satisfy the following conditions: (i) data for the treatment and control groups 
are collected using the same questionnaire; (ii) both treatment and control groups are drawn 
from the same locality; and (iii) the dataset contains a rich set of variables relevant to 
modelling credit participation and the outcomes. The similarity of the treatment and control 
groups, in terms of observable characteristics, increases the likelihood of getting matches and 
hence reduces the bias. In addition, the PSM method allows controlling for potential bias such 
as non-placement and self-selection on observed characteristics in programme participation.  
 
In this study, various PSM estimators of the microcredit impact on expenditure and income 
are discussed. To control selection bias based on observable factors, a set of covariates will 
also be included. The set of controlling covariates should meet conditions of matching 
controlling variables discussed in Imbens (2004), Lee (2005), and Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), among others.  
 
b) Implementation strategies of Propensity Score Matching estimators 
Theoretically, the households representing one matched pair are identical to each other except 
for their loans from the microcredit programme. Therefore, matching is able to isolate the 
impact idiosyncratic factors have on the outcome variables by reducing observed 
heterogeneity between the borrowers and non-borrowers. The procedure of implementing 
PSM estimation consists of two stages. In the first stage, probit or logit is used to estimate the 
propensity score or probability of receiving a microloan conditional on control variables, and 
then stratifies individuals or households into blocks according to their scores. This procedure 
may include stepwise model selection, with repeating steps until the treatment and control 
groups are achieved. In the second stage, the estimated propensity scores will then be used 
together with various average treatment effect estimators to obtain estimates of the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  
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Different possible matching procedures can be used in such a study. One possible procedure is 
Stratification Matching, which performs matching by dividing the range of variation of the 
propensity score in intervals to ensure that within each interval test the average propensity 
scores of treated and control households do not differ (Becker & Ichino, 2002). The 
Stratification Matching algorithm, in fact, discards observations when either treated or control 
units are absent. Therefore, this method is not recommended for data in which the treated and 
control groups are unbalanced. Another possible procedure is Radius Matching. With Radius 
Matching, the average treatment effect is computed by averaging over the unit-level treatment 
effects of the treated where the control unit(s) within a pre-defined radius of propensity 
score(s) is/are matched to a treated unit. If there is more than one control unit within a radius, 
the average outcome of those control units is used. This approach can avoid bad matches and 
can overcome the drawback of stratification matching, so, the quality of matching rises 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Given the dataset, the smaller the radius, the better the quality 
matching becomes since matched control units and the treated units have close scores. 
However, Radius Matching uses those treated units that have control matches within a radius, 
so if the radius is very small, many treated units are not matched and hence dropped. 
Therefore, the ATT by the radius matching estimator is no longer representative of the 
population of the treated units (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
Instead, other variants in matching estimators are applied to estimate programme impact. 
Kernel Matching is used to match all treated with a weighted average of all controls with 
weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity score of treated 
and controls (Arun, Imai, & Sinha, 2006). Becker and Ichino (2002) show that Kernel 
Matching provides a solution to the problem of discarding observations in Radius Matching 
because the Kernel Matching estimator possesses a smaller variance since information from 
all or nearly all control units is used. However, one drawback of this approach is bad 
matching because few or many far-distance control units may be used to match with one 
treated unit (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
The next consideration is the choice of the covariates for the propensity score estimation. In 
the PSM method, choosing the covariates is important because they directly affect the 
estimation outcomes. Lee (2005) suggests that the chosen covariate X must be predetermined 
and affect both outcome Y  and treatment D . In addition, to avoid the causality bias, 
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X should not be affected by D , hence post-treatment covariates should not be controlled for 
because that will remove part or all of the effect of D on Y . 
 
The unconfoundedness assumption or conditional independence assumption (CIA) 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) implies that the observable control covariates should not be 
affected by the treatment, and the outcomes of interest are independent of the treatment 
assignment. Thus, included variables should either be fixed over time or be measured before 
the treatment intervention (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) and the pre-treatment measured 
variables must not be affected by anticipation of the treatment participation (Imbens, 2004). 
For example, if the households know they will receive credit, this may lead to higher 
consumption even before the household is lent the money (Doan, 2011). 
 
In addition, the variables should be excluded if they are either unrelated to the outcome or not 
proper covariates of the treatment participation decision model. Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon 
(2002) suggest selecting a variable that affects only credit participation but not treatment 
outcome so it is not necessary to control for this because the outcome of interest is not 
affected by this variable. On the other hand, if a variable affects only the outcome but not the 
treatment participation, one should not control for it since the variable will not make any 
significant difference between the treatment and control groups. Consequently, only the 
variables that influence simultaneously the participation decision and the outcome should be 
included in the score estimation stage.  
 
Finally, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Heckman et al. (1997) state that the exclusion of 
important variables could seriously increase bias in estimates. But a covariate is not, or only 
weakly, correlated with the outcomes and the treatment may reduce the precision of the 
estimates (Imbens, 2004). In the presence of uncertainty, however, it is better to include too 
many rather than too few covariates (Bryson et al., 2002). Furthermore, Dehejia and Wahba 
(1999) suggest starting with the covariates linearly and checking whether balancing of 
covariates within each stratum is obtained, and then test for statistical significance of 
differences in the distribution of the covariates. As balance is obtained, the specification is 
accepted. Otherwise, one should change the potential covariates into higher-order terms and 
interactions until balancing is satisfied. 
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The third consideration is defining the common support and overlap region. The second 
assumption of PSM is the common support. Only a subset of the comparison group that is 
comparable to the treatment group will be used, therefore it is necessary to check the overlap 
and the common support between the treatment and control groups. Lechner (2002) suggests 
inspecting the density distribution of propensity scores to check the overlap and common 
support in order to see whether comparability between the treatment and control groups is 
sizeable. Imbens (2004) shows how the PSM method handles the lack of overlap. The 
probability or score receives a value from 0 to 1; the observations with probabilities close to 
one will receive high weights, leading to an increase in the variance of the average treatment 
effect estimator. As a result, the PSM is designed to cope with limited overlap in the covariate 
distributions than parametric regression models because adding control observations of 
outliers, i.e., scores near 0 or 1, in a parametric regression approach will lead to substantial 
changes in the estimated coefficients. 
 
What happens if the assumption of the common support is violated? If treated and control 
observations fall outside the common support, they need to be dropped. If the number of 
outside-common support observations of the treatment group is large, the estimate of the 
within-common support observations may be misrepresented and misleading (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008; Imbens, 2004). Therefore, ignoring the common support problem or 
estimating a subpopulation within the common support may give misleading estimates and 
inferences (Lechner, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, the lack of overlap in the covariate distributions between the control and 
treatment groups could lead to imprecise estimates and could cause the estimators to be 
sensitive to the choice of specification (Crump, Hotz, Imbens, & Mitnik, 2004). Evaluators 
often use a strategy of trimming the sample to address limited overlap. Crump et al. (2009) 
suggest a simple rule of thumb to discard all units of both control and treatment groups that 
have an estimated propensity score outside the range [0.1, 0.9]; the authors show that the 
precision gain from the approach is substantial with most of the gain captured. This is because 
using probit and logit models to estimate the scores will give different results when the 
propensity scores are close to 1 or 0; and for units with scores close to 1 or 0, the weights 
could be large so these units may considerably affect the estimates of the treatment effects and 
hence the estimates become imprecise (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). However, Crump et al. 
(2009) also suggest that potentially some external validity may be lost by changing the focus 
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to average treatment effects for a subset in the range [0.1, 0.9] of the original sample if the 
dropout observations significantly affect the estimated result when a large number of 
observations is discarded; the estimates could be misleading even if the strategy of estimation 
improves the lack of overlap. 
 
In summary, matching is expected to produce less biased results than those from OLS because 
matching compares borrowers only with similar non-borrowers. Nevertheless, the „similarity‟ 
of non-borrowers to borrowers is built on observed characteristics, so bias likely exists if 
unobservables affect both treatment participation and outcomes of interest. The assumption is 
easily violated if we are unable to control for all variables, especially the unobservables that 
affect both the treatment participation and outcomes (Bryson et al., 2002) . However, since 
our data focused only on the rural poor households, the disparity in unobservables between 
the borrowers and non-borrowers is expected not be large hence the bias may be reduced and 
the reliability of the matching estimates is improved.  
 
However, one drawback of the PSM method is that it fails to control for unobservable 
characteristics, which may create a hidden bias because the scores are calculated only on the 
basis of observed characteristics. Dias, Ichimura and Berg (2007) argue that if the treatment 
assignment and the outcome are affected by unobservables, matching tends to give biased 
results because the unobservables cannot be controlled. This means that the observed 
characteristics may not fully capture the individual motivation, ability and skills, which may 
affect treatment participation. Again, the success of PSM closely depends on how similar the 
control group is to the treatment group in terms of space and time, and the two groups should 
have as little baseline difference as possible (Lee, 2005). 
 
4.3.2.2 Impact Estimator for Panel Data: Difference-in-Differences Approach 
a) Difference-in-Differences estimators and assumptions 
We now turn to the idea of using panel data to estimate the treatment effect under the 
Difference-in-Differences approach, which is an increasingly popular method for identifying 
programme impact in the absence of purely experimental data (Ashenfelter & Card, 1985; 
Athey & Imbens, 2006). It takes sometime for a policy to be implemented or to take effect on 
the target group of participants. The observed outcomes over time may be attributed  not only 
to the treatment but also the observed and unobserved factors such as economic conditions, 
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other concurrent policies, individual motivation and ability, etc. It is necessary to exclude 
such undesired attributes in order to assess the real effect of the policy. The DinD method 
resolves the problem by comparing the control individuals, who share the same 
characteristics, with the treated ones and then substracting the difference in the outcome 
variables of the treated ones over time by the difference of the control ones. In doing so, the 
desired effect can be expressed as follows: 
 
, 1 , , 1 ,( - | 1) - ( - | 0)
ATT
DiD i t i t i t i tE Y Y D E Y Y D                           (4.34) 
 
 1, 1 1, 0, 1 0,( - ) - ( - )
ATT
DiD i t i t i t i tY Y Y Y                           (4.35) 
 
Equation (4.35) can be represented by the following regression equation (Angrist & Krueger, 
1999; Meyer, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002): 
 
 0 0 1 1it t i t i itY D D D D                                  (4.36) 
 
itY  is the outcome of interest for individual i  at period t . tD  is time dummy variable, taking 
a value of zero for individual in pre-programme period and one for post-programme. iD  
denotes the treatment variable, which equals unity for an individual in a treatment group and 
zero otherwise. Hence, iD  captures the differences in outcome between the treatment and 
control groups due to policy change. The interaction term, i tD D  indicates the programme 
participation and takes a value of one if the household i  borrowed money and the observation 
observed in the second period, and zero otherwise. The final term it  is the idiosyncratic 
disturbance, which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance. Under this assumption, equation (4.36) can be estimated by OLS from repeated 
cross-sectional or panel data. The coefficent 0  accounts for aggregate factors that affect the 
outcome over time for both treatment group and control group. Coeficient 1  captures the 
mean of the potential time-invariant difference between the two groups. The coefficient 1  is 
the parameter of the programme impact since it measures the average effect of the treatment 
on the treated individuals, e.g., the average programme impact on the borrower group 
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compared with the non-borrower group and its statistical significance can be tested by the 
conventional t-test.  
 
However, for 1  to be the consistent estimator of the average treatment effect on treated 
individuals, two crucial assumptions have to be made (Blundell & Dias, 2000). The first 
assumption that, in the absence of the treatment, both the treatment and control individuals 
experience the same time-effect. Under this assumption, it is postulated that the unobserved 
factors, for example changes in economic conditions and other policy initiatives, may affect 
both groups in a similar manner. The second assumption is that there is no systematic 
changein the composition of individuals within each group. That is, before and after the 
treatment being implemented and takes effect, there is no big event that induces a majority of 
individuals in one group to move to another group.  
 
Equation (4.36) provides an unbiased programme impact estimator under randomisation of 
programme participation, i.e., households are randomly selected in a microcredit programme. 
However, given non-random participation in microcredit programme, it is likely that 
participants in a microcredit programme are selected based on pre-programme attributes. 
Consequently, the pattern of change in the outcome influenced by programme participation 
may vary systematically across the two groups if there are no credit programme. Ignoring 
these systematic differences may lead to biased estimates of the programme impact (Abadie, 
2005; Islam, 2010). 
 
To control for the pre-programme attributes, a vector of observable household characteristics 
and commune characteristics is included in equation (4.36).  The programme impact estimator 
can be obtained from the following model: 
 
0 0 1 1it t i t i it i itY D D D D         X                          (4.37) 
 
Equation (4.37) allows heterogeneity of the two groups in terms of the observable 
characteristics such as individual demographic characteristics, geographical differences of 
residence, etc. That is, unbiasedness of the estimator is possible only when the treatment of 
interest is not systematically correlated to other factors affecting Y . However, this assumption 
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is rarely satisfied in programme evaluation since programmes are normally designed to help 
groups with specific attributes. To capture the heterogeneity of individuals‟ attributes by 
conditioning on covariates, X , such as demographic characteristics or housing 
characteristics, the treatment effect model is specified as:  
 
0 0 1 1 1it t i t i it i t i it itY D D D D D D            X X                        (4.38) 
  
where i  captures the effects of the covariates on the outcome for each time period. The 
parameter 1  measures the treatment effects of tiX  in case the treatment changes the slope of 
the coefficients in equation (4.38). The coefficient 1δ  in equation (4.37) no longer explains the 
full treatment effect as in equation (3.38) but, instead, 1 it 1δ + γX  does (Pham, 2009).  
 
Estimating equation (4.38) faces problems of endogeneity and selection bias (see also Athey 
& Imbens, 2006; Coleman, 1999; Heckman, 2001; Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Pitt & 
Khandker, 1998). It isimportant to note that equation (4.38) is a non-linear model. Therefore, 
the treatment effects coefficient should be interpreted with care because in a non-linear 
model, covariates X  cannot be excluded by taking the differences across individual groups 
and time periods. The treatment effect is conditional on both covariates and the functional 
form of the response functions (Ai & Norton, 2003). Hence, the magnitute of the effect and its 
statistical significance may vary across X's  values. 
 
b) Estimation strategies 
Recent studies have used panel data to tackle the major issues and shortcomings in 
microcredit programmes. The fixed effects method using panel data is used to evaluate the 
impact of a single microcredit programme and the results confirm that microcredit is 
statistically significant in reducing poverty among poor borrowers and within the local 
economy in Bangladesh (Khandker, 2005). To estimate the impact estimator, the outcome 
equation is respecified as follows. First, the interaction terms in equation (4.37) are 
considered as latent variables of borrowing, which is the participation function.  
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 0 0 0 1it t i it i it itC D D I         X                          (4.39) 
 
 it it itI   W                   (4.40) 
 
Next, the real term of borrowing is used as a dependent variable of the latent function; this is 
equivalent to the loan equation. Therefore, equations (4.39 & 4.40) can be re-written as a 
system of equations as follows:   
 
 0 0 0 1it t i it i it itC D D FL         X                        (4.41) 
 
it it itFL   W                             (4.42) 
 
where itFL  is the amount of loan if the household borrows in the post-period and zero 
otherwise. itC is consumption at the household level. itW is a vector of household factors that 
may be different from itX . Again, two potential problems arise in estimating the model, 
namely endogeneity and selection bias. The fixed effects model can be applied to solve 
potential biases using the maximum likelihood or two-step estimation methods(Angrist, 2004; 
Wooldridge, 2002). Equation (4.42) is estimated in the first step and equation (4.41) is 
estimated in the second step. The coefficient, 1 , is now the impact of the microcredit 
programme on the consumption outcome of the household. 
 
To measure the impact of formal microcredit on household income, Coleman (2006)suggests 
using income as the dependent variable to credit constraint. The income model can be written 
as follows: 
 
0 0 1 2it t i it i it itI D D FL         X                        (4.43) 
 
it = φ+εit itFL W                           (4.44) 
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where all notations in equations (4.43 and 4.44) are similar to equations (4.41 and 4.42) in the 
consumption model, except income is replaced as the outcome variable in equation (4.41). A 
similar estimation technique will be applied to estimate the system equations (4.43) and (4.44) 
to obtain the coefficient microcredit programme impact, 2 , on the consumption outcome of 
the household. 
 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter demonstrates a number of important issues in microcredit literature including 
asymmetric information, credit constraint and credit rationing, and consumption. Through the 
theoretical models, various economic relationships have been established for empirical 
estimation. Information asymmetry is the core of the lending principle that explains why 
lenders always select a certain borrower to grant a loan contract and hence there is always a 
mismatch between supply of and demand for credit in the formal rural credit market. This 
credit rationing creates a credit constraint on the rural household, particularly the rural poor. 
Subsequently, the household consumption model shows that credit helps reduce constraints to 
working capital in agricultural production or in non-farm income generating activities and 
hence, enhances the household‟s consumption growth.  
 
Following the defined economic relationship, different empirical models are discussed in this 
study. First, the credit accessibility model is specified to determine factors affecting the 
household‟s decision to borrow from the formal credit sector under the conditions that the 
informal sector exists and interacts with the formal sector in the credit market. The model is 
expected to achieve consistent estimators for the determinants of the household‟s access to the 
formal and informal credit under the credit rationing assumption, selection bias and 
interaction between informal and formal credit.  
 
The Propensity Score Matching method and the Difference-in-Differences approach used for 
evaluating the impact of a microcredit programme on household consumption and income 
were also discussed. Their estimation strategies were proposed to obtain unbiased and 
consistent estimators, depending on the types of dependent variables as well as the nature of 
the dataset. The dataset and the estimation results for the empirical models will be presented 
and discussed in the following chapters. 
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    Chapter 5 
Data and Respondents 
This chapter describes the MRD survey data and the VHLSS data used in the study. Section 
5.1 describes the MRD survey data including the questionnaire, the selection of the 
respondents and data collection process. Section 5.2 provides a profile of the respondents in 
terms of demographic, socio-economic and loan characteristics using the MRD survey data. 
Section 5.3 briefly introduces the VHLSS in years 2006 and 2008. The last section 
summarises the chapter. 
 
5.1 Description of the MRD Survey Data 
5.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
The household survey was conducted in 2010 using a structured questionnaire interview. The 
questionnaire was designed to gather information on the respondents‟ access to microcredit in 
the Mekong River Delta, given the availability of microcredit programmes. The survey 
questionnaire aimed to collect information about the demographic characteristics, income, 
expenditure (on farm and non-farm activities, education, health care) and information about 
accessibility to credit (formal microcredit and informal credit) of rural households. In 
addition, if they had participated in a microcredit programme, respondents were asked about 
the impact of microcredit on their families and welfare.  
 
The questionnaire consists of six sections. The first section was designed to identify the 
demand for credit and the access to formal and informal credit for all respondents. 
Information about the different microcredit programmes and the future demand for credit 
were included in this section. Section 2 focussed on the loan (both formal and informal) 
characteristics of the borrowing households; specific characteristics such as loan amount, loan 
duration, interest rate, mode of repayment, and purpose of loan were asked. Sections 3, 4 and 
5 were designed to obtain information from the respondents about participation in a 
microcredit programme and to understand how microcredit affected the respondents‟ living 
conditions. Only respondents who had obtained a loan in 2009 were asked to answer these 
sections. Section 6 concludes the questionnaire with demographic information of the 
respondents in the sample (see Appendix C).  
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The questionnaire was pre-tested with a small sample of six borrowing and four non-
borrowing households in Can Tho city to check for completeness and consistency. This pre-
testing helped to clarify and improve the quality of the questions used in the questionnaire 
before administering the survey.  
 
5.1.2 Data Collection 
A three-stage stratified random sampling technique was used to draw the survey sample. In 
the first stage, sample communes were selected on the basis of the availability of formal 
microcredit providers. Fourteen rural districts
19
 were selected. To capture the micro lending 
practices, the selected districts must have had microcredit programmes operating since 2002. 
All rural districts in the sample complied with the condition that a branch of the microcredit 
provider existed in the district. To control for heterogeneity at the commune level, 3 of the14 
communes were selected from ethnic populated districts. Next, communes were selected from 
the sample districts to form the sample communes. Two villages were randomly chosen from 
each sample commune; altogether 22 villages were included. The selection of the sample 
households was the final stage of the sampling process.  
 
To capture credit accessibility in the rural credit market, the selected respondents addressed 
the household credit constraint that requires the sampled respondents to have at least 
demanded any type of loan during the previous 12 months. In addition, the objective of this 
study is to assess the impact of the microcredit programme on rural households, it is necessary 
to obtain a sample containing a sufficient number of rural households borrowing from the 
microcredit programme and a similar number of rural households that had a demand for credit 
but were unable to obtain a microloan. The specified sample is expected to be appropriate for 
the household model of credit accessibility and for the impact assessment framework using 
the propensity score matching approach discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Unless informal loan associated with borrower is stated, respondents were classified into two 
groups based on their formal borrowing status. The group of rural households that had 
borrowed from microcredit programmes is referred to as the borrowing group and the other 
group of rural households that had a demand for credit but had never borrowed a formal loan 
                                                 
19
The administrative divisions in the MRD are classified as provincial, district, commune, and village. 
Communes or their urban equivalent, the district towns or wards, are defined as the primary unit of sample 
design in the VHLSS.     
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is referred to as the non-borrowing group. Given the households‟ characteristics, the survey 
questionnaire was designed to capture the credit constraints of rural households with respect 
to formal microcredit in the previous 12 months. Households that had not borrowed a formal 
loan were asked to provide information about any informal loan if they had borrowed an 
informal loan. The informal loan is used to investigate the interacting effect between the 
formal and informal credit markets.  
 
The sampled households were selected as follows. First, the households with access to 
microcredit, namely the borrower group, were identified through the local authority at each 
research site. A total of 619 borrowers were randomly chosen to participate in an interview. 
Then, 309 non-borrowing households that had not been able to obtain a formal loan within the 
last 12 months were randomly selected. Overall, 928 households were included in the sample; 
all respondents were the head of the household since we considered the household head as the 
representative for household‟s decision making and because microcredit are issued to the 
household under the name of the household head. This selection ensures a consistent covariate 
of the household characteristics to be obtained from the survey.  
 
5.2 Profiles of the Sampled Households in the MRD Survey 
This section describes the sampled respondents‟ characteristics including individual, 
household, formal and informal microcredit characteristics, and geographic factors. 
Microcredits were classified based on the borrowing sources in order to identify the 
respondents for the subsequent analysis. Descriptive tables containing frequency, mean and 
median, and their respective tests were constructed to compare the two groups of respondents. 
First, a t-test was used to test whether the means of the household characteristics between the 
two groups, borrowers and non-borrowers in microcredit programmes, were statistically 
different. This indicates how good a metric variable can be used to control for the similarities 
and differences between the two groups. Second, a Chi-square test shows how likely a 
categorical variable is independent of the distribution of the two groups.      
 
5.2.1 Forms of Microcredit 
The borrower and non-borrower groups were divided into three types of respondents 
corresponding to the two types of loan in the rural credit market. Table 5.1 shows the 928 
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respondents classified into three categories: borrowers, non-borrowers due to credit constraint 
and non-borrowers subject to unconstrained credit. Of the total, nine respondents were not 
exposed to credit constraint because they had had no loans and they had not needed to borrow 
money at any time in the past 12 months. The nine non-borrower households with no credit 
constraint were excluded; the remaining 919 households were used in the subsequent analysis 
(see Table 5.1). The 775 borrowers and 144 non-borrowers formed the sample of 919 
respondents considered to have a demand for a loan and were subjected to credit rationing in 
the rural credit market. The 144 non-borrowers were rationed out of the rural credit market 
and the 775 borrowers were either partially rationed or not rationed in the informal or formal 
credit sector. Of the borrowers, 156 households borrowed only from the informal sector, 261 
borrowed only from the formal sector, and 358 borrowed from mixed sources of credits from 
both sectors.  
 
Table 5.1 Formal and Informal Microcredit 
Number of Respondents 
Source of loans 
Total 
Informal Formal Mixed 
Formal 
and 
Informal 
Borrower households 156 261 358 775 
Non-borrowers due to credit constraint                     144   144 
Non-borrowers subject to unconstrained credit                               9 9 
Total number of respondents 156 261 511     928 
Source: The author‟s survey data, 2010. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 shows formal microcredit (261 formal contracts) outnumbered the informal loans 
(156 informal contracts), and the households with both types of loan (358 contracts) 
outnumbered both. The 358 housheolds, over one third of the households, obtained loans from 
the formal and informal microcredit sectors simultaneously. This confirms the prevalence of 
private lenders and suggests co-existence of formal and informal microcredit in the rural 
credit market. These results for the rural credit market are similar to those of other rural credit 
markets in the developing countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam (Pham & 
Izumida, 2002).   
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5.2.2 Individual Characteristics 
The individual characteristics of the sampled respondents are summarised in Table 5.2. The 
variables age, ethnic group, and main occupation, are significantly different at the 1% level, 
but gender and education level are not significant. This means the distribution of borrowers 
and non-borrowers is strongly associated with the age, ethnic group and main occupation of 
household heads in the sample. Although the proportion of female heads in both the borrower 
group (57.1%) and non-borrower group (53.1%) was over 50%, the statistical evidence is not 
strong enough to conclude that being female or male is associated with borrowing or not 
borrowing microcredit.  
 
The age of the respondents ranged from 24 to 89 years; the average was 47. When grouped 
into age categories, a substantial proportion (76.3%) of the borrowers fell into the 41-60 years 
old category but the majority (73.9%) of non-borrowers were in the 31-50 years old category. 
The average age of the borrowers and non-borrowers is significantly different at the 5% level. 
There are more, younger respondents in the non-borrower group.     
 
Ethnicity is significantly associated with classifying borrowers and non-borrowers; more 
ethnic households were represented in the borrower group than in the non-borrower group. 
Table 5.2 shows that about 11% of non-borrowers belong to ethnic groups compared with 
20% ethnic households in the borrower group. Ethnicity explicitly influenced participation in 
formal credit because most microcredit programmes target ethnic groups.    
 
Survey respondents were divided into seven groups with respect to educational attainment: 
those without any education, primary school, middle school, high school, college, vocational 
training, and higher education. Table 5.2 shows that about 90% of the respondents had 
obtained some form of education. The distribution of education levels shows a small 
difference between the two groups but the distributions do not follow similar education 
patterns. For example, there is a similarity between the borrowers and non-borrowers in that 
over half of the respondents had attended at least primary school. The proportion of non-
borrowers with middle school is higher than that of the borrowers (25.2% versus 23.7%). 
Conversely, the proportion of non-borrowers (9.7%) with high school level is slightly smaller 
than that of borrowers (10.6%). The proportion of households with education beyond high 
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school was low (< 3%). This variation in education pattern is related to a weak association 
between educational attainment and credit accessibility in the sample (see Table 5.2).  
 
The survey data also show that the respondents engaged in various occupations such as rice 
farming, orchard farming, aquaculture, and handicrafts. The survey results indicate that more 
households engaged in agriculture-based activities than other occupations. The proportions 
were 41.3% and 51% of households had farming work (rice farming, orchard farming and 
aquaculture farming) in non-borrower and borrower groups, respectively. The proportion of 
households classified in other occupations such as small trader, handicraftsmen, housewives, 
government employees, and mixed occupations, are similar with small differences between 
the borrower and non-borrower groups, except for non-skilled workers. More household 
heads were unskilled workers in the non-borrower group (25%) than in the borrower group 
(15.8%). This reflects a significant difference in source of income between the borrower and 
non-borrower groups at 1% level (See Table 5.2). 
 
In general, access to microcredit is largely explained by household income. However, using 
income as an explanatory variable for access to microcredit is problematic due to 
endogeneity. Therefore, using the difference in income sources to explain credit accessibility 
is more acceptable and this is consistent with a number of studies in microfinance. For 
example, Li et al. (2011) used income sources, including farm and non-farm income, to 
explain sources of income attributed to credit accessibility of rural households in China.  
 
Similarly, Kaino (2006) used sources of income (agricultural and non-agricultural income, 
income during slack season) to explain credit accessibility in Myanmar. Our results indicate 
that, the households‟ main income source from primary production accounted for 52.1% of 
the sample (32.8% agriculture, 10.7% orchard farming, 4.4% aquaculture and 4.2% livestock 
breeding). Other sources of income included non-farm activities such as small trade (9.8%) 
and handicrafts (6.1%). However, if we compare the sources of income between the borrower 
and non-borrower group, the non-borrowers were more likely to exhibit unstable earnings 
from unskilled jobs (unskilled workers accounted for 25% of the non-borrowers versus15% of 
the borrowers). This relationship is significant at the 1% level. This implies that differences in 
income sources contributed significantly to a household‟s occupation and income sources 
which in turn influence credit accessibility (see Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2 Profile of the MRD Survey Respondents (Individual Characteristics) 
 
Non-Borrowers 
(N1=300) 
 
Formal 
Borrowers 
(N2=619) 
All respondents 
(N=919) 
 Statistical 
Test  Count % of N1 Count % of N2 Count % of N 
    (n1)     (n1)  (n=n1+n2)   
Individual characteristics  
Gender        
Female 171 57.0 332 53.6 503 54.7  
Male 129 43.0 287 46.4 416 45.3  
Total  100  100  100 
2 =0.92 
Age group (years)       
22-30 34 11.5 32 5.2 66 7.3  
31-40 73 24.7 146 23.8 219 24.1  
41-50 80 27.0 179 29.2 259 28.5  
41-60 66 22.3 167 27.2 233 25.6  
61-89 43 14.5 89 14.5 132 14.5  
Total  100  100  100  
Mean age 46.74  48.26  47.76  t  = 13.09
***
 
Ethnic group        
Kinh 267 89.0 489 79.0 756 82.3  
Khmer 32 10.7 122 19.7 154 16.8  
Others 1 0.3 8 1.3 9 1  
Total  100  100  100 
2 =14.22*** 
Education level       
No education 36 12.1 73 11.8 109 11.9  
Primary school 150 50.3 320 51.7 470 51.3  
Middle school 75 25.2 147 23.7 222 24.2  
High school 29 9.7 68 11 97 10.6  
Vocational training 3 1.0 5 0.8 8 0.9  
College 3 1.0 3 0.5 6 0.7  
Higher education 2 0.7 3 0.5 5 0.5  
Total  100  100  100 
2 =1.61 
Main occupation      
Rice farming 79 26.3 222 35.9 301 32.8  
Unskilled workers 75 25.0 98 15.8 173 18.8  
Orchard farming 27 9.0 71 11.5 98 10.7  
Small traders 29 9.7 61 9.9 90 9.8  
Handicrafts 24 8.0 32 5.2 56 6.1  
Housewife 17 5.7 28 4.5 45 4.9  
Aqua. Farming 18 6.0 22 3.6 40 4.4  
Livestock breeding 10 3.3 29 4.7 39 4.2  
Govt Employees 11 3.7 14 2.3 25 2.7  
Mixed occupation 10 3.3 42 6.8 52 5.7  
Total  100  100  100 
2 = 28.35*** 
Source: The author‟s survey data, 2010.  
Note:   1.  ni and Ni (i=1,2) are number of respondents in each sub-sample. 
            2. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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5.2.3 Household Characteristics 
Table 5.3 describes the household characteristics, namely household size, number of income 
earners, number of children, land holding status, agricultural land and household income. 
The household size, number of children, and land holding status characteristics are 
statistically significant at the 10% level, but number of income earners and household income 
are not significantly different. The average household size was about five members; a greater 
proportion (59%) of the households had one to four members in the family than households 
with five to seven members (36.1%). Households with over seven members were only 5% of 
the sample. Due to the birth control policy in Vietnam, families are encouraged to have only 
one or two children. This implies that most households would be four members or fewer. 
Households with over four family members are likely to have more than two generations 
living in the house. Overlapping generations in the family probably enable the households to 
accumulate more wealth such as land, durable assets and savings. Table 5.3 shows 43.3% of 
households in the borrower group had more than four members in the family compared to 
36.3% in the non-borrower group. The variation in the average household size between the 
two groups is moderately significant. Overall, the average household size is statistically 
different at the 10% level between the borrower and non-borrower groups in the sample.   
 
The number of income earners and the number of children in the family are distributed in 
proportion to the household size. For example, over 60% of households have one or two 
income earners in the family and over 45% of households have one or two children. Overall, 
there was little difference in the number of income earners between the two groups of 
households. However, the difference in the number of children is statistically significant at the 
1% level, i.e., on average, households with more children are more associated with 
participating in the microcredit programme (see Table 5.3). The economic dependent ratio 
(EDR) is the ratio of the household members without income to the number of income 
earners. Households with a higher EDR tend to have more dependants, such as children and 
the elderly, and are more financially stressed. The proportion of households with more than 
three children (3.30) in the borrower group is significantly greater at the 1% level than the 
households with fewer than three children (2.90) in the non-borrower group. As a result, the 
non-borrower group is less likely to be financially stressed than the borrower group. 
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Table 5.3 Profile of the MRD Survey Respondents (Household Characteristics) 
 Non-Borrower 
(N1=300) 
Formal 
Borrower 
All Respondents 
(N=919) 
 
Statistical 
Test   (N2=619)  
 Count % of N1 Count % of N2     Count % of N 
   (n1)    (n2)    (n=n1+n2)  
Household characteristics 
Household size (members)       
1 – 4 191 63.7 351 56.7 542 59.0  
5 – 7 94 31.3 238 38.4 332 36.1  
8 – 10 14 4.7 28 4.5 42 4.6  
11 and more 1 0.3 2 0.3 3 0.3  
Total  100  100  100  
Mean household size 4.32  4.53  4.47 t  = -1.82
*
 
Number of income earners      
None 3 1.0 2 0.3 5 0.5  
1 – 2 199 66.3 398 64.3 597 65.0  
3 – 4 72 24.0 171 27.6 243 26.4  
5  and more  26 8.7 48 7.8 74 8.1  
Total  100  100  100  
Mean income earners 2.50  2.54  2.54 t  = -0.39 
Number of children       
None 15 5.0 15 2.4 30 3.3  
1 – 2  150 50.0 272 43.9 422 45.9  
3 – 4  81 27.0 193 31.2 274 29.8  
5 – 7  42 14.0 116 18.7 158 17.2  
7 and more 12 4.0 23 3.7 35 3.8  
Total  100  100  100  
Mean number of children 2.9  3.3  3.13 t  = -2.69
***
 
Land holding status        
Owned land 162 64.0 436 79.3 598 74.5  
Leased land 7 2.8 17 3.1 24 3.0  
Landless 
84 33.2 97 17.6 181 22.5 
2 = 
Total  100  100  100 24.10
***
 
Agriculture land (ha)       
Less than 0.1  24 14.6 67 15.0 91 14.9  
0.1 to less than 0.5 71 43.3 192 43.0 263 43.1  
0.5 to less than 1.0 38 23.2 88 19.7 126 20.7  
Above 1.0  31 18.9 99 22.2 130 21.3  
Total  100  100  100  
Mean agriculture land 0.496  0.686  0.632 t  = -1.78
*
 
Household income in 2009 (in million 
VND) 
     
Less than 10  60 20.6 82 13.4 142 15.7  
10 to less than 50  167 57.4 392 64.1 559 61.9  
50 to less than 100  52 17.9 101 16.5 153 16.9  
100  to less than 200 9 3.1 29 4.7 38 4.2  
Above 200  3 1.0 8 1.3 11 1.2  
Total  100  100  100  
Mean household income  35.07  39.76  38.25 t  = -1.41  
Source: The author‟s survey.  
Note:  1. ni and Ni (i=1,2) are number of respondents in each sub-sample. 
            2. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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In terms of land holding status
20
, households were divided into the following categories: land 
owner, land leasee and landless. Table 5.3 shows that there is a difference in „long-term 
owned‟ land and landless status between the borrower and non-borrower groups. About 80% 
of households in the borrower group owned land compared with 64% in the non-borrower 
group. Conversely, about 33% of the landless households were non-borrowers compared with 
17.6% of the landless households in the borrower group. Land-leasee households accounted 
for only 3% of the total sample. The difference in land holding status between the two 
borrowing status groups is statistically different at the 1% level.  
 
The agricultural land area held by land holding households was significantly different at the 
10% level between borrowers and non-borrowers. Table 5.3 shows that borrowing households 
owned, on average, about 0.7 ha and the non-borrowing households owned 0.5 ha. The 
proportion of households over both groups holding less than 1 ha was about 15%; households 
holding from 0.1 to 0.5 ha and 0.5 ha to 1.0 ha accounted for about 43.1% and 20.7%, 
respectively. A comparison of borrowers and non-borrowers owning more than 1.0 ha showed 
a slight difference: 18.9% of the non-borrower group households held over 1.0 ha compared 
with 22.2% in the borrower group. Generally, agricultural land area and land ownership serve 
as a proxy of creditworthiness although their collateralised value is low because agricultural 
land is a less liquid asset. Even though most microcredit programmes do not require collateral 
for a loan, households owning land seem to have an advantage over landless households in 
borrowing (see Table 5.3).    
 
Household annual income was divided into five levels
21
: less than 10 million VND, between 
10 and 50 million VND, between 50 and 100 million VND, between 100 and 200 million 
VND, and more than 200 million VND. Table 5.3 shows the mean income of the borrower 
group was 39.76 million VND compared with 35.07 million VND for the non-borrower 
group.  In terms of the income brackets, a higher proportion of non-borrower households fell 
into the lowest income bracket. However, there was a higher proportion of the borrower group 
in the second lowest income bracket (between 10 and 50 million VND) than in non-borrower 
group. About 64% of the households in the borrowing group earned between 10 and 50 
million VND compared with 57.4% of the non-borrower group. For the middle income 
                                                 
20
According to the Law of the Land of Vietnam, land is owned by the people and the state is the representative of 
the people and responsible for administering the use of land and the rights of land users. The term „long-term 
owned land status‟ refers to the land use rights of land owners. 
21
 Exchange rate in 2010: 1 USD = 19,000 VND  
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category (between 50 and 100 million VND), approximately 17% of each group of 
households was represented. Similarly, there was little difference between the borrower and 
non-borrower groups in the higher income brackets. The average income of the borrower 
group (39.76 million VND) is greater than that of the non-borrower (35.07 million VND) 
group but the difference in average income is not significant. 
 
5.2.4 Formal and Informal Microcredit Characteristics 
Table 5.4 provides general information about the microcredit obtained by the respondents 
from the formal microcredit provider, i.e., VBSP, and informal lenders. The six characteristics 
of the formal and informal loans are: amount of loan, interest rate, loan duration, processing 
time, repayment frequency, and loan purpose. 
 
In terms of the maximum amount in a single loan, formal microcredit were categorised into 
three groups as follows: less than 10 million VND, between 10 and 50 million VND, and 
more than 50 million VND. On average, households obtained a single loan for a maximum of 
12.6 million VND. Most households (70%) borrowed less than 10 million VND and 27.8% of 
the households borrowed between 10 and 50 million VND per single loan. Only 2.3% of the 
households borrowed over 50 million VND in a single loan.  
 
Informal microcredit were similarly categorised into three levels: less than 5 million VND, 
between 5 and 10 million VND, and more than 10 million VND. The average informal loan 
was 6.4 million VND, which is equal to half the average of the formal loan. About 70% of the 
households borrowed less than 5 million VND, 17.3% borrowed between 5 and 10 million 
VND and 12.8% borrowed more than 10 million VND.   
 
Interest rates were expected to vary more for informal microcredit than for formal microcredit 
since the microcredit programme received subsidised interest from the government whereas 
informal interest rates have normally been found to be excessively high in Vietnam (Pham & 
Izumida, 2002). The great majority of households (96%) borrowed at low interest rates of less 
than 1.5% per month and only 4% of the households borrowed at a rate higher than 1.5% per 
month. There was a wider variation (zero to 5% per month) in informal interest rates as shown 
in Table 5.4. In particular, 52% of the households borrowed at an interest rate of over 5% per 
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month, followed by 42% of households that borrowed at an interest rate between 2% and 5% 
per month. Only 6% of households obtained an informal microcredit at an interest rate lower 
than 2% per month. The results suggest that rural poor households faced credit constraints and 
borrowing money from the formal sector is likely to be a favoured choice because microcredit 
lending provides a preferential interest rate for the targeted poor households.   
 
Table 5.4 also compares formal and informal microcredit in terms of loan duration, which was 
classified as short-term, medium-term and long-term. The microcredit programme tends to 
give short-term loans (loan duration less than 12 months) rather than medium (loan duration 
over 12 months but less than 36 months) and long-term loans (over 36 months to 60 months). 
For example, 72% of households received a short-term formal loan and they had to repay the 
loan principal by the end of the loan period. The proportion of households borrowing medium 
and long-term formal loans were 18% and 10%, respectively. On the other hand, informal 
loans are associated with longer term. For example, 33% of households borrowed long-term 
informal loans and 63.1% borrowed short-term informal loans. While only 5% of the 
households who borrowed from an informal provider obtained medium-term loans (see Table 
5.4). 
 
Loan processing is expected to be different between formal and informal microcredit. Table 
5.4 shows that 51.8% of the households obtained a formal microcredit from the VBSP within 
a week from submitting the application. This loan processing time is, however, not as quick as 
for informal microcredit since 91% of the informal loan processing was within a day and over 
80% of the informal loans were given instantly to the borrowers. In other words, the time 
spent obtaining the loan from informal microcredit providers (such as relatives, friends, or 
money lenders) is significantly less than the time spent obtaining a formal microcredit. A 
significantly shorter time to process a loan implies simplicity of the lending procedures in the 
informal credit sector. In addition, as transaction costs exist in most lending processes (in the 
form of application fee, travelling cost, waiting time, etc.), borrowing money from informal 
lenders incurs significantly lower transaction costs than obtaining a formal microcredit.   
 
The most common interest payment frequency was monthly although paying interest at the 
end period of the contract was also quite common for both formal and informal microcredit. 
For example, 67.8% of the households with informal microcredit paid interest monthly 
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compared with 62% of those with formal microcredit. Besides the common payment modes, a 
number of households paid the interest on an irregular basis such as at the end of harvesting 
crops or paid interest and principal at the end of the loan contract period. Some borrowers of 
small amounts of formal microcredit were even given the option to choose a flexible 
repayment schedule based on their ability to repay the loan. Therefore, the interest rate was 
calculated based on the flexible loan period and payment in one sum plus the principal. This 
practice is very common in the rural credit market in Vietnam, particularly in the informal 
credit sector. Table 5.4 shows that 25.4% of the households paid formal loan interest on an 
irregular basis and 29.6% paid informal loan interest similarly.  
 
Households obtained formal and informal microcredit to finance their needs such as 
agricultural production, small investment/trade, consumption, education, health, repairing the 
house, and even to repay other loans, although the loan purposes varied between the formal 
and the informal microcredit. Table 5.4 shows the main purpose for obtaining formal 
microcredit was for agricultural activities, with over 49% of these loans being mainly used as 
production capital for rice farming, cropping, or livestock raising. This loan purpose was 
largely associated with short-term contracts with monthly interest payments or some interest 
payment modes based on the loan contract. One particular characteristic of a microloan is that 
the repayment schedule of VPSB loans is rather flexible and some loan contracts were 
actually given according to the loan purpose. As most formal microcredit in the sample were 
used to finance agricultural production, the repayment mode was closely linked to the 
production cycle, with the interest payment often after the harvest season. Formal microcredit 
used for small investment/trade, whose business activities were considered more flexible than 
agricultural production, were similarly flexible in the loan period. The repayment period for 
these loans were relatively short hence the interest payment mode was mostly monthly (see 
Table 5.4). 
 
On the other hand, informal microcredit were largely used for consumption purposes such as 
purchasing durable assets, paying off other loans, production, and for emergencies such as 
attending funerals, medical treatment or weddings. The results showed about half (47.5%) of 
the households borrowed money from private lenders to finance a shortage of cash in 
purchasing durable assets such as machinery or home appliances. Meanwhile, 13% of the 
households borrowed to pay off other debts, 12% borrowed for production capital and 10% of 
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loans were for emergencies. The proportions of informal microcredit for small 
investment/trade and repairing houses were 6% and 4%, respectively (see Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4 Profile of the MRD Survey Respondents (Characteristics of Formal and Informal Microcredit) 
 Informal credit    Formal credit  
 All Borrowers    All Borrowers 
Loan characteristics (N
IFL 
= 514)   Loan characteristics (N
FL 
= 619) 
 Count Frequency   Count Frequency 
Informal loan value (in million VND)    Formal loan value (in million VND)   
Less than 5 359 69.8  Less than 10M 435 69.9 
From 5 to 10 89 17.3  From 10Mto 50M 173 27.8 
Above 50 66 12.8  From 50M to 100M 14 2.3 
Sub-total 514 100  Sub-total 622 100 
Mean      6.37      Mean         12.61 
Informal interest rate (%/month)     Formal interest rate (%/month)   
Less than 1.5 11 3.2  Less than 1.5 598 96.0 
1.5 to 2 10 2.9  More than 1.5 25 4.0 
2.1 to 5 146 42.0  Sub-total 623 100 
More than 5 181 52.0      
Sub-total 348 100      
Mean                  7.15  Mean        0.70       
Informal loan duration (months)     Formal loan duration (months)   
Short term (up to 12) 269 63.1  Short term (up to 12) 443 72.1 
Medium term (up to 36) 17 4.0  Medium term (up to 36) 112 18.2 
Long term (up to 60) 140 32.9  Long term (up to 60) 59 9.6 
Sub-total 426 100 
 
 Sub-total 614 100 
Mean                 19.7  Mean                   20.7 
                      (Table 5.7 continued next page) 
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Table 5.4 Profile of the MRD Survey Respondents (Characteristics of Formal and Informal Microcredit) (cont.) 
 Informal credit    Formal credit 
 All Borrowers    All Borrowers 
Loan characteristics (N
IFL 
= 514)   Loan characteristics (N
FL  
= 619) 
 Count Frequency    Count Frequency 
Processing time for formal loan    Processing time for informal loan  
Instantly 413 81.0  Less than a week 300 51.8 
Within a day 52 10.2  1 week 143 24.7 
1 week 29 5.7  2 weeks 60 10.4 
More than 1 week 16 3.1  More than 2 weeks 76 13.1 
Sub-total 510 100  Sub-total 579 100 
Formal repayment frequency    Informal repayment frequency  
Weekly 6 1.6  Weekly 2 0.3 
Monthly 257 67.8  Monthly 379 62.0 
Semi-annually 3 0.8  Semi-annually 54 8.8 
Annually 1 0.3  Annually 21 3.4 
Others 112 29.6  Others 155 25.4 
Sub-total 379 100  Sub-total 611 100 
Formal loan purposes     Informal loan purposes   
Production capital (farming) 60 11.7  Production capital (farming) 304 49.3 
Small investment/trade 31 6.0  Small investment/trade 49 7.9 
Pay tuition fees  6 1.2  Pay tuition fees  25 4.1 
Emergencies (health) 51 9.9  Emergencies (health) 9 1.5 
Housing (repair) 21 4.1  Housing (repair) 42 6.8 
Purchasing durable assets 244 47.5  Purchasing durable assets 99 16.0 
Pay other loans 67 13.0  Pay other loans 22 3.6 
Others 34 6.6  Others 67 10.9 
Sub-total 514 100  Sub-total 617 100 
Source: The author‟s survey data, 2010. 
Note:   1. N
IFL 
are the total number of respondents borrowing from only informal credit and from mixed formal and informal sources. 
            2. N
FL
 are the total number of respondents borrowing from only formal credit and from mixed formal and informal sources. 
            3. The sub-total in each category may be less than N
IFL 
or N
FL
 due to missing data. 
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5.2.5 Geographic Factors 
Table 5.5 shows the geographical distribution of respondents. The three main indicators that 
capture the geographic characteristics of the sample are: urbanisation, ethnic concentration 
commune and direct road access at village level. Information on these variables was obtained 
from direct interviews with local officials at the research sites. The province variable was 
included to capture geographical differences between the borrowers and non-borrowers at the 
provincial level. The ethnic concentration commune and province variables were statistically 
significantly associated with access to microcredit at the 1% level; urbanisation and direct 
road access were not significant for credit access.  
 
The urbanised commune, direct road access, and ethnic concentration commune variables 
introduced in this study were aimed at accounting for differences between borrowers and non-
borrowers at commune and village levels. The urbanised commune variable is defined as a 
commune located in a rural area but adjacent to a city or town where industrial zone(s) are 
present and the distance from the commune to the industrial zone(s) is less than 10 kilometres. 
The urbanised commune variable implies that, normally, households living in urbanised 
communes may have a higher incidence of employement in non-farm commerical enterprises 
in the industrial zones that entails a higher income from non-farm sources and ensures stable 
comsumption for the households. Hence, these housesholds may be less likely to participate 
in a microcredit scheme as well as being less likely to borrow an informal loan. Table 5.5 
shows the distribution of households between urbanised and rural communes. The proportion 
of households located in rural and urbanised communes were 54.5% and 45.5%, respectively. 
There is an approximately equal proportion of non-borrower households (50.7% versus 49.3% 
of non-borrowers) in rural and urbanised commnues, respectively. However, the results 
showed a considerably smaller proportion of borrowers in urbanised communes in the 
borrowing group (45.5% of urbanised borrowers versus 54.5% of rural borrowers). This 
difference implies that households in urbanised communes are less likely to participate in the 
microcredit programme. 
 120 
Table 5.5 Profile of the MRD Survey Respondents (Geographic Characteristics) 
 
Non-Borrower 
(N1=300) 
Formal 
Borrower 
All Respondents 
(N=919) 
Statistical 
test 
  (N2=619)  
 Count % of N1 Count % of N2 Count % of N 
 (n1)  (n2)  (n=n1+n2)  
Geo-economic characteristics      
Province        
Bac Lieu  15 5 72 11.6 87 9.5  
Ben Tre  25 8.3 77 12.4 102 11.1  
Ca Mau  45 15 33 5.3 78 8.5  
Can Tho 16 5.3 60 9.7 76 8.3  
Dong Thap  20 6.7 39 6.3 59 6.4  
Hau Giang  17 5.7 54 8.7 71 7.7  
Kien Giang 37 12.3 54 8.7 91 9.9  
Soc Trang  25 8.3 69 11.1 94 10.2  
Tien Giang 47 15.7 52 8.4 99 10.8  
Tra Vinh  15 5 66 10.7 81 8.8  
Vinh Long  38 12.7 43 6.9 81 8.8  
Total  100  100  100 
2 = 70.82*** 
Urbanised commune       
No 152 50.7 349 56.4 501 54.5  
Yes 148 49.3 270 43.6 418 45.5  
Total  100  100  100 
2 = 2.66 
Ethnic concentration commune      
No 260 86.7 484 78.2 744 81  
Yes 40 13.3 135 21.8 175 19  
Total  100  100  100 
2 = 9.42*** 
Direct road access commune       
No 122 40.7 222 35.9 344 37.4  
Yes 178 59.3 397 64.1 575 62.6  
Total       
2 = 1.99 
Source: the author‟s survey data, 2010. 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Ethnic concentration at the commune level controls for differences in terms of ethnicity 
because the ethnic issue is believed to be closely related to poverty in Vietnam. Evidence of 
an ethnic differential was found in all geographic and income levels; the adverse effects of 
minority status were most pronounced among poor households in remote areas 
(Teerawichitchainan & Phillips, 2008). For this reason, communes with a high ethnic 
concentration might have a higher chance of being selected into the national microcredit 
programme. This might provide a higher chance of households in these communes receiving 
formal microcredit than households in other communes. Granting a formal loan might also 
alter the occurence of an informal loan as a substitute. Table 5.5 shows that the proportion of 
the borrowers in ethnic concentration communes (21.8%) is much higher than that of the non-
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borrowers (13.3%). The results show that ethnic concentration is significantly associated with 
accessibility to microcredit at the 10% level.  
 
Direct road access at the village level means villages have a direct concrete road connecting 
them to their commune centre. This factor helps to control for the availability of formal credit 
given the respondents‟ location. In Vietnam, geographic factors, particularly in the rural MRD 
where the land teritory is divided by many rivers and river branches and poor physical 
infrastructure such as bad road conditions and unconcreted bridges, all suggest that they are 
important in differentiating the rural households‟ livelihoods. A few studies in Vietnamand in 
other countries provide evidence that households located in villages with good road access to 
the commune centre, where formal credit branches are present, would have a higher chance of 
gettting access to microcredit. Meanwhile, households in remote rural areas with difficult road 
access are likely to borrow from informal sources more often (Ho, 2004; Kochar, 1997a). 
Table 5.4 shows the number of more borrowers (64%) located in the villages with direct road 
access to their commune centreis more than the borrower (36%) located in the villages 
without direct road. 
 
5.3 Description of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey Data 
This study also uses data from the two Vietnamese Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS) conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical 
support from the World Bank (WB) for the years 2006 and 2008. Each survey contains a 
sample of 9,189 households and the two datasets form a panel dataset of 4,127 households 
which are representative of the whole country; the data also form a panel dataset of 866 
households that is representative for the MRD. The panel data contain information about the 
households for the two separate years, including the urban and rural population in Vietnam, 
however, only the rural sample is used in this study. In addition, information on commune 
characteristics was collected from 2,880 and 2,219 communes in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, 
respectively. These data consist of demographic and general information regarding 
communes, general economic conditions and aid programmes, non-farm employment, 
agricultural production, local infrastructure and transportation, education, health, and social 
affairs. The commune data are merged with the household data to form a combined panel 
dataset that includes household, village and commune charateristics.  
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The collected information includes demography, income, expenditure, education, health care, 
employment, fixed assets and durable goods; and particularly, access to finance through 
formal or informal credit. This study utilises information on household members‟ 
characteristics such as age, gender, place of residence, education qualifications, as well as 
information on expenditure and income. In addition, information about participation in 
microcredit programmes is also used such as loans, values of loans, the interest rate from 
different banks and social funds, loan purposes. The dataset represents Vietnam and the MRD 
therefore both samples will be used to evaluate the impact of microcredit in this study. Table 
7.5 summarises variables for the impact evaluation models. 
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Table 5.6 Description of Variables using VHLSS 2008 
 
  Borrowers  Non-borrowers 
Variables Description Mean S.D.   Mean S. D.  
1. Individual characteristics      
AGE Age of household head (years) 46.90 10.86  50.89 13.44 
GENDER Gender of household head 0.78 0.41  0.74 0.44 
ETHNIC Ethnic group (1= ethnic group, 0=Kinh)  3.31 5.49  1.88 3.52 
MARRIED Marital status (1=married, 0=otherwise) 0.86 0.35  0.81 0.39 
 Completed education degree of head      
PRI_SCHO Head with primary school 0.01 0.07  0.01 0.08 
SEC_SCHO Head with secondary school 0.26 0.44  0.27 0.44 
HIG_SCHO Head with high school 0.33 0.47  0.29 0.45 
TEC_DEGRE Head with technical degree 0.10 0.30  0.14 0.35 
UNI_DEGRE Head with university degree 0.01 0.07  0.01 0.10 
POST_GRAD Head with post-grad degree 0.01 0.09  0.04 0.19 
2. Household characteristics      
HH_SIZE Household size  4.54 1.63  4.12 1.67 
R_FEMALE Ratio of female members 0.51 0.18  0.52 0.20 
R_BELOW16 Ratio of member below 16 0.26 0.21  0.22 0.21 
R_ABOVE60 Ratio of member above 60 0.06 0.14  0.14 0.27 
R_WAGRI Ratio of members working in agriculture 0.47 0.29  0.39 0.33 
R_WINDUS Ratio of members working in industry 0.28 0.25  0.25 0.26 
R_WSERV Ratio of members working in services 0.12 0.21  0.15 0.23 
R_PRI_SCHO Ratio of members with primary school 0.26 0.25  0.25 0.26 
R_SEC_SCHO Ratio of members with secondary school  0.26 0.26  0.24 0.26 
R_HIG_SCHO Ratio of members with high school  0.14 0.22  0.15 0.23 
R_UNI_DEGRE Ratio of members with tertiary education 0.01 0.05  0.03 0.12 
NUM_SDAYS Num of day-off due to illness per member 7.15 6.48  6.67 6.19 
LAND_ACROP Area of annual crop land (m
2
) 4309.05 8685.75  3459.07 9890.42 
LAND_PCROP Area of perennial crop land (m
2
) 1538.86 11269.48  1270.29 6203.83 
LAND_WSURF Area of aquaculture water surface (m
2
) 195.25 1341.47  406.68 4598.76 
RE_OVERSEAS Oversees remittance (1,000 VND) 504.70 4533.89  1218.28 8815.66 
RE_DOMESTIC Domestic remittance (1,000 VND)  1605.16 3391.04  2460.80 7597.42 
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PENSION Pension (1,000 VND) 608.56 2861.87  1496.57 5655.33 
SAVINGS Savings (1,000VND) 37.75 426.46  656.57 9199.07 
POOR_CER Poor certified households 0.34 0.47  0.11 0.32 
3. Village and commune characteristics      
GEO_CSTAL Coastal area  0.07 0.26  0.07 0.25 
GEO_DELTA Delta 0.36 0.48  0.55 0.50 
GEO_MIDLAND Midland/hilly land  0.05 0.22  0.07 0.25 
GEO_LMOUNT Low mountainous areas 0.23 0.42  0.18 0.38 
GEO_HMOUNT High mountainous areas 0.29 0.45  0.13 0.34 
CR_COM Having car road commune  0.81 0.39  0.69 0.46 
DE_CENTER Distance to the nearest extension centre (km) 12.96 10.86  10.96 8.83 
NF_ENTER Having nonfarm enterprise commune 0.49 0.50  0.53 0.50 
TR_VILLA Having traditional-village commune 0.08 0.27  0.10 0.30 
CR_VILLA Having car road village  0.75 0.43  0.63 0.48 
4. Instrumental variables      
R_POVERY Poverty ratio by commune authority 0.24 0.17  0.16 0.14 
D_BANK Distance to the nearest bank (km)  9.19 3.24  7.80 2.67 
 Number of observations 556  3,571 
Source: The Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2008, GSO. 
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5.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter describes the survey data and respondents in the study. The descriptive analysis 
reflects the data, profile of respondents, and loan characteristics of the formal and informal 
lenders in the rural credit market.  
 
The profile of respondents includes 919 households, of which 619 are borrowers and 300 are 
non-borrowers in the sample. The average age of the respondents is 47 years old and has 
attained some form of education but predominately at the primary level. The household head 
most likely engaged in farming work such as rice farming, orchard farming or aquaculture 
farming, although different non-farm activities were also possible occupations. In general, a 
rural household has five members in the family of which three are children. The household 
owned about 0.63 ha of land and earned a mean income of 38.28 million VND a year. 
However, a non-borrower household earned a mean income below the average.  
 
The microcredit characteristics are different from formal and informal credit sectors. On 
average, the formal microcredit given for a single loan is greater than the informal one. 
Interest rates vary more for the informal microcredit than the formal one. The formal interest 
rates are commonly fixed and below the average market interest rate for different microcredit 
schemes while the informal interest rates are excessively high. Two advantages of informal 
microcredit over formal microcredit are loan duration and loan processing time. The formal 
microcredit through microcredit programmes is associated with short-term loans, while the 
informal one is associated with longer term. The processing time is significantly less for an 
informal microcredit than a formal one. One equal advantage of formal and informal 
microcredit is the flexible interest payment frequency; borrowers are allowed to pay loan 
interest at some irregular basis in accordance to their income flow. Formal microcredit are 
mainly used for production purpose, while informal ones are largely given to consumption.  
 
In addition, the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS were used to analyse the microcredit programme 
impact evaluation. The data were collected in 2006 and 2008 following the commencement of 
the VBSP microcredit programme. Therefore appropreate impact evaluation models need to 
be defined in the subsequent analyses in order to obtain unbiased estimator for the microcredit 
impact evaluation.  
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    Chapter 6 
Determinants of Rural Households Access to Microcredit 
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the models for informal microcredit, 
accessibility to formal microcredit, and formal microcredit using survey data from the 
Mekong River Delta, Vietnam. The models are estimated using maximum likelihood method. 
The estimated results are expected to reflect the rural household‟s decisions to seek credit 
under credit constraint and coexistence of the informal and formal credit sectors in the rural 
credit market.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 specifies the empirical models of informal 
microcredit, accessibility to formal microcredit, and formal microcredit. Estimation strategies 
to obtain the desired estimates are also discussed for each model. Section 6.2 discusses the 
empirical findings of the three models. Finally, Section 6.3 summarises the results and 
discusses the empirical findings.    
 
6.1 Model Specification and Estimation Strategies 
6.1.1 Model Specification 
The empirical models of the informal microcredit, accessibility to formal microcredit, and 
formal microcredit of the rural household are rewritten from specified in the reduced form 
equations (see section 4.2.2) as follows:  
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = + + + +  u        IFL X H M G                 (6.1) 
 
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 = + + + +  B u          X H M G IFL                           (6.2) 
 
*1  0B if B   
 
 0 B otherwise  
 
 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 = + + + + +  B u         FL X H M G               (6.3) 
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All dependent variables and groups of independent varibles were previously defined in 
chapter 4.  However, in order to obtain the desired estimates, each equation in the model is 
defined in the following subsections.     
 
 Empirical model of informal loan (IFL) 
An informal microcredit is a function of individual and household characteristics plus a set of 
credit and geographic factors (see equation 6.1). The informal loan (ln IFL) is empirically 
specified as a function of age (ln AGE), gender (GENDER), no education (NOEDUC), land 
holding (OWN_LAND), savings (SAVINGS), number of children (NUM_CHILD), monthly 
household consumption (HH_CONS), household income levels (INCL_1, INCL_2, INCL3), 
informal loan purposes (IF_TRAD, IF_CONS), informal loan interest rate (IF_INT), informal 
loan duration (IF_DURA), and geographic factors (DRA_VIL, UBR_COM, ECO_COM).  
 
 Empirical model of accessibility to formal microcredit (B) 
Accessibility to formal microcredit is a function of age (ln AGE), marital status (MARRIED), 
ethnicity (ETHNIC), no education (NOEDUC), primary school (PRI_SCH), middle school 
(MID_SCH), local government employee (GOV_EMP), member of a credit group 
(CRE_MEM), poor certificate (POOR_CER), household income levels (INCL_1, INCL_2, 
INCL_3), main income sources (MI_FARM, MI_LIVES, MI_NONF), main income inflows 
(MINC_1, MINC_3, MINC_6, MINC_9), and geographic factors (DRA_VIL, ECO_COM, 
UBR_COM,). In addtion, the term informal loan (IFL) is also included as an exogeneous 
variable in the model because an informal loan is supposed to influence the household‟s 
decision to borrow a microloan. The dependent variable in equation (6.2), decision to borrow, 
is observed only as the borrowing status of the household. This borrowing status is interpreted 
as accessibility to microcredit. The borrowing status (B) takes the value 1 if the household 
borrowed a microloan and 0 otherwise. Non-borrower households fall into two groups: one 
group faces credit constraint, the other does not. Including the second group inthe sample 
might result in biased estimators since the households that do not face credit constraints tend 
to have a stable and high income and tend to save money instead of borrowing from a 
microcredit organisation. This inclusion might lower the coefficient of income in the analysis. 
Thus the credit unconstrained group is excluded from the sample. The borrowing variable, 
(B), includes only the credit constrained households and is replacedfor (Y*) in equation (6.2) 
for the model to be estimable. This model is now referred to as the borrowing model.  
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 Empirical model of formal microcredit (FL) 
The formal microcredit (FL) is a function of age (ln AGE), gender (GENDER), no education 
(NOEDUC), local government emplyee (GOV_EMP), main occupation (RI_FARM, 
UN_SKILL, OR_FARM), houshold size (HH_SIZE), number of children (NUM_CHILD), 
number of income earners (NUM_ERN), agricultural land (AGRI_LAND), health expense 
(HH_EXP), interest subsidy (SUB_INT), formal microcredit duration (F_SHO, F_MED), 
formal microcredit purposes (F_AGRI, F_TRAD, F_CONS), and geographic factors 
(DRA_VIL, ECO_COM, UBR_COM). In addtion, the borrowing decision is believed to be 
correlated with the formal microcredit since the formal microcredit given to a borrower is 
conditional on the self-selection of the household into the microcredit programme (Pham & 
Izumida, 2002; Zeller, 1994). In the other words, if households form themselves into a 
microcredit group to receive microloans then estimating this group with the pool of non-credit 
group participation and non-borrower group might suffer from selection bias (Heckman, 
1979). Therefore, the borrowing decision is also included in the formal microcredit equation 
6.3. Table 6.1 provides the names, descriptions, and summary statistics of all the explanatory 
and dependent variables to be used to estimate the formal microcredit model.   
 
The specification of the informal and formal microcredit models follows Zeller‟s (1994) 
framework that suggests individual characteristics (age, gender, education) and household 
characteristics (household size, wage income, assets, savings) are highly related to informal 
credit access. In addtion, other factors such as social responsibility of houshold head and 
location are also included in the determinant of the informal microcredit and accessibility to 
formal microcredit equation. To address the loan amount of formal credit, Pham and Izumida 
(2002) included the amount of formal credit in the accessibility to formal credit equation and 
use the Tobit model to investigate formal credit rationing in the rural credit market in 
Vietnam. In an attempt to determine the factors that influence informal loan, accessibility to 
microcredit and microcredit , our models‟ specification is similar to Pham and Izumida‟s 
(2002) model. 
 
The informal and formal credit sector coexist despite the fact that formal interest rates are 
substaintitally lower than those charged in the informal sector (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990); few 
empirical models have considerred this fact in their model. For example, Kochar (1997b), 
Diagne (1999) and Guirkinger (2008) are some of the pioneer papers advancing our 
understanding of the coexistence of formal and informal credit markets. Detail of these three 
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studies can be found in Chapter 4. The interaction between the formal and informal credit 
sectors will be examined in our model. The names, describtions and summary statistics of the 
independent variables used in the models are given in Table 6.1.      
 
 Definitions of the explanatory variables in the models 
In lending practice, many variables simulteneously determine assessiblity to microcredit as 
well as the loan amount of microcredit. For example, farm size is likely to affect the absolute 
amount of microcredit because farm size determines the total demand for credit. On the other 
hand, an increase in farm size tends to increase the credit worthiness of a household hence 
affects the supply side of credit (Pham & Izumida, 2002). This indicates the simultaneous 
nature of the demand for and supply of credit hence some variables might be jointly determine 
the lending process. The following subsection will define some addtional explanatory 
variables used in the model and discuss some simultaneous influences on the dependent 
variables. The the expected signs are ambiguously defined due to the simultaneous effects.  
 
Under the household characteristics, having a government poor certificate
22
 is one important 
factor that influences accessibility to microcredit because having a poor certificate is one 
criterion to be selected into a microcredit programme in Vietnam. This is an indicator for the 
Vietnamese government to monitor the coverage of the microcredit programmes since 2002. 
Particularly, information about poor households has been collected in the National Survey for 
the purpose of examining the coverage of National Target Program of microcredit and health 
programmes to the poor in Vietnam. However, having a poor certificate does not guarantee 
the poor households a microloan but it does give them a greater chance to participate in 
microcredit programme with a favourable interest rate. The descriptive analysis of the 
variables shows that 22% of the respondents with poor certificates in the survey did not have 
access to microcredit. This makes the poor certificate variable an interesting instrument to 
monitor the implementation of microcredit programmes in Vietnam. 
 
Interest rates and loan duration are also included as explanatory variables in order to 
determine the formal and informal microcredit. This is because interest rates are closely 
related to the credit demand and supply sides of the credit market and loan duraitons are 
                                                 
22
Poor certificate is based on the the national poverty line. In 2010, the national poverty line was set at 300,000 
VND (16 USD) per month per person. 
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related to risk and incentives in a loan contract of a certain type of microcredit. These two 
variables are known to highly influence the the formal and informal microcredit equations in 
the model.  
 
In this study, interest rate is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with microcredit, i.e., a 
low interest rate is associated with a higher demand for microcredit from rural household. 
However, including interest rate in the formal microcredit equation likely faces endogeneity 
problem because the interest rate serves as cost of money and it is simultaneous defined by 
credit supply and demand in the credit market (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). To capture the effect 
of interest rate, we used the subsidised interest rate which is defined as the difference between 
the average interest rate of commercial lending in 2009 and the interest rated given to rural 
households in the microcredit programme. This variable reflects the relationship between the 
demand for formal microcredit and the interest rate in terms of how much interest subsidy 
affects microcredit. Although, subsidised interest rate has been widely used in microcredit 
programmes, credit subsidy in the form of an interest rate below the market interest rate is 
arguably an effective tool to address poverty (Giné, 2010). 
 
Similarly, loan duration is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with loan size on the 
demand side of microcredit. In a capital shortage rural credit market like Vietnam, given a 
constant interest rate, households tend have higher demand for long-term loans. In addtion, 
some agricultural investments, e.g., replanting perennial crops requires longer loan duration 
than others. Long-term loans are also prefered for education expenses because returns to 
education of a university studenttakes at least after four years to repay the loan. Therefore, 
loan duration is expected to reflect with the loan size including the difference in lending 
practice in the formal and informal sectors. This specification of loan duration is consistent 
with Ho (2004) whose study concludes that short-term loans exhibit a higher probability from 
informal sources.   
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Table 6.1 Determinants of Informal Microcredit in Rural Vietnam 
Variable Description  Mean S.D. Min Max 
Individual characteristics     
AGE Age of household head (years) 47.29 13.34 22 89 
GENDER  Household head (1=male, 0=female)   0.45 0.50 0 1 
ETHNIC Ethnic group (1=ethnic group, 0= Kinh)    0.18 0.38 0 1 
MARRIED Marital status (1=married, 0=otherwise)     0.91 0.28 0 1 
NOEDUC  No education (D)    0.12 0.32 0 1 
PRI_SCH Primary school (D) 0.51 0.50 0 1 
MID_SCH Middle school (D) 0.24 0.43 0 1 
HIG_SCH High school level (D)      0.11 0.31 0 1 
GOV_EMP Work for local government (D)   0.19 0.39 0 1 
CRE_MEM Credit group member (D)     0.15 0.36 0 1 
OCCUPATION†      
RI_FARM Rice farming (D)      0.42 0.49 0 1 
UN_SKILL Unskilled worker (D)     0.19 0.39 0 1 
OR_FARM Orchard farming (D)    0.11 0.31 0 1 
      
Household characteristics     
HH_SIZE  Household size (persons) 4.46 1.63 1 11 
NUM_ERN Number of income earners (persons) 2.53 1.39 0 10 
NUM_CHIL Number of children (persons) 3.12 1.96 0 10 
OWN_LAND Landownership (1=land owner,  
0= otherwise)     
0.66 0.48 0 1 
AGRI_LAND Agricultural land (1,000m
2
) 6.27 13.84 0 300 
POOR_CER Household having poor certificate (D)     0.26 0.44 0 1 
SAVINGS Household having savings (D)   0.34 0.47 0 1 
HH_INC Household income (million dong) 38.25 46.94 1 567.2 
SUB_INC  Subsidised income (million dong) 2.48 9.61 0.2 180.0 
HH_CON Hh. consumption (million dong) 22.91 23.90 0.003 434.8 
HEA_EXP Health expenditure (million dong) 1.57 7.36 0 150.0 
MAIN INCOME INFLOWS†     
MINC_9 Main income from [9-12) months (D)     0.22 0.41 0 1 
MINC_6 Main income from [6-9) months (D)     0.09 0.29 0 1 
MINC_3 Main income from [3-6) months (D)    0.04 0.20 0 1 
MINC_1 Main income from [1-3) months (D)    0.03 0.17 0 1 
MAIN INCOME SOURCE†     
MI_FARM Main inc. from farming (D)   0.47 0.50 0 1 
MI_LIVES Main inc. from livestock (D)   0.25 0.43 0 1 
MI_NONF Main inc. from nonfarm (D)   0.11 0.32 0 1 
INCOME LEVEL†        
INCL_1 Average income below 
300,000dong/person/month) (D) 
0.24 0.43 0 1 
INCL_2 Average income between 300,000dong  
to 600,000dong/person/month) (D) 
0.31 0.46 0 1 
INCL_3 Average income between 600,000dong  
to 1,000,000dong/person/month)    (D) 
0.20 0.40 0 1 
Informal credit      
IFL Max informal loan (Million dong) 3.54 8.16 0 100 
IF_DURA Informal loan duration (months) 10.66 21.39 0 60 
IF_INTER Informal interest (%/month) 3.94 12.27 0 240 
INFORMAL LOAN PURPOSES     
IF_AGRI Informal loan for agricultural production (D) 0.17 0.38 0 1 
IF_TRAD Informal loan for small trade (D) 0.06 0.23 0 1 
IF_CONS Informal loan for consumption (D) 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Formal credit      
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Source: The author‟s survey data, 2010.  
Note:     D is dummy variable, indicating the variable takes the value of 1 if the statement is true and 0 if 
otherwise.                    
              †  At least one sub-group is excluded from this categorical variable in the estimation. 
              †† Some variables do not have full observations due to missing data. 
 
Development economic theory suggests that if the rural credit market is underdeveloped and 
fragmented and if formal credit is difficult to access, informal credit can help the households 
to reduce credit constraints. This underdevelopment of the market is largely attributed to 
factors such as poor physical infrastruture as well as institutional development (Conning & 
Udry, 2007). Therefore, variables such as direct road access from the home village to the 
commune centre, urbanised commune, and ethnic concentration commune, are also included 
as explanatory variables in the model. Table 6.1 documents the names, descriptions and 
summary statistics of the explanatory and dependent variables used to estimate the informal 
loan model.  
 
Geographic factors serve as a set of instruments that control for geographical differences at 
the village and commune levels. The inculsion of this group follows Jalan and Ravallion 
(2002), whose study suggests a set of geographic factors to explain household consumption 
growth in the standard Ramsey model. Under geographic factors, three variables namely 
urbanised commnue, direct road access at village level, and ethnic concentration commune 
are assumed to be exognenous to the households‟ decision to borrow formal microcredit and 
FL Max formal microloan (million dong) 12.58 16.18 0.4 150 
F_INTER Formal interest (%/month) 0.69 0.39 0 1.9 
F_DURA Loan duration (Months) 20.70 20.25 0 120 
SUB_INT Subsidised interest rate (%) 1.03 0.46 0 1.5 
FORMAL LOAN PURPOSES†     
F_AGRI Formal loan for agricultural production (D)     0.49 0.50 0 1 
F_TRAD Formal loan for small trade/investment (D)     0.08 0.26 0 1 
F_EDUC Formal loan for education (D)    0.05 0.22 0 1 
F_CONS Formal loan for consumption (D)    0.12 0.33 0 1 
LOAN DURATION†     
F_SHO Short-term loan from 1 to 12 months (D)     0.48 0.50 0 1 
F_MED Medium-term loan from 12 to 36 months (D) 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Geographic 
factors 
     
DRA_VIL Direct road access to village(D) 0.63 0.48 0 1 
ECO_COM  Ethnic concentration com (D) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
URB_COM Urbanized commune (D) 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Dependent variables     
IFL Max informal loan (million dong) 3.54 8.16 0 100 
FL Max formal microloan (million dong) 12.58 16.18 0.4 150 
B Borrowing status in microloan (B=1 if 
borrowed, B=0 otherwise)   
0.67 0.47 0 1 
Number of observations††  919  
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are hypothesised to be highly correlated to informal loans. All variables in the geographic 
factors are dummy variables that receive the value 1 if the statement is true and 0 otherwise. 
 
The urbanised commune variable is defined as a commune that is located in rural area 
adjacent to a city or town where industrial zone(s) are present. The travel distance from the 
commune to the industrial zone(s) is not more than 10 kilometres. Householdsliving in 
urbanised communes may have a higher incidence of employement in non-farm enterprises in 
these industrial zone(s) that entail a higher income from non-farm sources and ensures stable 
comsumption for the households. Hence, the housesholds may less likely to participate in a 
microcredit scheme and less likely to borrow an informal loan. This variable is specified 
differently in Kochar (1997b) in which the author argued that urbanised districts have more 
concrete roads, which likely improve access to formal credit. 
 
Direct road access at the village level is defined as a village that has direct concrete road 
connecing to the commune centre. This specification is similar to the study by Ho (2004) 
where the average distance from the commune to the main formal microcredit institutions was 
used to control for the availability of formal microcredit. In Vietnam, particularly in the MRD 
where there are many rivers and river branches coupled with poor infrastructure such as road 
and bridges, makes the endowment of geographic factors really matter for rural households‟ 
livelihood. It is beleived that households located in villages that have easy road access to the 
commune centre where the formal credit branches are present will have a higher chance of 
accessing to formal microcredit. Meanwhile, the households in remote rural areas with 
difficult road access are likely to borrow from informal sources more often than access formal 
microcredit. 
 
 Ethnic concentration at the commune level controls for differences in ethnicity because 
ethnicity issue is closely related to poverty in Vietnam (Nguyen, Albrecht, Vroman, & 
Westbrook, 2007). Ethnic differentials are evident in all geographic and income levels, 
although the adverse effects of minority status are most pronounced among poor households 
in remote areas (Teerawichitchainan & Phillips, 2008). For this reason, communes with a 
higher ethnic concentration migh have a higher likelihood of being selected into the national 
microcredit programme. This, in turn, might provide the household with a higher likelihood of 
receiving formal microcredit in these communes than the household in other communes. 
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6.1.2 Estimation Strategies 
This section addresses some estimation issues to ensure consistent coefficients are obtained in 
the final results. The first consideration is the distribution of the dependent variables, formal 
and informal loan. Next, the problem of a truncated dependent variable is considered when 
estimating the simultaneous model with a truncated right hand side endogeneous variable. The 
restriction from the exclusion of explanatory variables in the covariates is also considered for 
the identification of simultaneous equations. Finally, tests for multicollinearity and 
heteroskedasticity are conducted to validate the statistical tests of coefficients before 
inferences from the estimated results can be made.  
 
Distributions of the dependent variables informal and formal loan were examined in level and 
in natural logarithmic forms (see Appendix A-1). The distribution of the formal microcredit is 
very right-skewed due to its nature that loan amount ranges from zero to infinity hence the 
loans in the level form will be transformed to the logarithmic scale. Transforming the 
dependent variable into log form gives the estimation the following advantages. First, at the 
level form a linear model tends to provide very poor predictions because it restricts the effects 
of regressors to be additive (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). For example, age of household may 
increase the formal microcredit by a constant amount regardless of the observed loan amount. 
This seems unrealistic in microcredit since there should be a maximum limit for a loan 
contract for each household imposed by the credit provider. Secondly, if log transformaton is 
applied to both sides of the equation, it gives more intuitive economic meaning to the 
estimated coefficient, called elasticity. For example, if an estimated coefficient 0.05j  , 
then a 1% change in x j  is associated with a proportionate increase of 5% in the formal loan. 
Lastly, log transformation brings the distribution of the error terms of the model close to the 
normal distribution. To be consistent, the dependent, informal micorcredit, and all the 
independent variables in our model, except the dummy variables, are also transformed to 
natural logarithms. 
 
The informal microcredit (IFL) and accessibility to microcredit (B) models can be estimated 
following Rivers & Vuong‟s (1988) probit model with continuous endogenous variable at the 
right hand side(probit RHS). The probit RHS estimates jointly two equations to obtain 
consistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). However, as Rivers and Vuong (1988) referred to 
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the endogenous variable at the right hand side as continuous, the IFL in our model is 
continuous but it is not fully observed for all observations. In the other words, the 
endogeneous IFL is truncated at some point where the formal microcredit are recorded but the 
informal microcredit are not. A formal microcredit is officially recorded but an informal 
microcredit can be any unwritten contract without verification. Therefore, the respondents 
tend to hide the amount of the informal microcredit or even exaggerate the amount during the 
interview process. Empirical evidence from other study in Pakistan indicates that when 
conducting interviews with informal lenders to obtain information about informal loans was 
even more difficult because of concern that the obtained information may end up with the 
government (for example, see Aleem, 1990). Any hidden informal loan amount, however, if 
not taken into account, might result biases in the borrowing model that might lead to other 
biases in determining the microcredit model. The unobserved amount of informal microcredit 
is a truncated variable.  
 
To take into account truncation in accessibility to formal microcredit, a Tobit model will be 
used to estimate the informal microcredit in the first step, following Rivers and Vuong (1988). 
Then the probit model using the residual of the informal credit is estimated in the second step. 
Alternatively, the equations can be estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood 
estimation. This, however, can also be estimated using the conditional mixed process (cmp) 
introduced by Roodman (2009).  
 
Restrictions on exclusion are recommended to check for robust identification for the models. 
The exclusion restrictions require that the borrowing equation (6.2) has at least one exogenous 
variable that is excluded from the formal microcredit equation (6.3). Moreover, the excluded 
variable should have substantial impact on the probability of selection (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2009). This restriction, however, can be satisfied in our models because the informal 
microcredit (equation 6.1) is endogeneous in the selection and the informal microcredit does 
not directly influence the formal microcredit. Specifying this way, the informal microcredit is 
expected to be significant in the accessibility to formal microcredit and the informal 
microcredit should have at least one valid explanatory variable as an instrument. In addtion, to 
obtain more robust identification, the dependent variables were  fitted using different 
covariates of the individual characteristics, household characteristics, formal microcredit, and 
geographic factors in which some of the variables in the covariate of the selection equation 
are excluded from the outcome equation and vice versa (Greene, 2003). 
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Tests for multicollinearityand heteroskedasticity were also conducted to check for the 
consistency and robustness of coefficients in the models. VIF tests for the linear forms of the 
three equations confirmed no collinearity in the model; however, the Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity concluded at the 1% level that heteroskedasticity 
presents in the three equations. Therefore, the models were estimated using robust variance to 
resolve hetereskedasticity. A summary of the tests for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity 
is presented in Appendix A-2.    
 
6.2 Results and Discussion 
6.2.1 Determinants of Informal Microcredit 
Table 6.1 shows the parameter estimates of the informal microcreditmodel. Overall, 896 
observations were used to calculate the estimated coefficients. The likelihood ratio test, with 
the Chi-square statistic equal to 156.24 with 23 degrees of freedom, rejects at the 1% level the 
null hypothesis that the parameter estimates for the model are all equal to zero. As a result, the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables can be used to explain the informal microcredit.  
 
For endogeneity relationship between the informal microcredit and accessibility to formal 
microcredit models, the estimated coefficient 12ˆ 0.216  is positive and significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that a positive correlation exists between the unobserved factors in the 
informal microcredit and accessibility to formal microcredit. The probit endogenous model 
and the selection model suggest that there are unobserved factors such as entrepreneurship, 
personal accountability, or attitude of housheolds in the formal or informal credit sectors, etc., 
that might induce the household to either borrow from the formal or informal sectors or not 
borrow from either sector (Heckman, 1979; Rivers & Vuong, 1988). The estimated 12ˆ  
suggests that, holding informal microcredit and all other observable factors constant, if a 
household head exhibits a high degree of entrepreneurial skills, that willl enable him or her to 
have a higher likelihood in accessing formal microcredit than those who do not have such 
skills.  
 
This relationship is particularly true in many formal microcredit programmes where the 
selection of borrowers is based on group voting. Credit group members vote not just for their 
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peers based on observed factors but also based on the next of kin relationship for the 
unobserved factors. This is possible because credit group members have more information 
about their peers than the credit provider. If a financially constrained household with high 
entrepreneurial skills has borrowed an informal microcredit, there is a higher probability that 
he or she will be able to access formal microcredit. The significance of this correlation also 
confirms the interaction between the formal and informal credit sectors where there is a 
positive relationship between the informal microcredit and access to formal microcredit if a 
household exhibits a positive unobserved desire to borrow money in order to improve its 
family‟s livelihood.  
 
Empirical research often presumes the existence of the informal credit sector and considers it 
as an exogeneous variable that affects the accessibility to microcredit. This presumption, 
therefore, tends to ignore the endogeneity effect of the informal microcredit. Therefore, when 
the informal microcredit equation is specified and estimated simultaneously with the 
accessibility to formal microcredit equation, the unobserved factors in the accessibility to 
formal microcredit equation likely account for more unobserved bias in the model of access to 
formal credit. Consequently, the estimated result of the probability of access to formal 
microcredit is more reliable hence better predictive power for accessibility will be achieved. 
In our result, the interaction between the formal and informal microcredit sectors is 
documented; hence, this problem is appropriately addressed. The result is consistent with 
Kochar (1997b) whose results provide evidence of the important role of the informal credit 
sector in determining participation in the formal credit sector. However, this result contrasts 
with Diagne (1999) whose findings reject the bias from informal microcredit characteristics to 
the formal microcredit equation due to weak correlation. 
 
Holding all explanatory variables unchanged, the constant indicates that, rural households 
tend to borrow 2.4 million VND in informal microcredit without considering any covariates 
that control for differences among households. This prediction is much lower than the average 
formal microcredit, which is 6.37 million VND. The precision of this prediction is not 
statistically significant because informal microcredit are truncated. This will be explained 
further as more explanatory variables enter our model to form the determiants of the informal 
microcredit. 
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We now turn to the determinants of the informal microcredit. The estimated results show that 
the informal microcredit is significantly explained by the following factors: ln AGE, 
NOEDUC, OWN_LAND, SAVINGS, ln HH_INC, INCL_1, INC_2, IF_TRAD, IF_CONS, 
IF_INTER, ln IF_DUR, DRA_VIL, and URB_COM.  
Under the individual charateristics, the coefficients ln AGE and NOEDUC are negative 
significant at the 10% level. This implies a proportionate change in age with the informal 
microcredit, older household heads tend to borrow proportionately less informal loans. This 
finding supports the evidence of Pham and Izumida (2002) whose study showed that age has 
an inverse relationship with the informal credit demand in Vietnam. On the other hand, the 
inverse relationship between education and the informal loan suggests that household head 
with no education level tends to borrow less informal microcredit compared to household 
heads with educational attainment. This finding does not support most empirical evidence that 
additional education tends reduce the level of informal credit demand (Barslund & Tarp, 
2008) (see Table 6.2).       
 
For household characteristics, the positive significant OWN_LAND coefficient at the 1% 
level indicates that households who hold land borrow more from informal lenders than 
landless households (see Table 6.2). In fact, the land-holding household borrows as much as 
31.5% more than the landless household, other factors held constant. As in the case of credit 
constraint, we assumed that households lack working capital for agricultural production, 
therefore, greater land-holding households are likely to require more inputs such as fertilisers. 
Land-holding households can obtain these agricultural inputs in the form of informal 
microcredit from the local input suppliers. On the other hand, land-holding households can 
obtain more informal microcredit because they have collateral for informal loans as the 
informal lender‟s decision to give a loan is heavily based on the wealth of the borrower. This 
finding supports the evidence that most informal lenders‟ decision to approve a loan request is 
based on the wealth of the borrower, which is an indicator of repayment capacity (Zeller, 
1994).  
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Table 6.2 Determinants of Informal Microcredit in Rural Vietnam 
 Coefficient R.S.E. P_value 
ln Informal loan amount (ln IFL)   
Constant  0.882 0.768 0.251 
Individual characteristics    
ln AGE -0.362
*
 0.207 0.080 
GENDER -0.104 0.090 0.252 
NOEDUC -0.232
*
 0.132 0.078 
Household characteristics    
OWN_LAND  0.315
***
 0.100 0.002 
SAVINGS -0.312
**
 0.127 0.014 
ln  NUM_CHILD -0.039 0.095 0.679 
ln HH_CONS 
a
 -0.036 0.036 0.328 
INCL_1 -0.321
**
 0.145 0.027 
INCL_2 -0.308
**
 0.137 0.025 
INCL_3 -0.133 0.146 0.362 
Informal credit    
IF_TRADE  0.416
**
 0.182 0.022 
IF_CONS  0.663
***
 0.091 0.000 
IF_INTER  0.505
***
 0.042 0.000 
ln IF_DURA  0.438
***
 0.031 0.000 
Geographic factors    
DRA_VIL  0.342
**
 0.145 0.018 
ECO_COM  0.068 0.139 0.624 
URB_COM -0.397
***
 0.111 0.000 
Accessibility to formal microcredit (probit estimation results are omitted) 
23  0.220
*
 0.112 0.051 
23ˆ  0.216 0.107  
Number of observations
†
 896   
Log likelihood -1379.82   
Chi2(23)
 
126.54   
Note: 1. R.S.E. stands for Robust Standard Errors 
          2. 
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
          3. 
a
 indicates VND/month 
          4. 
†
 is smaller than the number of respondents in the sample due to missing data 
 
The coefficient SAVS is negative and significant at the 5% level indicating that savings in 
household significantly reduced the demand for informal microcredit. Economic theory 
suggests that savings helps the rural household self-insures against natural disasters that may 
affect its income. Savings is compulsory in some microcredit programmes that aim to help 
members to build up their assets over time or to smooth future consumption (Aghion & 
Morduch, 2005). The negative relationship of savings with informal microcredit indicates that 
households can subsidise their savings to demand for an informal microcredit. This finding 
partially reflects the idea that savings is  a substitute source of credit rather than a source of 
collateral for the lenders (Fenwick & Lyne, 1998). In terms of the household income, the 
significant negative coefficients of income level indicates that the informal microcredit is 
strongly associated with the income level of the borrower. The specification of income levels 
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categorises the rural household into four groups
23
: group 1 is poor, group 2 is low-income, 
group 3 is average and group 4 is others. Comparing among different income levels, the 
significant coefficients of income levels 1 and 2 show significantly that poor and low-income 
households tend to borrow from informal microcredit sources although the amount of 
informal loans differ. Meanwhile, households with fairly high income show no statsitical 
evidence of demand for informal microcredit.  
 
Under informal credit factors, the loan purposes (IF_TRAD) and (IF_CONS) coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Informal microcredit are 
strongly associated with trade and consumption purposes. The demand for informal loans to 
finance consumption is more than 60% higher than informal loan for other purposes, followed 
by demand for trading activities, which is 50% higher than loan for other purposes. 
Interestingly, this high demand for informal microcredit, however, can be reduced by 31.2% if 
rural househoulds have savings as discussed earlier.  
 
The informal interest (IF_INT) and (IF_DUR) duration coefficients are postive significant at 
the 1% level. The formal loan duration coefficient indicates that informal microcredit tend to 
change proportionately with changes in loan duration; rural households consider the 
importance of the flexibility of informal microcredit rather than the interest rate. Because an 
informal loan is a flexible contract, borrowers can either terminate or extend the loan duration 
according to their repayment capacity; the longer the loan duration, the larger loan size they 
borrow. Informal interest, on the other hand, is significant but opposite sign to the 
hypothesised sign. We hypothesised that a higher interest rate tend to reduce the demand for 
informal microcredit; however, this hypothesis is significantly rejected. This relationship may 
be explained by the fact that the households facing credit constraints are most likely rejected 
by the formal credit sector. In addition, the informal microcredit market is likely to be a 
momopolistic market where a few lenders can actually manipulate the supply of the informal 
credit. Therefore, obtaining an informal microcredit with a relatively higher interest rate is the 
only choice.  
 
                                                 
23
The new poverty line was set by the Prime Minister in the Resolution 170/2005/QD-TTg issued on July 8th, 
2005: “...where households in rural areas having income less than 300,000 VND/person/month are classified as 
poor”. 
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For geographic factors, both DRA_VIL and URB_COM variables are significant at the 1% 
level. The negative coefficient of URB_COM  indicatesthat the household residing in 
communes that are adjacent to industrial zones tend to demand 40% less for informal 
microcredit than the household residing in the other communes. While the positive coefficient 
of DRA_VIL shows that  households in villages that have direct road access demand as much 
as 34.4% higher for informal microcredit than households in other village with poor 
transportation. This result does not support our hypothesis that households in remote rural 
areas with difficult road access are likely to borrow more from informal sources. In fact, 
higher demand for informal microcredit in the rural credit market in the MRD is probably 
attriubuted to road condition improvement which enables the rural household greater 
accessibility to different forms of informal microcredit such as cash in advance from input 
suppliers or seed and fertiliser from marketing agents. 
 
6.2.2 Determinants of Accessibility to Formal Microcredit 
Table 6.2 presents the determinants of accessibility to formal microcredit, including the 
parameter estimates and marginal effects. As for the endogeneity model for informalmicro 
credit, the likelihood ratio test (
( 23)
2 =207.6) rejects the null hypothesis that the parameter 
estimates for the probit model are equal to zero; the model can be used to explain the 
probability of accessing formal microcredit by rural households. Overall, the probit model 
successfully predicts the possibility of the household‟s accessibility to formal microcredit for 
73.10% of cases (see Appendix A-3). Given the relatively high predictive power, calculation 
of marginal effects for the regressors will give a direct interpretation of the influence of these 
variables on the household‟s accessibility to formal microcredit.   
 
The estimated results show that the assessibility to formal microcredit (B) is significantly 
explained by the following factors: ln AGE, MARRIED, ETHNIC, GOV_EMP, CRE_MEM, 
POOR_CER, INCL_1, MI_FARM, MI_LIVES, MINC_6, DRA_VIL,  ECO_COM, 
URB_COM and ln IFL (see Table 6.3). The significant positive informal loan (ln IFL) at the 
1% level means that the informal microcredit positively influences the probability of access to 
formal microcredit. As the test for endogeneity confirmed the simultaneous effect of the 
unobserved factors of the informal microcredit on accessibility to formal microcredit, the 
significant informal microcredit coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in the informal 
microcredit will likely increase the probability of accessibility to formal microcredit by 5%. 
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This positive relationship is expected because informal microcredit are costly while formal 
microcredit are much cheaper. As the survey results showed, the average interest rate of 
informal microcredit is five times higher than the formal microcredit interest rate. Therefore, 
the household who happened to borrow an informal loan might seek a loan from the formal 
microcredit sector to repay or roll over the informal credit. This turns out to be true in many 
cases whereby poor and low-income households try to participate in formal microcredit 
programmes to borrow at a preferable rate and use the formal microcredit to pay the informal 
loan. Currently, these households are found in the overdue payment status in the microcredit 
schemes. This switching status is refered to as the moral hazard problem in the rural credit 
market; it occurs in many formal microcredit programmes with a poverty reduction objective 
targeting the rural poor and low-income groups. Wherein, microloans are often expected as 
given and repayment is expected to be low.    
 
Among individual characteristics, age (ln AGE), marital status (MARRIED), ethnicity 
(ETHNIC), government employee (GOV_EMP), and member of credit group (CRE_MEM) 
are significant postive predictors of accessibility to formal microcredit (see Table 6.3). The 
age of household head proportionately influences the probability of accessibility to formal 
microcredit at the 1% level. Holding other factors constant, a proportionate change in age 
group increases as much as 20.3% probability of accessibility to formal microcredit. This 
proportionate change contrasts with Barslund and Tarp‟s (2008) finding that reports a 
negative effect of age on the probability of access to formal microcredit in Vietnam. 
However, our finding is consistent with Zeller‟s result where age likely increased the 
probability of access to formal microcredit in rural Madagascar. This relationship is 
reasonably explained in our study because the age of household head is believed to relate to 
controlling over a household‟s resources. In Vietnam, the age of the household head involves 
in the formal microcredit participation as a proxy for accountability which indiates a 
commitment to repay loan to microcredit providers. Similarly, the significant positive sign for 
the marital status (MARRIED) and ethnicity (ETHNIC) variables at the 5% level implies that 
married household heads and ethnic family are more likely to access a microcredit 
programme. This latter positive relationship is expected in the Vietnam rural credit market 
because many microcredit programmes are designed to provide microcredit particularly to 
ethnic groups.   
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Table 6.3 Determinants of Accessibilityy to Formal Microcredit and Its Marginal 
Effects 
      Coefficient R.S.E. P_value Marginal effect
b
 
ln Formal microcredit (results omitted)    
Accessibility to formal microcredit (B)    
Constant -3.144
***
 0.773 0.000  
Individual characteristics     
ln AGE   0.585
***
 0.186 0.002 0.203 
MARRIED  0.336
**
 0.154 0.030 0.124 
ETHNIC  0.327
**
 0.159 0.039 0.107 
NOEDUC -0.127 0.200 0.524 -0.045 
PRI_SCH -0.032 0.153 0.835 -0.011 
MID_SCH  -0.117 0.170 0.493 -0.041 
GOV_EMP  0.413
***
 0.133 0.002 0.132 
CRE_MEM  0.370
**
 0.153 0.016 0.119 
Household characteristics     
POOR_CER  0.643
***
 0.123 0.000 0.201 
INCL_1 -0.342
*
 0.177 0.054 -0.123 
INCL_2  -0.026 0.163 0.874 -0.009 
INCL_3  -0.025 0.156 0.872 -0.009 
MI_FARM  0.577
***
 0.127 0.000 0.197 
MI_LIVES  0.598
***
 0.136 0.000 0.188 
MI_NONF  0.149 0.132 0.260 0.051 
MINC_9 
a
 -0.168 0.117 0.151 -0.060 
MINC_6 
a
  0.300
*
 0.180 0.096 0.097 
MINC_3 
a
 -0.209 0.233 0.369 -0.076 
MINC_1 
a
  0.009 0.262 0.972 0.003 
Geo-economic factors     
DRA_VIL  0.659
***
 0.155 0.000 0.235 
ECO_COM  0.643
***
 0.184 0.001 0.195 
URB_COM -0.255
**
 0.120 0.033 -0.089 
Endogenous variable     
ln IFL   0.143
***
 0.052 0.006 0.050 
23  -0.380
*
 0.222 0.087  
Number of observations
†
 896 
Log likelihood -1132.0 
 Chi2
 
207.6 
Predicted probability   70.98% 
Note: 1. R.S.E. stands for Robust Standard Errors.  
          2. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
          3.
a
 indicates months/year 
          4. b Marginal effect is evaluated at the mean value and is interpreted differently for dummy variables 
          5. † is smaller than the number of respondents in the sample due to missing data 
 
The local government employee coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the government employee is a significant contributor to rural households‟ 
accessibility to formal microcredit. A household having a member working as a village or 
township official will have access to greater amount of information about microcredit 
programmes than other household in the village. The result shows these households have 
13.2% higher probability of accessing a microcredit than other households. In addition, in 
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Vietnam the employees‟ contribution to the local village or commune is highly recognised by 
the commune leaders. This work relationship enables an easier approval from the commune 
leader in the screening process. The result is consistent with the finding in Li et al.‟s (2011) 
study in which households with members working as local officials in China seem to have 
easier access to microcredit due to good personal relationships with the local financial 
institutions (see Table 6.3).  
 
The positive and significant CRE_MEM coefficient indicates that, if a household is a member 
of a credit group in a village, he or she has an11.9% higher probability to receive a 
microcredit than non-members. As a member of a credit group is designed to capture the 
mixture of lending policies in formal microcredit, many microcredit programmes have 
followed lending through group
24
 method (individual lending is also available). Lending 
through group practice seems to be working in Vietnam because it employs social sanctions, 
self-incentives and self-monitoring but does not strictly follow joint-liability group lending. 
Thus, an improvement in formal microcredit accessibility can be achieved for rural 
households, provided they are organised in a microcredit group (see Table 6.3).   
 
Four income-related factors, INCL_1, MI_FARM, MI_LIVES, and MINC_6, are signficant 
in explaining the borrowing status. For household income levels, the results show that income 
level 1 (INCL_1) is negative and significant at the 10% level. As one of the formal criteria for 
credit rationing, the income level particularly differentiates the lowest income borrowers from 
the group of borrowers. This means the poorest group receives a significantly lower loan 
amount, 12.3% less than other brrowers. Microcredit programmes favourably select rural 
households that have main income sources from farming (MI_FARM) and livestock feeding 
(MI_LIVES). At 1% significance level, farming households have a 19.7% higher probability 
and livestock feeding households have an 18.8% higher probability to access microcredit than 
other households based on main income sources. In addtion, at the 10% level, households that 
                                                 
24
In Vietnam, lending through a group is popular in making loans to rural poor households. This lending practice 
is adapted from the group lending technique but does not strictly follow the joint-liability principle. The 
borrowers are required to form a group including a number of certified poor members and a group leader without 
joint specification. The group leader‟s tasks are: (i) to provide information about group members to microcredit 
officers; (ii) to collect loan applications from group members and disperse the loans, and (iii) to convince 
members to repay their loans. In case of default, the responsibility of dealing with default borrowers is the 
microcredit officer; the group leader helps persuade them to repay. As a result, lending through a group is 
popular but it is simply a mechanism to reduce transaction costs rather than to reduce default risk. However, 
lending through a group is more effective in dealing with asymmetric information than in individual lending 
(Quach, 2005).      
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have income flow of 6 to 9 months a year (MINC_6) have a 10% higher probability to access 
microcredit than other households.       
 
The above findings exhibit important evidence in the microfinance literature. As microcredit 
programmes are designed to target the lowest income group so that microcredit can help 
households at the bottom of the population pyramid to improve their livelihoods and get out 
of poverty. Our finding indicates that the lowest income group faces more credit rationing 
than other groups in the selection process. This finding is consistent with the study of 
microcredit in Bangladesh by Amin, Rai and Topa (2003) who concluded that microcredit 
successfully reached the poor, but is less successful at reaching the vunerable. Moreover, 
microcredit is unsuccessful at reaching the group most prone to destitution, the vulnerable 
poor. The findings reflect the paradox in microfinance that “Why doesn‟t capital naturally 
flow to the poor?” addressed by Aghion and Morduch (2005). The question provides a 
foundation to why many countries need policy intervention in rural credit markets, 
particularly the credit market to serve the poor and low-income households (see Table 6.3).  
 
Interestingly, our findings reveal that, although microcredit programmes are not successfully 
reaching the lowest income group, government intervention is effective in adjusting the defect 
of microlending. The poor certificate coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level and 
its effect shows that the certified poor households have as much as a 20.1% higher probability 
of obtaining a formal microcredit. The result supports our hypothesis that having a poor 
certificate is one important criterion to access to formal microcredit. The result also shows the 
consistency of the National Poverty Reduction Programme in targeting and ensuring a wider 
outreach of microcredit programmes to rural households, particularly the rural poor in 
Vietnam, in general, and the MRD in particular.  
 
All geographic factors coefficients have the anticipated signs and are significantly associated 
with the probability of access to formal microcredit. The significant positive DRA_VIL 
coefficient implies that households residing in villages with direct road access have as much 
as a 23.5% higher possibility in participating in microcredit programmes than other 
households. Similarly, the significant positive URB_COM coefficient implies that households 
living in urbanised communes are 10% less likely to participate in microcredit programmes 
than other households. Conversely, rural households in ethnic concentration communes have 
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as much as a 20% probability to access formal microcredit. The findings strongly support the 
development finance view that underdevelopment of physical infrastructure highly contributes 
to credit inaccessibility (see Table 6.3).   
 
Finally, the estimated coefficient 23  is significant at the 10% level. A sample selection 
model (Heckman, 1979) suggests that there are always unobserved factors such as 
entrepreneurship, accountability, and attitude of household heads that might influence them  
to participate in a microcredit programme. This means participation in a formal microcredit 
programme significantly determines the formal microcredit equation. The results of the 
microcredit model are discussed in the following subsection.   
 
6.2.3 Determinants of Formal Microcredit 
Table 6.4 summarises the results of formal microcredit using the Heckman two-step model 
and cmp. Tests for sample selection, equivalent to the null hypothesis 0  , significantly 
comfirm that a selection bias problem is present in the three models and this problem is 
appropriately addressed in the first step. The presence of sample selection bias is consistent 
with Pham and Izumida‟s (2002) study of the Vietnam rural credit market. We can also 
estimate the formal microcredit using the conditional maximum likelihood mixed process. 
This estimation technique provides more desired estimates because the cmp method includes 
more observations in the estimating procedures to allow more variation in the covariates as 
well as increasing the robustness of the power of tests for endogeneity of informal 
microcredit. Moreover, the inclusion of more observations in the model makes the results 
more consistent with the estimated results in previous steps in terms of the number of 
observations. The likelihood ratio test (
( 23)
2 =207.6) gives this model an identical conclusion 
to the Hecknan model‟s. As a result, the estimated results using the cmp method are used to 
explain the determinants of formal microcredit in the subsequent analysis.  
 
The formal microcredit (ln FL) is significantly explained by the following factors: NOEDUC, 
RI_FARM, UN_SKILL, ln AGRI_LAND, ln HEA_EXP, ln SUB_INT, F_EDUC, and 
URB_COM (see Table 6.4).  
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The significant negative sign of the rice farmer and unskilled worker coefficients at the 1% 
level indicate that rural households receive 27.6% less than the average formal microcredit if 
they were rice farmers (RI_FARM) and receive 23.5% less microcredit if they were in the 
unskilled worker group (UN_SKILL) (see Table 6.4). Since different sources of income 
explain the loan purpose in the screening process, the variables rice farmer (RI_FARM), 
unskilled worker (UN_SKILL) and orchard farmer (OR_FARM) explain the repayment 
capacity in determining the loan amount. These occupations reflect a lower payment capacity 
than other occupations such as skilled-labourer or non-farm activities. Although most 
microcredit schemes provide relatively the same amount of small loans to rural households, a 
significant difference in loan size can be found in the formal loan determining stage if the 
household head‟s occupation is considered.   
 
The no education (NOEDUC) coefficient is negative significant at the 5% level in the formal 
microcredit determining stage. Holding other factors constant, having any form of education 
attainment gives the applicants a 17% higher loan than no education applicants. The 
consistent negative sign for education on the informal microcredit, formal microcredit 
accessibility and formal microcredit models implies that education attainment is particularly 
important. Head‟s education reflects creditworthiness in the rural credit market. Meanwhile, 
being illiterate is one of the biggest disadvantages in getting access to any form of 
microcredit. These disadvantaged households likely face external credit rationing in that they 
tend to be excluded from the selection process of microcredit programmes. However, these 
households also face credit rationing in the informal sector. As a result, these households are 
likely to be internally rationed. If internal credit rationing becomes dominant, the households 
tend not to borrow. This is reflected in the interview that many poor households answered 
they currently have a demand for a microloan but they could not get access to the microcredit 
programme. Similarly, when asked about the future demand for microcredit, they indicated a 
zero demand.  
 
Under household characteristics, the ln AGRI_LAND and ln HEA_EXP variables 
significantly influence formal microcredit. First, agricultural land is positive significant at the 
1% level which implies that a 1% increase in agricultural land increases formal microcredit by 
8.8%. The result reconfirms the positive relationship between agricultural land and demand 
for formal microcredit; this is also true for the informal credit. That reflects the important role 
of land in the rural credit market where households with land always have an advantage over 
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landless households once they join the credit group. The result is consistent with Zeller (1994) 
in Madagascar and Pham and Izumida (2002) in Vietnam (see Table 6.4).  
 
The health expenses (ln HEA_EXP) coefficient is positive and significant, which indicates 
that formal microcredit changes proportionately with the demand for health expenses in the 
household although the proportionate change is relatively small in magnitude. In particular, if 
health expenses increases by 1%, the demand for a formal microcredit is likely to increase by 
8.4%. One possible explanation is that health expenditure represents a living cost and 
therefore borrowing from a formal microcredit source at a low interest rate for health care 
expenditure is reasonable. Demand for health expenditure sometimes is urgent for emergency 
purposes so many households cannot wait to borrow from formal microcredit sources. 
However, many formal microcredit programmes provide loans for health and medical 
treatment as long as the borrower can provide evidence of health expenses when they apply 
for such a loan. The finding implies that there is a substitution of credit between the formal 
and informal credit sectors; households can borrow from the informal credit sector for urgent 
needs then they apply for a formal microcredit to pay off the informal loan. In other words, 
coexisting formal and informal credit sectors helps reduce credit constraints of the rural 
household.       
 
The subsidised formal interest is negative significant at the 1% level. Subsidised interest is 
defined as the difference between the average interest rate of commercial loans in 2009 
compared with the interest on formal microcredit given to rural households in the survey. A 
negative relationship indicates that the subsidised interest rate is associated with small 
microcredit; microcredit is 36.2% smaller than the average loan amount if that loan has a 1% 
subsidised interest rate per month. Given the estimated average loan in the model, a 1% 
change in the interest subsidy per month for a loan amount, the formal loan amount borrowed  
reduced by 9.83 million VND. This finding strongly supports the evidence that most 
microcredit programmes providing preferential loans are small loans compared with the 
average microloan in the country. A small loan amount is less likely to be demanded and they 
are mainly given to poor and low-income households such as poor subsidised and drug 
rehabilitation loans (see Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4 Determinants of Formal Microcredit in Using the Conditional Mixed 
Process and Heckman Two-step Method 
 ln Formal Loan (1)   ln Formal Loan (2) 
 Coefficient R.S.E. P_value Coefficient S.E. P_value 
ln Formal microcredit (ln FL)      
Constant  3.308
***
 0.699 0.000  3.351
***
 0.659 0.000 
Individual characteristics       
ln AGE -0.127 0.171 0.459 -0.134 0.159 0.401 
GENDER  0.080 0.063 0.206  0.078 0.063 0.212 
NO_EDUC -0.170
**
 0.083 0.042 -0.169
*
 0.100 0.092 
GOV_EMPL  0.117 0.082 0.150  0.115 0.081 0.161 
RI_FARM -0.276
***
 0.087 0.002 -0.282
***
 0.079 0.000 
UN_SKILL -0.235
***
 0.091 0.010 -0.237
**
 0.101 0.019 
OR_FARM -0.131 0.109 0.228 -0.139 0.108 0.2007 
Household characteristics       
ln HH_SIZE  -0.154 0.105 0.141 -0.154 0.108 0.155 
ln NUM_CHILD  0.014 0.068 0.837  0.015 0.071 0.833 
ln NUM_EARN  0.076 0.074 0.302  0.077 0.078 0.322 
ln AGRI_LAND  0.088
***
 0.014 0.000  0.089
***
 0.014 0.000 
ln HEA_EXP  0.084
**
 0.043 0.049  0.084
**
 0.040 0.037 
Formal credit       
ln SUB_INT -0.362
***
 0.090 0.000 -0.364
***
 0.082 0.000 
F_SHO  0.013 0.111 0.907  0.012 0.103 0.905 
F_MED  0.149 0.128 0.244  0.143 0.121 0.238 
F_AGRI  0.128 0.093 0.168  0.124 0.081 0.124 
F_TRAD -0.020 0.123 0.874 -0.019 0.109 0.866 
F_EDUC  0.199
*
 0.115 0.084  0.201
*
 0.120 0.093 
F_CONS  0.002 0.075 0.978 -0.003 0.081 0.976 
Geo-economic factors       
DRA_VIL -0.099 0.135 0.465 -0.097 0.119 0.415 
ECO_COM -0.072 0.137 0.598 -0.078 0.122 0.522 
URB_COM -0.184
**
 0.077 0.017 -0.186
**
 0.078 0.017 
23  -0.380
*
 0.222 0.087    
     -0.276
*
 0.159 0.083 
Number of observations 896   879   
Rho Na   -0.371   
Sigma Na   0.744   
Log likelihood -1132.0   Na   
Chi2
 
207.6   173.9   
Note: 1. S.E. and R.S.E. stand for Standard Errors and Robust Standard Errors, respectively.   
          2. 
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
          3. (1) and (2) are conditional mixed process and Heckman two-step method, respectively.  
         4. 
†
 is smaller than the number of respondents in the sample due to missing data 
 
The loan purpose for education variable is positive significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
demand for education loan is covered by microcredit programmes. Given a subsidised interest 
rate, a loan for education tends to receive an additional 20% increase in loan value compared 
with other loan purposes. This finding supports the evidence that microcredit programmes are 
likely to expand in providing credit to rural areas, not only agricultural loans but also for 
education and health purposes. This finding also supports the fact that providing loans for 
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education purposes, such as student loans or vocational training, is one of the main objectives 
of many microcredit schemes. This lending implementation is consistent with the long-term 
strategy of the poverty reduction programmes of the government by ensuring credit 
availability and sustainability to rural households through the formal microcredit sector (see 
Table 6.4). 
 
With regard to geographic factors, only the urbanised commune coefficient is negative 
significant at the 1% level. Holding other factors constant, rural households residing in an 
urbanised commune received 18.4% less than the average formal microcredit in the region. 
Given the estimated average microcredit in the model, the result indicates a variation of 4.92 
million VND in loan size between urbanised and rural communes. The result supports our 
hypothesis that households residing in an urbanised commune are likely to demand less for 
formal microcredit. This finding is consistent with Kochar‟s (1997b) finding in India.   
 
However, the local government employee (GOV_EMP) variable is insignificant in affecting 
formal microcredit although it has a positive effect on the probability of access to formal 
microcredit. This finding indicates that there might be bias toward households having member 
working for the government in the selection process for formal microcredit. However, there is 
no statistical evidence to conclude that bias toward government employees presents in the 
determining stage of formal microcredit.  
 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter identifies the factors influencing the household‟s access to the informal and 
formal microcredit sectors under credit constraint and the coexistence of two credit sectors. 
Our results show that an informal microcredit can alter the decision of the household to 
participate in a formal microcredit programme. The informal microcredit, considering 
endogeneity, positively influences the probability of accessibility to formal microcredit. 
Ignoring this interaction may result in the less desirable properties of the determinants that 
explain the household‟s decision to participate in a microcredit programme. 
 
Our results confirm that the use of informal microcredit is positively influenced by the 
following factors: land holding status, informal loan purposes, informal interest, informal 
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microcredit duration, and direct road access to the village. Rural households residing in areas 
with direct road access to a town centre and with land ownership can obtain credit from the 
suppliers or traders but while others with a higher demand for consumption might borrow 
more from friends, relatives or money lenders. Flexible informal microcredit duration can 
compensate for the high interest rate hence both factors result in a positive relationship with 
the informal microcredit. Informal microcredit is a prevalent source of trade and consumption 
credit for the rural household, particularly the poor and low-income household as the informal 
microcredit is accessible for this group.   
 
The positive contributors to formal microcredit accessibility are local government employee, 
membership of credit group, and a poor certificate. Working as a local government employee 
improves accessibility to formal microcredit through work relationship and it is considered as 
a bias in the selection process; improving accessibility to formal microcredit using poor 
certificate is a social policy intervention. Lending through a group is considered a more 
appropriate improvement of accessibility to formal microcredit because it is cost-effective in 
overcoming the problem of asymmetric information in individual lending. Direct road access 
and ethnic concentration commune also improve the accessibility to formal microcredit for 
rural households. These factors can be used in designing formal microcredit schemes that 
provide a good coverage to the target poor household in rural areas. In addition, agricultural 
land ownership positively increases microloan demand; capital for agricultural production 
results in a greater loan demand. Providing for agricultural production and education purposes 
are the main coverage of the microcredit programme; microcredit for other purposes are given 
but are of a smaller loan size.  
 
The research findings show a strong link between the informal and formal microcredit sectors 
in the rural credit market and both sectors play important roles in serving the rural 
households. Credit constraint and information asymmetry are the main problems that the rural  
household face in obtaining credit although each problem plays different roles in different 
credit sectors. Different lenders employ different risk assessment mechanisms to select 
borrowers. Improving formal microcredit access can start from the government; it can 
improve physical infrastructure and provide a consistent microcredit policy to ensure the 
bottom poor have adequate access to formal microcredit. Improved formal microcredit 
accessibility can also start from the household themselves by actively participating in a credit 
group and improving their education and work skills because education essentially builds up 
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creditworthiness for collateral-free borrowers and work skills promise repayment. As the 
informal and formal credit sectors coexist and interact, an appropriate credit policy is to direct 
both sectors to work better towards the rural development goal. A better linkage between the 
two credit sectors would enable one sector to overcome its weaknesses by gaining from 
other‟s strengths. Particularly, lending through group without joint-liability helps improve 
participation rate of poor households. Expanding this lending to some informal lenders in the 
group would reduce transaction costs of screening but likely increase the repayment rate 
because the borrowers can roll over their loans using the available alternative credit.  
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    Chapter 7 
Impact Evaluation of Access to Formal Microcredit 
Programme 
This chapter assesses the impact of formal microcredit on rural households. The impact of a 
formal microcredit programme on target households is subject to two main sources of bias, 
the observed and unobserved bias. The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach and Fixed 
Effects (FE) model are applied to assess the microcredit programme impact using the 2010 
survey data in the Mekong River Delta and the 2006 and 2008 VietnamHousehold Living 
Standard Surveys, respectively. Because the VBSP microcredit programme is the biggest 
microcredit institution providing the poor with preferential credit, the VBSP microcredit 
programme‟s impact is examined in this study. The interest in assessing the microcredit 
impact does not stem from econometric curiosity rather it provides useful justification for 
policy makers and microcredit providers in designing, implementing and monitoring 
microcredit programmes. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 discusses the 
impact of the VBSP microcredit programme on the consumption and income outcomes of 
rural households using the PSM method; Section 7.2 dicusses the impact of the VBSP 
microcredit programme using the FE model. Section 7.3 summarises the results and findings.    
 
7.1 Impact of Access to Formal Microcredit Programme on Rural 
Households: An Impact Evaluation of Cross Sectional Data 
7.1.1 Data for Impact Evaluation 
The data used for impact evaluation of the VBSP microcredit programme on the rural 
households were collected in the MRD in 2010 (see discussion of the characteristics of 
borrowers and non-borrowers in Chapter 5). The survey particularly targeted rural households 
that are considered to be in the low-income bracket, including poor families. Special 
consideration was given to data collection to ensure that the collected data contained the 
treated and control groups of households that can be used in the matching methods. The 
purpose of the impact assessment is to compare the outcomes of the borrowers – the treated 
group with the control group – the non-borrowers. The treated group is the target group and 
selection of the target group is strictly based on the borrowing status under credit constraint 
conditions. The control group includes non-borrowers who might or might not face credit 
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constraint, but we excluded the group of credit unconstrained households in the sample. 
Excluding the unconstrained household allows the control group to be more comparable with 
the treatment group in terms of demand for credit because the credit unconstrained households 
might not borrow any credit in a defined period but the credit constrained might borrow later. 
Defining the control group as those who did not participate in the microcredit programme at 
the survey period but would have participated in the microcredit programme later under time 
invariant condition provides a better assessment for the impact estimator (Sianesi, 2004). The 
comparison is then between the borrowers and the non-borrowers who did not borrow 
microcredit but would have borrowed credit in the next period. Therefore, our sample 
excludes the credit unconstrained households to help redefine the control group for matching 
purposes, given the time invariant household‟s characteristics.   
 
In addition, as the defined sample includes households that were eligible to participate in a 
microcredit programme, this selection of the respondents maximises the possibility of 
collecting data that show accessibility to microcredit is highly associated with the observed 
factors. Given the self-selection bias in the sample (discussed in Chapter 6), the observed bias 
due to self-selection can be controlled for using the available observed factors. However, self-
selection into a microcredit programme due to unobserved factors possibly occurs. For 
example, household heads having business skills or ability to start a small business tend to 
participate in microcredit programmes to obtain loans at a preferential interest rate. This 
unobserved factor not only biases the prediction of credit borrowing but also leads to bias in 
the impact evaluation of a microcredit programme on the households‟ outcomes such as 
income or consumption. Because such households can earn additional income that 
significantly improves their income level, this unobserved bias should be netted out in a 
programme impact evaluation. Treatment of the unobserved bias in the microcredit 
programme evaluation is beyond non-experiment data, particularly cross-sectional data. 
Because of individual heterogeneity and time varying effects one cannot construct the 
counterfactual for the treatment object to yield an unbiased comparison. However, minimising 
the bias from unobserved factors can be attained by using data on pre-treatment variables of 
interest in a cross sectional data survey (Lee, 2005).  
 
To measure the consumption and income impact, this section uses the household monthly 
expenditure and income as the measurement of the outcomes. The pre-treatment household 
monthly consumption and income of a one year period before the impact evaluation are used 
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to test whether there is a relationship between the pre-treatment outcome and the unobserved 
factors, conditional on the observed factors. Mosley (1997) shows that the unobserved factors 
can be controlled for by using the pre-treatment outcome as the observed explanatory variable 
in the model, under the condition that the unobserved factor is a time-invariant effect on the 
outcome. Therefore, the pre-treatment data of household consumption and income were 
collected in the survey and are used in the impact evaluation to control for unobserved bias. 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics of Pre-treatment and Outcome Variables 
Variables 
 
Formal 
Borrowers 
(1) 
 Non-borrowers 
 
(2) 
Difference 
 
(1)-(2) 
Test  
statistics 
Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Pre-treatment variables        
Pre-treatment monthly 
consumption 
1.527 0.936  1.388 0.861 0.139 2.103** 
Pre-treatment monthly income
 
2.705 2.642  2.589 2.620 0.115 0.607 
Outcome variables        
Monthly expenditure 1.963 1.823  1.686 1.135 0.277 2.346** 
Monthly income 3.086 3.106  2.854 2.889 0.234 1.064 
Number of observations 598  282   
Source: The author‟s survey data  
Notes: 1. Mean values are measured in 1,000 VND. 
           2. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 7.1 compares the means of houssehold monthly expenditure and income in the pre and 
post-treatment periods. The pre-treatment monthly expenditure is significantly different at the 
5% level between the two groups but the pre-treatment monthly income difference is 
statistically insignificant. This means the initial household monthly expenditure is greater in 
the borrower than the non-borrower group. Similarly, the difference in household monthly 
expenditure in the post-treatment period between the borrower and non-borrower is 
significantly different at the 5% level but is not significantly different for household monthly 
income. This result is similar to Setboonsarng and Parpiev‟s (2008) study in Pakistan where 
the borrower group was initially wealthier in terms of household consumption and food 
expenditure than the non-borrower group. The authors argued that if these initial differences 
are not controlled for in estimating the impact, it is likely that one would overestimate the 
impact of microcredit. 
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7.1.2 Estimation Strategies 
The coefficient of the average impact of treatment on the treated of microcredit programme 
ATT
PSM  is obtained using the PSM method, based on the following specficiation:  
 
1 0( | , 1) [ ( | , 0) | 1]
ATT
PSM XE Y X D E E Y X D D                                
(7.1)   
 
where Y is the outcome of interest, i.e., household‟s monthly expenditure and income 
(measured in million VND). D is programme participation; 1D   if a household is a 
programme participant; 0D   otherwise. X  is a covariate of the observed factors including 
the household head‟s characteristics (such as age, gender, ethnicity, married, education), the 
household‟s characteristics (credit group member, poor certificate, household size, number of 
children, land holding status, main income source), and geographic factors (village and 
commune factors). In addition, the pre-treatment household consumption and income in 2008 
are also included in the covariate to explain the programme impact estimator for each 
outcome of interest. The chosen variables in the covariates are drawn from the previous 
chapter, which showed a high predictive power of credit participation (equation 6.2) 
conditional on the explanatory variables.  
 
Selection of the covariates to control for individual heterogeneity follows the rules that the 
variable should simultaneously influence the programme participation and the outcome 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Therefore, our covariates are selected from the variables that 
were significant in determining credit participation in the previous analysis and they were 
reported to be correlated with the consumption and income outcomes in other empirical 
studies. For example, household characteristics such as education and household size were 
strongly associated with income and consumption outcome in microcredit studies (see Imai, 
Arun, & Annim, 2010; Nguyen, 2008 for detail). Given the covariates significantly control for 
the fact that borrowers are not a random group of participants, households are assumed to be 
time invariant during the comparison period. Once the conditions are satisfied, the impact 
estimators can be obtained from different matching procedures.   
 
The matching procedure consists of the following steps. The estimation begins with selecting 
the variables for the covariates to define the probability of participation in a microcredit 
programme. Three different sets of covariates are defined for the consumption and income 
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estimators. The base covariate (C1) for the consumption estimator includes: AGE, GENDER, 
ETHNIC, MARRIED, NO_EDUC, PRI_SCH, MID_SCH, HIG_SCH, GOV_EMP, 
CRE_MEM, POOR_CER, HHSIZE, NUM_CHIL, OWN_LAND, MI_FARM, MI_NONF, 
DRA_VIL, ECO_COM, and URB_COM. Covariate C2 equals C1 plus PRE_CONS, the pre-
treatment consumption, which is expected to control for the unobserved factors that are likely 
to correlate with consumption in the pre-treatment period. Covariate C3 equals C2 plus ln IFL, 
which is expected to control for the external credit that affects the programme outcome. 
Because IFL significantly influences the probability of access to microcredit, this 
specification is also used to check for the sensitivity of the effect of the microcredit 
programme whether there is another lower level of treatment likely to affect the outcome 
(Lee, 2005). Similarly, the covariates I1, I2, and I3 are specified for the income estimator, 
except that the PRE_INC is replaced for the PRE_CONS variable in the covariates I2 and I3. 
 
Once the covariates are selected, the probabilities of participating in the VBSP microcredit 
programme are calculated using the probit model. Following this, the propensity scores are 
calculated based on these probabilities. Different distributions of the propensity scores 
obtained from the six covariates are documented in Appendices B-5 and B-6, and tests for 
balancing the group should be conducted to ensure that the mean propensity score is not 
different for the treated and control groups in each block for each model. This ensures a good 
comparison group is constructed from the selected covariates. If the balancing property is 
satisfied, common support is defined and used for matching purposes. Finally, Kernel (with 
the default bandwidth of 0.06) and Radius matching (with the default radius of 0.1) are used 
to perform the PSM for the credit impact on consumption and income. The estimated results 
for the microcredit programme impact estimators are presented and discussed in the following 
section. 
 
7.1.3 Results and Discussion 
7.1.3.1 Impact of VBSP Microcredit on Household Consumption 
The estimated results of the probit models for propensity scores are reported in Appendices B-
1 and B-2. Among the variables determining the propensity of participation in the VBSP 
microcredit programme, MARRIED, ETHNIC, GOV_EMP, CRE_MEM, POOR_CER, 
OWN_LAND, URB_COM, ECO_COM, and DRA_VILL are significant at the 10% level. In 
addtion, PRE_CONS and ln IFL are positive and significant at the 5% and 10% level, 
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respectively, in the covariates of the consumption models. For the income model, ln IFL is 
positive and significant at the 10% level but the PRE_INC is not significant in determining 
the propensity score. The Chi square test for each model shows statistical significance at the 
1% level, indicating that the variables included in the model statistically explain the 
propensity scores used in the matching steps (see Appendices B-1 and B-2).   
 
Based on the results of the probit models, the propensity scores for each covariate were 
estimated and all three specifications were balanced based on the balancing tests. The 
propensity distributions are shown in Figure 7.5 a, b, and c in Appendix B-5. To avoid 
repetition, only the kernel densities of the propensity scores when the pre-treatment 
expenditure and informal microcredit are included in the controlling covariate C3 are 
discussed. The solid and long dash lines in Figure 7.1 describe the distribution of the 
propensity scores of the non-borrowers and borrowers, respectively. The propensity score 
ranges from 0.182 to 0.958 and from 0.254 to 0.994 for borrowers and non-borrowers, 
respectively; the mean scores are 0.578 and 0.727 for borrower and non-borrower groups, 
respectively. Given a substantial overlap in the distributions, the common support region is 
defined in the range from 0.250 to 0.994. This means the average treatment effect is restricted 
to the overlapping area whereby the non-borrowers are comparable with the borrowers based 
on their observed characteristics. Some non-borrowers who are not similar to borrowers in 
terms of the observed characteristics were not used in the comparison.  
 
The estimates of the average treatment effect of the VBSP microcredit programme 
participation on the treated (ATT) are summarised in Table 7.2 for the three specifications 
using Kernel and Radius matching routines. The first column in Table 7.2 specifies the 
control variables in the propensity score function and the second column reports the treated 
and control used in the matching process. The last two columns display the ATT for 
household monthly consumption by Kernel and Radius matching; the standard errors are 
provided in parentheses. According to these PSM estimates, borrowers on average spent 
265,000 to 274,000 VND per month more than their similar non-borrower counterparts. This 
comparison is based on matching 595 borrowers and 274 non-borrowers using the controlling 
variables in C1. The matching results are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Figure 7.1 Propensity Scores of Borrowing Status Based on Covariate C3 for 
Household Monthly Consumption Impact 
 
However, if pre-treatment consumption is included in the covariate to control for the 
unobserved factors then the difference in consumption declines to 138,000 VND and 196,000 
VND for Kernel and Radius matching estimators, respectively (see Table 7.2). Although  
Kernel matching reduces the significance of the statistical test, both impact estimators are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The results are similar to Doan (2011) whose study 
evaluating the impact of microcredit on the education spending of poor households indicates 
that the more pre-treatment included in the covariates will result in both the magnitude of the 
education spending impact and the significance level being reduced but the results are still 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Given the small trade-off between the reduced 
number of observations in the treated and control groups, including the household 
consumption in the pre-treatment period allows the observed variables to control for more 
differences and similarities in both groups, which generates a more reliable impact estimator.  
 
The matching results for covariate C3 show that both Kernel and Radius matching matched 
592 borrowers to 270 non-borrowers and the programme is significant at the 10% level. The 
programme impact on household consumption ranges from 130,000 to 186,000 VND per 
month on the borrowers. The informal loan controls for the lower level of treatment effect; it 
slightly reduces the impact of the microcredit programme on household consumption. The 
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results provide two implications. First, households participating in microcredit have 
significant gains in consumption over non-participants. Secondly, the pre-treatment factors 
can also be used to control for unobserved factors that influence the probability of access to a 
microcredit programme. Including these pre-treatment factors allows the matching methods to 
control for unobserved bias in impact evaluation of a microcredit programme.  
 
Table 7.2 The Average Treatment Effect on Household Monthly Consumption (in 
million VND) Using Matching Estimators 
Control variables in the propensity  
score estimation 
Treated/ 
control 
Kernel 
matching 
Radius 
Matching 
Covariate 1 in probit estimation (C1) 595/274 0.274 
(0.113)*** 
0.265 
(0.110)*** 
C2=C1+ PRE_CONS 595/274 0.138 
(0.092)* 
0.196 
(0.093)** 
C3=C2 + ln IFL 592/270 0.130 
(0.092)* 
0.186 
(0.093)** 
Notes: 1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1,000 replications. 
           2. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
           3. C1: AGE, GENDER, ETHNIC, MARRIED, NO_EDUC, PRI_SCH, MID_SCH, HIG_SCH, 
GOV_EMP, CRE_MEM, POOR_CER, HHSIZE, NUM_CHIL, OWN_LAND, MI_FARM, 
MI_NONF, DRA_VIL, ECO_COM, and URB_COM. 
           4. ln informal loan is obtained from Tobit estimation. 
 
The findings are consistent with previous studies that employed a similar PSM. For example, 
Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) provide evidence of the microcredit impact on the poor in 
Pakistan. The impact of microcredit programmes significantly improved agricultural 
production, particularly animal raising. Similarly, Arun et al., (2006) find evidence of the 
impact of microfinance institutions on household poverty in India. Microcredit significantly 
reduces the poverty rate in all cases; borrowing for productive purposes has a larger impact in 
raising the index-based ranking (IBR) indicator for those above the poverty threshold.  
Furthermore, the findings support Pitt and Khandker (1998) whose study indicates that 
microcredit significantly improves a household‟s annual consumption and Nguyen‟s (2008) 
study that reveals a positive impact of microcredit programmes on household per capita 
consumption in Vietnam.  
 
7.1.3.2 Impact of VBSP Microcredit on Household Income 
Figure 7.2 shows the kernel densities of the propensity scores estimated for evaluating the 
impact of credit on household monthly income. The solid and dashed lines illustrate the 
distribution of the propensity score of the non-borrowers and borrowers, respectively. The 
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propensity scores range from 0.207 to 0.966 and from 0.274 to 0.994 for borrowers and non-
borrowers, respectively; the mean scores are 0.583 and 0.724 for borrower and non-borrower 
groups, respectively. Given the substantial overlap in the distributions, the defined common 
support region ranges from 0.274 to 0.994; the average treatment effect is restricted to the 
overlapping area where the non-borrowers are comparable with the borrowers based on their 
observed characteristics. 
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Figure 7.2 Propensity Scores of Borrowing Status Based on Covariate I3for 
Monthly Income Impact onRural Households 
 
Three estimates of the credit impact on household monthly income are reported in Table 7.3. 
The results show that the effect of microcredit programme participation on income is not 
significant no matter which set of covariates and which matching approach is used. 
Interestingly, the impact of the microcredit programme on income approaches zero if the pre-
treatment income and informal microcredit are controlled for in the covariates. The 
insignificant impact estimators of income is due to the fact that income has more variation 
than consumption but the mean incomes are approximately equal for the two groups. It is 
more likely that rural households have an unstable income from many sources, such as 
farming and non-farm activities, and these incomes vary differently between the borrower and 
non-borrower groups. As a result, comparing across the poor and low-income groups with 
large variation will likely yield insignificant results.  
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Table 7.3 The Average Treatment Effect on Household Monthly Income (in 
million VND) Using Matching Estimators 
Control variables in the propensity  
score estimation 
Treated/ 
Control 
Kernel 
matching 
Radius 
matching 
Covariate 1 (I1) 595/274 0.087 
(0.254) 
0.047 
(0.234) 
I2= I1 + PRE_INC  595/267 0.001 
(0.145) 
0.003 
(0.171) 
I3= I2 + ln IFL 592/263 -0.002 
(0.145) 
0.002 
(0.239) 
Notes: 1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1,000 replications. 
           2. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
           3. I1: AGE, GENDER, ETHNIC, MARRIED, NO_EDUC, PRI_SCH, MID_SCH, HIG_SCH, 
GOV_EMP, CRE_MEM, POOR_CER, HHSIZE, NUM_CHIL, OWN_LAND, MI_FARM, 
MI_NONF, DRA_VIL, ECO_COM, and URB_COM. 
           4. ln informal loan is obtained from Tobit estimation. 
 
Another possible explanation for the insignificant effect of the microcredit programme on 
income is that a microcredit programme provides small loans to help rural households to cope 
with risk and shocks in agricultural production. According to Morduch (1995), rural 
households cope with risk such as income fluctuation or low yield due to weather condition 
by either smoothing their income or consumption. First, households can smooth their income; 
this is often achieved by making conservative production or employment choices and 
diversifying economic activities. In this way, households take steps to protect themselves 
from adverse risk before they occur. Microcredit is used for non-farm activities such as small 
trade or stocking materials for handicrafts in order to diversify the household income. Second, 
the household can smooth consumption by borrowing and saving, depleting and accumulating 
nonfinancial assets. These mechanisms take force following unexpected events and help 
insulate consumption patterns from income variability. However, income and consumption 
smoothing are not tracked easily, tracking depends on how much constraint the household 
faces when dealing with certain kind of risk wherein one can dominates the other. Our 
findings imply that loans are likely to be used for the household‟s consumption needs before 
they are used for income generating activities. In this study, the consumption smoothing 
impact is believed to be stronger than the income smoothing impact.  
 
The findings on income impact are consistent with Coleman‟s (1999) study in Thailand that 
provides inconsistent evidence of microcredit programme impacts on poor households. The 
impact was insignificant on a set of outcomes such as physical assets, savings and 
expenditure. The impact was significant and negative on expenditure for men‟s health care. 
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However, our findings contrast with a number of studies that showed a significant positive 
impact of microcredit on household income. For example, Hossain (1988) shows that 
Grameen Bank members realised incomes that were 28% higher than non-participants in all 
the 30 project villages under survey. Hashemi and Morshed (1997) observe that the Grameen 
Bank not only reduced poverty and improved welfare of participating households, but also 
enhanced the borrowers ‟capacity to sustain their gains over time. Gibbons et al. (2000) report 
similar findings in Indonesia, Sri-Lanka and India. Recently, Sarangi‟s (2007) findings in 
India show a significant positive effect of programme participation by an increase in the 
income of poor households as the participants in the programme obtained easy access to 
formal microcredit from a group savings fund. 
 
7.1.3.3 Poverty Targeting of VBSP Microcredit on the Poor 
As microcredit targets the poor, our analysis tries to answer the question about the extent 
microcredit programmes impact the poor‟s outcomes. To answer the question, we used the 
subgroup of all households who were certified as poor households by the local authorities
25
. 
Choosing this subgroup of poor households faces the trade-off between the level of research 
interest and matching performance. The subgroup allows us to compare the poor‟s outcomes 
but it also reduces the number of treated and control observations. As the sample size gets 
smaller, the trade-off between bias and variance rises. The choice of the matching algorithm 
becomes important (Heckman et al., 1997). Caliendo and Kopeing (2008) suggest performing 
matching without replacement when there are a few control observations. Both the Kernel and 
Radius algorithm can perform multiple matching where the control unit can be matched with 
the treatment unit more than once. In total, 177 borrowers were matched with 46 non-
borrowers.         
 
The matching procedures follow the same steps as the previous matching. However, since the 
subgroup is the poor, the poor certificate variable is excluded from the covariates. The results 
of the probit models for the propensity scores are reported in Appendices B-3 and B-4. The 
informal microcredit coefficient is not significant in defining the probability of access to 
microcredit. Pre-treatment consumption is positive and significant in the probit model but the 
                                                 
25
The definition of certified poor household in Vietnam is more stringent than the definition of poor by income 
bracket. The procedure of defining a poor household goes through the following steps. First, a poor household 
has to be a permanent residency in the commune in order to apply for a poor certificate and the household has to 
be recommended by his or her neighbours in the community. Then, a review based on the criteria such as main 
income, house condition, assets, etc., will be done yearly. If all criteria are met, a poor certificate is issued to the 
household.   
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pre-treatment income is not significant. Therefore, the covariates C1 and I1 are defined and the 
average treatment effect of microcredit on the poor is performed over the region of common 
support [0.327, 0.996].  
 
The estimates of credit impact on income are reported in Table 7.4. The results show that the 
effect of credit participation on consumption is significant at the 1% level for Kernel 
matching and the 5% level for Radius matching but the impact on income is not significant. 
The consumption impact of microcredit is greater for the poor than for the low-income 
households. Specifically, the microcredit programme produces a consumption impact of 
518,000 VND and 463,000 VND by Kernel and Radius matching methods, respectively. 
Although the income impact is not significant in both matching methods, the impact of the 
microcredit programme on income is greater than zero. This implies a positive role of 
microcredit in enhancing the rural poor but the result needs more validation to become 
conclusive.  
 
There is a notable difference in the results between Table 7.4 and Tables 7.2 and 7.3. The 
results in sections (7.1.3.1 and 7.1.3.2) show that the microcredit programme has a positive 
impact on household consumption but it is insignificant on household income; the 
insignificant income impact is approaching zero. While the results in Table 7.4 also show the 
positive insignificant impact of microcredit on household consumption but insignificant 
impact on household income. The comparison shows the magnitude of the impact on 
consumption for only the rural poor is higher than that result for the rural household. The 
possible explanation for this result is that microcredit is designed to reduce the credit 
constraint on poor households under conditions that the relationship between microcredit 
investment and income is positive, therefore, microcredit is expected to increase household 
income and consumption. Remenyi et al. (2000) argue that the amount by which income 
increases due to microcredit cannot be determined easily. The income effect of microcredit is 
transferred through many stages from technical changes in household production to output 
changes subject to market conditions, which leads to a savings change in the household. 
These changes comprise the „multiplier effect on income and saving‟ before any real income 
changes can be realised. As a result, the empirical findings of the microcredit impact on 
household income are usually inconsistent in determining the impact of microcredit (for 
example, see Coleman, 1999; Pitt & Khandker, 1998). Although our findings do not confirm a 
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positive impact of microcredit on poor households, the results show a positive sign in income 
impact from microcredit participation for the poor.  
 
Table 7.4 The Average Treatment Effect on Household Monthly Consumption 
and Income (in million VND) Using Matching Estimators 
Control variables  
 
Treated/ 
Control 
Kernel 
Matching 
Treated/ 
control 
Radius 
Matching 
Covariate C1 excluding  
poor certificate 
177/46 0.518 
(0.226)*** 
123/38 0.463 
(0.201)** 
Covariate I1 excluding 
 poor certificate 
177/46 0.434 
(0.318) 
177/35 0.388 
(0.725) 
Notes: 1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1,000 replications. 
           2. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
           3. C1 and I1: AGE, GENDER, ETHNIC, MARRIED, NO_EDUC, PRI_SCH, MID_SCH, HIG_SCH, 
GOV_EMP, CRE_MEM, HHSIZE, NUM_CHIL, OWN_LAND, MI_FARM, MI_NONF, DRA_VIL, 
ECO_COM, and URB_COM. 
           4. ln informal loan is obtained from Tobit estimation. 
 
Many empirical findings indicate that microcredit programmes do not benefit the poor much 
in terms of outreach; the proportion of poor participants is smaller than non-poor participants 
in microcredit programmes (Nguyen, 2008). Once the non-poor group is separated, our results 
show that the income impact tends to diminish compared with low-income and poor 
households but the income impact emerges if the poor group is restricted in the comparison. 
This implies the „true poor‟ group is likely to benefit more from involvement with a 
microcredit programme than low-income households. This finding is consistent with the 
consensus that a well-designed credit scheme can raise the income of significant numbers of 
the poor across countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India (Hulme & 
Mosley, 1996).   
 
While PSM is a useful tool to control for bias due to observed factors in impact evaluation, 
the results have to be interpreted with caution as shown in the discourse between Smith and 
Todd (2005) and Dehejia (2005) particularly with matching based on cross-sectional data. 
First, unmeasured characteristics or time effects cannot be controlled for by cross-sectional 
data. Second, bias associated with cross-sectional matching estimators may be large without a 
good set of covariates or if treated and control households are not strictly comparable, for 
example, located in different markets (Smith & Todd, 2005). Therefore, methods controlling 
for unobserved bias such as the FE model using panel data are recommended if data are 
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available. Given the availability of a panel dataset to control for unobserved bias, estimating 
microcredit programmes using the fixed effect model is discussed in the next section.   
 
7.2 Impact of Access to Microcredit Programme on Rural Houaeholds: An 
Impact Evaluation of Panel Data 
7.2.1 Data for Impact Evaluation 
Data used for impact evaluation of the microcredit programme in this section were drawn 
from the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS surveys. The two datasets form a panel dataset of 4,127 
households which are representative of the whole country; the data also form a panel dataset 
of 866 households that is representative for the MRD (see Table 5.6 for description).  
 
Panel data used to estimate the unbiased programme impact require the two years‟ data to be 
collected before and after the programme implimentation, respectively. In other words, we 
need to have baseline data beforethe VBSP microcredit programme officially established and 
implemented in 2003 and one postperiod. Since our first dataset was collected in 2006 when 
the VBSP microcredit programme was already in operation, Nguyen (2008) raises concerns of 
bias in programme impact using only the post-programme data because there may be 
significant differences between the control and treated groups in the first period. Therefore, 
adjustmentsare required before the panel data can be used in the FE model.  
 
7.2.2 Estimation Strategies 
To deal with the data issue, we consider estimating PSM in the first period to match the 
borrowers with the non-borrowers using a set of observed characteristics. The PSM creates a 
new panel dataset that consists of the borrower and non-borrower groups that are more 
comparable in terms of the observed characteristics than the original panel data. The 
comparison between the borrowers and non-borrowers is now performed over a common 
support region with similar characteristics.  
 
The purpose of this step is to remove the observed heterogeneity in the initial period before 
using the FE model (see Heckman et al., 1998 for detail). Following the estimation strategies 
for PSM in chapter 6,the observed characteristics including individual, household, village and 
commune factors in the covariates are documented in Appendix B-7. 
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Given the matched pre-programme attributes from the PSM and under exogeneity of 
programme participation, the programme impact estimator can be obtained from the equation 
(4.37) in chapter 4. The model is rewritten as follows:  
 
0 0it t it i it i itY D I u         X                  (7.2) 
 
where the programme participation variable, itI  replaces i tD D  which takes the value of 1 if 
household i borrows microcredit in the post-programme period and 0 otherwise. The 
parameter of interest,  , is the impact estimator measuring the effect of microcredit 
programme on the outcome variables. Y is the outcome of interest, measured by the household 
consumption or income in natural logarithms. iD  
is the programme participation dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if household i belongs to the borrower group and 0 
otherwise. tD is a time dummy variable equal to 1 for t=1 (post-programme period) and 0 for 
t=0 (pre-programme period). The coefficient 0δ captures the aggregate time influences on 
both groups. itX is a vector of household characteristics (e.g., age, gender, household size, 
etc.);  captures the effects of the observed covariates on the outcome for each time period, 
iv is a time-invariant unobserved error and itu is the idiosyncratic error.  
 
Given the microcredit impact, to what extent does the impact of the microloan size have on 
the outcomes? Nguyen (2008) shows that when the amount of formal microcredit  ( ML ) 
replaces itI , the impact estimator   is interpreted as the impact of an addtional amount of 
microcredit on the participant. In addtion, the specification allows the ML  to enter the FE 
model as an exogeneous variable that indicates a possible correlation between the microcredit 
and time-invariant individual unobserved factors. The estimated model for a ML in the 
outcome equation is rewritten as follows:  
 
0 0it t it i it i itY D ML u         X                 (7.3) 
 
Unbiased estimators in equations (7.2) and (7.3) can be obtained using a FE model that is able 
to deal with the individual unobserved time invariant errors (Wooldridge, 2005). However, 
 168 
microcredit participation and formal microcredit are possibly endogenous in equations (7.2) 
and (7.3). Endogeneity probably occurs if the assumption of unobserved factors at the 
household, village and commune levels does not remain fixed. For example, time varying 
unobserved factors of different microcredit schemes such as expanding lending coverage or a 
change in lending regulations that might jointly influence credit participation and formal 
microcredit at the borrowing period but also influence households‟ consumption or income 
over a longer period of time. Households adjust credit demand and consumption according to 
such changes. If I and ML are not exogenously defined the households‟ outcomes, e.g., 
households within the programme villages self-select into the microcredit programme which 
depends on differential unobserved trends, biased estimators are likely obtained from the 
standard FE models (7.2 and 7.3), respectively. Therefore, Khandker (2005) suggests testing 
for endogeneity to detect whether the FE method is sufficient for the exogenous programme 
impact or if instrumental variables (IV) are needed for identification of endogenous 
programme impact.  
 
To overcome the potential endogeneity, this study used two candidate IVs, the commune 
poverty rate and the distance from village to the nearest bank, to test the endogeneity of ML  
in the programme impact in equation (7.3). The commune poverty rate provides a correlation 
between microcredit and households‟ criteria of programme selection. The poverty rate of the 
commune is suggested to control for time invariant unobserved factors because it is one 
criterion that makes a microcredit programme available to poor households. However, a 
commune that has a large number of poor households will have a large number of potential 
participants in the programme. Nguyen (2008) argues that when there are many applicants for 
credit borrowing, credit groups and commune heads tend to screen the applicant list more 
carefully because they have the responsibility of ensuring the repayment rate of the 
borrowers. More applicants are likely to be excluded from the borrowing list. As a result, an 
eligible household that is in a commune with a large number of poor households is likely to 
face a higher competition in borrowing from the programme.  
 
The second IV is distance from a village where households are located to the nearest bank. 
Although there is no confirmed information on whether the closest bank branch is a VBSP 
branch, the nearest bank can be any commercial bank, including VBSP. However, the 
coverage of VBSP has been expanded to reach rural areas and many bank branches are often 
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located close to each other in the commune centre. Households in a village that is closer to a 
VBSP branch are more likely to obtain microcredit than more distant households.  
 
Equations (7.2) and (7.3) were estimated using fixed effects models with the specified 
instruments. The estimated results are documented in Appendices B-8 and B-9. Before the 
estimated coefficients could be interpreted, different tests were conducted including tests for 
underidentification, endogeneity, weak identification and instrument-robust inference. The 
test results are documented in Appendices B-10 and B-11. First, the test for under-
identification concludes that all models are not under identified. Given the potential 
endogeneity problem of microcredit programme participation and microcredit in equations 
(7.2) and (7.3), the test for endogeneity confirms that programme participation and 
microcredit were endogenously defined with consumption and income in the fixed effects 
model. Therefore, the instrumental variable fixed effects models (IV-FE) were used to obtain 
the unbiased estimators for the microcredit programme participation and microcredit impacts. 
The results of the first stage of the FE models show that only the “commune poverty rate” is 
significantly correlated with microcredit programme participation at the 1% level. The higher 
the poverty ratio in the commune, the lower is the chance of participation in a microcredit 
programme. High poverty rate means many eligible households live in the area, thus it 
increases competition of being selected and reduces the chance of participation in the 
microcredit programme. Controlling for this factor, the IV-FE estimation can resolve the 
biased impact estimators due to the endogeneity problem.  
 
Although the IV can be significant in the regressions on the endogenous variables, i.e., the 
microcredit programme participation and the microcredit, they can be weakly correlated with 
the endogenous variables. The problem of weak identification causes the traditional 2SLS 
estimator not to function well and the inference from the estimates will not be reliable. 
Therefore, a test for weak identification of instruments is suggested using the Cragg-Donald 
statistic (Cragg & Donald, 1993; Stock & Yogo, 2002). The test results for weak 
identification of instruments indicate that the instruments are not weak for the Vietnam 
sample but rather weak for the MRD sample (see Appendices B-10 and B-11). In addition, 
tests for instrument-robust inference were performed to assure all the coefficients are able to 
be inferred under the present of heteroskedasticity. All the estimated results are obtained 
using Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) with IV because the IV-GMM class allows for 
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arbitrary heteroskedasticity with smaller standard errors hence its estimation gains are more 
efficient than the 2SLS (Baum, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002).   
 
7.2.3 Results and Discussion 
This section presents the empirical findings of the VBSP microcredit programme participation 
and microcredit impact on household consumption. Tables 7.6 and 7.7 summarise the 
estimated results of the four IV-FE models for microcredit programme participation and 
microcredit impact on household consumption and income. Each table has two sets of results, 
one for the MRD and another for Vietnam. The first set includes the results of the microcredit 
programme impact on household consumption (model E1) and microcredit impact on 
household consumption (model E2) using the MRD sample and likewise for household 
income (models I1 and I2). The last two columns are the results for microcredit programme 
impact (model E3) and microcredit impact (model E4) using the Vietnam sample and similarly 
for household income (models I3 and I4). The per capita expenditure and income in real terms 
are used to measure household consumption and income in the models, respectively
26
. Only 
the significant variables in the models are reported, non-significant variables are documented 
in Appendices B-8 and B-9. The coefficients of the IV were estimated in the first stage 
regression but for the purpose of identifying the impact coefficients, the IV will also be 
discussed. Since the estimated results (models E1, E2, and I1, I2) for the MRD are subject to 
weak instrument identification, the estimated results (models E3, E4 and I3, I4) for Vietnam are 
mainly discussed. Unless otherwise stated, all explanatory variables are mainly discussed 
using the results of the IV fixed effects models (E3 and I3) for the programme impact. Given 
that the determinants of consumption and income were identified, the treatment variables 
microcredit programme participation and microcredit are discussed for the average treatment 
on the treated (ATT) and the average treatment of additional microcredit on the treated 
(ATTM), respectively.    
 
7.2.3.1 Impact of the VBSP Microcredit on Household Per Capita Consumption 
Table 7.6 shows that for individual factors, only the ETHNICITY variable is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. The negative significant coefficient of ethnicity indicates that 
household heads belonging to an ethnic group have a lower per capita consumption than the 
                                                 
26
 To obtain the real term, first nominal data were adjusted for monthly price changes over the survey periods 
and then regional price differences over each survey. Next, the annual CPI was used to bring survey data to the 
base line year. Hence, all results in this section were reported in the real term. 
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main ethnic group. Economic theory of consumption suggests that ethnicity is included as a 
heterogeneous individual factor in the determinants of household consumption (Buse & 
Salathe, 1978). The difference in ethnicity contributes a 2% difference in household 
expenditure, holding other factors constant. The result implies a difference in per capita 
consumption by race, which has been documented in empirical research and official reports in 
Vietnam (see Haughton, Haughton, & Phong, 2001). 
 
Table 7.5 Summary of Significant Variables of IV Fixed Fffects Estimations for 
Household Per Capita Expenditure 
 The MRD  Vietnam 
 ln per capita 
Expenditure   
(E1) 
ln per capita 
Expenditure 
(E2) 
 ln per capita 
Expenditure 
(E3) 
ln per capita 
Expenditure  
(E4) 
Impact estimators      
Participation in VBSP 2.1150
***
   1.4140
***
  
ln Microcredit   0.3530
**
   0.3120
***
 
Individual factors      
ETHNIC 0.0210  0.0963  -0.0199
***
 -0.0246
*
 
SEC_SCHO 0.0522 -0.0758  0.0768 0.1620
*
 
UNI_DEGRE 0.4710
***
  0.2950  0.1450 0.5990
**
 
POST_GRAD 0.5470
**
  0.2250  0.2730 0.3810 
Household factors      
HHSIZE -0.0704
**
 -0.1040
**
  -0.0917
***
 -0.1100
***
 
R_FEMALE -0.4380
*
 -0.6410
*
  -0.0121 -0.0765 
R_BELOW 16 -0.4330 -0.5570  -0.3780
***
 -0.5590
***
 
R_PRI_SCHO  0.00562 -0.1800  0.1460
*
 0.1140 
R_SEC_SCHO -0.0628 -0.2150  0.1970
*
 0.1560 
R_HIG_SCHO  0.5030  0.8060
*
  0.2070 -0.0080 
NUM_SDAYS  0.0081
*
  0.0036  0.0028 0.0031 
LAND_ACROP  3.32e-06
*
  3.53e-06
**
  3.08e-06
**
 2.15e-06 
LAND_PCROP  2.52e-05
*
  1.95e-05  2.32e-07 -7.73e-08 
LAND_WSURF  1.02e-05
**
  1.25e-05
***
  1.01e-05
***
 8.73e-06
***
 
RE_OVERSEAS  7.25e-06  1.06e-05  2.97e-06
**
 4.41e-06
**
 
RE_DOMESTIC  2.32e-05
***
  3.03e-05
***
  1.31e-05
***
 1.37e-05
***
 
PENSSION  4.12e-05
**
  5.40e-05
**
  1.56e-05
**
 2.40e-05
*
 
SAVINGS  2.56e-05
**
  2.38e-05  1.64e-05
***
 1.65e-05
***
 
POOR_CER -0.0311 -0.2160  -0.1410
**
 -0.2620
**
 
Village and commune      
DE_CENTER  0.0102 0.0189
*
  0.0009 0.0034
*
 
NF_ENTER -0.0591 -0.0054  0.0904
***
 0.1740
***
 
Instrumental variables      
D_NBANK  0.0307 0.2260  -0.0239
**
 0.0683 
R_POVERTY -0.8520
***
 -4.5710
**
  -0.8000
***
 -3.2730
***
 
Number of observations 1,052 1,052  5,096 5,096 
Notes: 1. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
           2. The coefficients of instrumental variables are estimated in the first stage.  
           3. 
a
 in (million VND)  
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Among the household factors, the variables HHSIZE, R_BELOW16, R_PRI_SCHO, 
R_SEC_SCHO, LAND_ACROP, LAND_WSURF, RE_OVERSEAS, RE_DOMESTIC, 
PENSSION, SAVINGS, and POOR_CER significantly explain household expenditure (see 
Table 7.6). The negative coefficients of the HHSIZE and R_BELOW16 are significant at the 
1% level. Household size and number of household members below 16 years old are 
negatively correlated with household per capita expenditure. An increase in family members 
in a household significantly reduces 10% of per capita expenditure whereas an increase of 10 
percentage points of the ratio of member below 16 years old decreases as much as 5% per 
capita expenditure. The significant negative coefficient of POOR_CER at the 5% level 
indicates that poor certified households also have less per capita consumption than non-poor 
households. Holding other variables constant, the households with a high ratio of members 
below 16 years old  spend 37.8% per capita expenditure less than the average per capita 
expenditure.    
 
The coefficients of the R_PRI_SCHO and R_SEC_SCHO are both positive and significant at 
the 10% and 5% level. The results show that the expenses of children‟s primary and 
secondary schooling are important expenses in a household‟s expenditure. Households having 
children in primary and secondary school require 14.5% and 19.7% more spending, 
respectively. The results reflect the common spending pattern in the Vietnamese households 
that suggests spending on education takes an important share of the household budget because 
most Vietnamese families expect higher return from education (Doan, 2011). Therefore, they 
tend to prioritise human capital investment in their total spending, including in rural poor 
families.   
 
The contributors to household expenditure are LAND_ACROP, LAND_WSURF, 
RE_OVERSEAS, RE_DOMESTIC, PENSION, and SAVINGS. The significant positive 
coefficients of LAND_ACROP and LAND_WSURF at the 5% and 1% levels suggest that 
annual crop land and areas of water surface for aquaculture positively increases the household 
per capita expenditure. The other significant positive coefficients, RE_OVERSEAS, 
RE_DOMESTIC, PENSSION, and SAVINGS, indicate that household per capita expenditure 
is supported by overseas remittances, domestic remittances, pensions, and savings. The 
remittances – money and goods – sent back home by overseas migrant workers have a 
profound impact on the living standards of people in developing countries in Asia (Adams & 
Page, 2005). Consistently, the coefficients of both overseas and domestic remittances are 
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positive and significant at the 5% level. Overseas remittances suggest an external source of 
money sent from family members working or living overseas to support household 
consumption in Vietnam. On the other hand, the significant positive coefficient of 
RE_DOMESTIC at the 1% level indicates that domestic remittances from family members 
working away from home largely support household spending, particularly rural households. 
International remittances reflect the economic relationship between high income and low 
income countries and the internal remittances suggest a wage discrepancy and job 
opportunities between the rural and urban areas in a country. Our results indicate a greater 
weight of domestic remittances over overseas sources in the determinants of household 
consumption in rural Vietnam. Additionally, the significant positive coefficients of pensions 
and savings at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, show they are two important contributors to 
the determinants of household consumption (see Table 7.6).  
 
The coefficient of commune with the non-farm enterprises is positive and significant at the 
1% level. This means having non-farm enterprises located in the commune significantly 
contributes to household consumption. This finding is consistent with the view of the role of 
non-farm sectors in economic development. Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) emphasise that the 
non-farm sector potentially absorbs a growing rural labour force in slowing rural-urban 
migration and improves equitable income distribution. Consistent evidence is also found for 
the significant positive coefficient of non-farm enterprises affecting household per capita 
income (see Table 7.6). The combined results are consistent with Oostendorp, Trung and 
Tung‟s (2009) study which shows non-farm enterprises play an important role in increasing 
income and reducing income inequality in Vietnam (see Table 7.6).   
 
For the two IVs, the D_BANK and R_POVERTY coefficients are negative and significant at 
the 5% and 1% level, respectively (see Table 7.6). The results indicate that the ratio of 
poverty rate at the commune and distance to the nearest bank are negatively correlated with 
credit accessibility. The result strongly supports our hypothesis that a higher poverty ratio 
reduces the possibility of being selected in a microcredit programme and households in a 
village that is closer to a VBSP branch are more likely to obtain microcredit than more distant 
households. The findings are consistent with Nguyen‟s (2008) finding in Vietnam that shows 
a negative relationship of the two IVs, therefore, they are significantly valid IVs for 
microcredit impact in our study.  
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The impact estimator for household per capita expenditure is positive and significant at the 
1% level. The result indicates that the VBSP microcredit programme participation 
significantly helps increase the participants‟ consumption in Vietnam. The result reconfirms 
the positive impact of a microcredit programme on the consumption indicator of welfare. Our 
finding is consistent with a number of findings in microcredit literature such as Pitt and 
Khandker (1998), Mosley(2001), Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008), and Islam (2010), among 
others. Particularly, the result is consistent with Nguyen‟s (2008) findings in Vietnam and it 
also supports Khandker‟s (2005) findings in Bangladesh. 
 
7.2.3.2 Impact of the VBSP Microcredit on Household Per Capita Income 
Table 7.7 shows the HIG_SCHO and POST_GRAD coefficients are positive and significant 
at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. This indicates that a significant increase in the 
household income is associated with higher education attainment of the  household head. The 
result is consistent with Doan and John (2010) who indicate that the trend of returns on 
education had sharply increased after Vietnam‟s economic transition. Particularly, the returns 
to education significantly contributed to income growth at their peak rate. 
 
In the household factors, three negative and significant contributors to the determinants of 
household income are HH_SIZE, R_BELOW16, and POOR_CER. The negative effect of the 
household size, ratio of household member below 16 years old, and household having a poor 
certificate is derived in a similar manner as the determinants of consumption. The remaining 
positive and significant factors are R_WINDUS, R_WSERV, LAND_ACROP,  
RE_OVERSEAS, RE_DOMESTIC, PENSION, and SAVINGS.  Significant differences in 
the results of the consumption and income models are the ratio of members working in 
industry and services that are positive and significant at the 1% level. The results indicate that 
households with members working in the industry or service sectors significantly increases 
the per capita income. This result strongly supports the trend since the mid 1990s of the 
shifting of labour supply in agriculture to the other sectors. The main reasons were 
documented by Haughton et al. (2001) that the share of hired farm workers without annual 
cropland was only 55% of the agriculture work and that landless households were forced to 
work outside the agriculture sector. The share of workers in the agriculture sector has been 
declining. As a result, the share of income from the non-agriculture sector significantly 
constitutes the rural household income and the bulk of poor and low income households are 
still among self-employed farmers.  
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Table 7.6 Summary of Significant Variables of IV Fixed Effects Estimations for 
Household Income Per Capita 
  The MRD  Vietnam 
  ln per capita 
Income 
(I1) 
ln per capita 
Income  
(I2) 
 ln per capita 
Income 
(I3) 
ln per capita 
Income  
(I4) 
Impact estimators       
Participation in VBSP   1.6660
**
    0.8370
***
  
ln Microcredit    0.2540
**
    0.1620
***
 
Individual factors       
ETHNIC   0.0843  0.1370
*
  -0.0116 -0.0137 
HIG_SCHO   0.3340
*
  0.3200   0.0600  0.0880 
POST_GRAD   1.3010
***
  1.0690
***
   0.1860  0.2200 
Household factors       
HHSIZE  -0.0552
*
 -0.0819
**
  -0.0889
***
 -0.1000
***
 
R_FEMALE  -0.6120
**
 -0.7690
**
  -0.1200 -0.1550 
R_BELOW 16  -0.5230
*
 -0.5820  -0.3650
***
 -0.4560
***
 
R_WINDUS   0.1040  0.2140   0.3200
***
  0.3230
***
 
R_WSERV   0.0909  0.1200   0.3770
***
  0.3440
***
 
R_PRI_SCHO   0.0207 -0.1120   0.1850
**
  0.1650 
R_SEC_SCHO   0.1110  0.03210   0.2110
**
  0.1980 
R_UNI_DEGRE  -1.5380
**
 -1.5200
**
   0.3360  0.3110 
LAND_ACROP   1.28e-05
***
  1.30e-05
***
   1.16e-05
***
  1.12e-05
***
 
LAND_PCROP   2.77e-05
*
  2.33e-05
*
   2.44e-06  2.54e-06 
LAND_WSURF   5.26e-06  6.99e-06
*
   5.64e-06  5.11e-06 
RE_OVERSEAS   1.47e-05
***
  1.69e-05
**
   1.43e-05
***
  1.49e-05
***
 
RE_DOMESTIC   2.21e-05
***
  2.74e-05
***
   1.73e-05
***
  1.76e-05
***
 
PENSSION   6.66e-05
***
  7.47e-05
***
   2.41e-05
***
  2.79e-05
***
 
SAVINGS   1.34e-05  1.21e-05   1.64e-05
***
  1.65e-05
***
 
POOR_CER   0.0199 -0.1190  -0.1540
***
 -0.2120
***
 
Village and commune       
CR_COMMUNE   0.1160  0.2300   0.1150  0.1940
*
 
NF_ENTER   0.0374  0.0817   0.0831
***
  0.1270
***
 
GEO_MIDLAND     -0.1840
**
 -0.1620 
Instrumental variables       
D_NBANK   0.0323  0.2390  -0.0236
**
  0.0702 
R_POVERTY  -0.8200
***
 -4.2970
**
  -0.7980
***
 -3.2530
***
 
Number of observations  1,050 1,050  5,094 5,094 
Notes: 1. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
           2. The coefficients of instrumental variables are estimated in the first stage. 
           3. 
a
in (million VND)   
 
There are some notable differences between the results in Table 7.7. First, the ETHNIC 
coefficient has mixed signs, which shows an inconsistent relationship between ethnicity and 
income. Ethnicity is positively significant at the 10% level in model I2 and positive but  
insignificant in model I1, and it is negative and insignificant in the other models (I3 and I4). 
The results imply that ethnicity is significantly correlated with household income in the MRD 
where there are few numbers of ethnic minorities such as Khmer, Chinese and Cham whose 
income levels are significantly unequal. However, when ethnicity is investigated at the 
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national level with a wider range of ethnic minorities with different geographic and economic 
conditions from mountainous and remote areas, the impact is insignificant and inverse. The 
finding is consistent with Nguyen et al.‟s (2007) findings that show ethnicity is one of the 
determents of the income gap. In addition, the coefficient of geographic factors is negative 
and significant at the 1% level for mid land and hilly land areas. If we consider the MRD 
only, geographic factors do not vary but geographic effects become significant at the national 
level. The result indicates that a lower income is closely related to mid land or hilly land areas 
across the country.  
 
The positive and significant coefficients R_PRI_SCHO and R_SEC_SCHOO both at the 5% 
level indicate a similar explanation for income model. As education expenses are higher, these 
households are believed to earn a significant higher income that are 18.5% and 21.1% higher 
than households without having primary and secondary schooling children (see Table 7.7). It 
is noted that the ratio of household member schooling can have an inverse effect if more 
household resources have been allocated for higher education level. For example, the negative 
and significant coefficients of the R_UNI_DEGRE are reported in models I1 and I2. This is 
expected because the coefficient of the ratio of university degree means household members 
engaging in higher education level have used more household resources but have yet 
contributed to per capita income. 
 
For the two IVs, both the D_NBANK and R-POVERTY coefficients are negative and 
significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Their signs and significance levels remain 
consistent with the expenditure models; therefore, similar possible explanations apply. 
However, the D_NBANK is negative and significant in both E3 and I3 (see Table 7.6 and 7.7) 
but it is positive and non-significant in the rest of the models. The repeated inconsistent 
results may arise from two possibilities. First, the inconsistency may arise from missing data 
at the commune level because of mismatched communes from merging the commune and 
household datasets. Some communes in the VHLSS survey data for commune were not 
interviewed in the same VHLSS surveys for households. As a result, D_NBANK is a valid 
instrument for the credit participation at the national level but may be invalid for the 
microloan and for the MRD models. In addition, as pointed out by Nguyen (2008), the 
distance from a village where the households are located to the nearest bank does not 
guarantee that the bank branch is a VBSP branch; the nearest bank can be any commercial 
bank, including VBSP. The distance is probably an inaccurate proxy for many observations. 
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Moreover, the coverage of the VBSP microcredit programme has been expanded over time. 
Increased lending to groups has been organised in villages where microcredit groups can be 
formed by credit group members with the presence of village heads or local authorities rather 
than just lending to individuals at the VBSP branch. Therefore, the time varying effects could 
possibly make this variable an inappropriate proxy for VBSP credit availability in the current 
context.  
 
The impact estimator for household per capita income is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. As real income data were used, the result indicates that the VBSP microcredit 
programme significantly increases the participants‟ real income. The result confirms the 
positive impact of microcredit programmes on real income of welfare. This evidence is 
consistent with the findings of Zaman (1999), Sarangi (2007), Nguyen (2008), among others 
but contradicts with Coleman (2006) whose finding show an unclear impact of a microcredit 
programme on income indicators in Thailand.     
 
7.2.3.3 A Summary of Impact Estimators in the Models 
Table 7.8 summarises the impact estimators of the VBSP microcredit programme to provide a 
comparison between the programme and microloan impacts on household consumption and 
income. It also compares the microcredit programme participation and microcredit impacts 
between the MRD and Vietnam. All the impact estimators are positive and significant relative 
to the household per capita expenditure and income. This finding suggests two important 
points: participation in a microcredit programme has benefited the target households and the 
marginal effect of microloan significantly contributed to either household consumption or 
income. There is a large difference in the magnitude of the impact, provided that endogeneity 
has been significantly controlled for in the models. The greater impacts of microcredit are 
found in the MRD than in the whole country for both the consumption and income models. 
 
All the impact estimators are significant at the 1% level, while the MRD impact estimators of 
microcredit on consumption and income are significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
The significantly high magnitude of the MRD impact estimators at lower significance levels 
is largely due to two possibilities. The first is the smaller sample size of MRD that produces 
larger variances of the impact estimators in the model. Another possibility can be explained 
based on Morduch‟s (1998) claim about the weak instrument identification problem. As the 
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instruments were supposed to pick up any systematic heterogeneity such as land ownership, 
entrepreneurship skills, etc., that are correlated with programme participation, weak 
instrument identification found in models E2 and I2 indicates that the instruments fail to do so. 
As a result, the unobserved heterogeneity, for example, „better borrowers‟ get bigger loans, 
yield what appears to be positive non-significant marginal impacts in the models.  
       
Table 7.7 Summary of Impact Estimators of the VBSP Microcredit Programme 
Using IV-FE Models 
 The MRD  Vietnam 
Impact variable ln per capita 
Expenditure  
ln per capita 
Income  
 ln per capita 
Expenditure  
ln per capita 
Income 
Programme participation  2.115
***
 1.666
***
  1.414
***
 0.837
***
 
 [0.616] [0.583]  [ 0.16] [0.135]    
Microloan (1,000 dong) 0.353
**
 0.254
**
  0.312
***
 0.162
***
 
 [0.147] [0.129]  [0.073] [0.046] 
Number of observations 1,052 1,050  5,096 5,094 
Notes:  1.
 *
, 
**
, and 
***  
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
             2. Robust S.E. (with sampling weight error corrected) are in brackets. 
 
7.3 Chapter Summary 
Using the cross sectional survey in 2010, the PSM estimates show that VBSP microcredit 
programme has a significant positive impact on household monthly consumption but no 
significant impact on household monthly income. Both kernel and radius matching estimators 
display similar estimates that are statistically significant at different levels. To account for 
possible unobserved bias, pre-treatment monthly consumption and pre-treatment monthly 
income were included. In addition, a lower level of microcredit impact was considered by 
including the informal microcredit in the covariates of PSM. Therefore, the matching should 
be less biased than the results from the OLS regression because matching compares borrowers 
with similar non-borrowers. In addition, the findings show a greater monthly consumption 
and income impact for the „true poor‟ when only the poor group is included in the 
comparison. This implies the „true poor‟ benefits more from involvement with a microcredit 
programme than low-income households. 
 
Using the panel data of the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS surveys, the IV-FE models produce four 
impact estimators of VBSP microcredit on household consumption and income for the MRD 
and Vietnam. Controlling for heterogeneity at individual, household, village, commune, and 
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regional levels, the results document a positive and significant effect of the microcredit 
programme participation and microcredit on household per capita consumption and income at 
the national level. In addition, greater impacts were found in the MRD, assuming that the 
endogeneity was significantly controlled for in the models. 
 
Policy implications from these findings require extra caution. Because the consistent impact 
estimators are estimated from the IV-FE models, instruments to counter endogeneity likely 
face weak instrument identification due to time varying effects. The IV, the poverty rate of the 
commune, remains valid but the IV distance to the nearest bank is not significant. Besides 
missing data at the commune level, other possible explanations for the invalidity of the 
instrument are because the economic condition dramatically changed or there was a 
significant improvement in institutional settings in the rural credit market.  
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    Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the study. Section 8.1 presents a summary of the research objectives, 
data and methodology and Section 8.2 summarises major findings. Section 8.3 discusses the 
implications of the research findings and Section 8.4 discusses the research limitations and 
provides directions for future research. 
 
8.1 Summary 
The overall objective of this study was to address two main issues that explain how 
accessibility to microcredit, including formal and informal microcredit sectors and to what 
extent formal microcredit has impacts on rural households. There are four research objectives: 
(i) to review the Vietnam rural credit market and microcredit programmes targeting the rural 
poor household; (ii) to identify factors affecting microcredit accessibility, both loan amount of 
formal and informal microcredit; (iii) to evaluate the impact of the microcredit programme on 
rural household, including impact on income and consumption; and (iv) to identify policy 
implications towards improving microcredit accessibility and impact to rural households 
through improving government policies towards the rural credit market and rural household. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Vietnam rural credit market and microcredit 
programmes targeting rural poor households. The rural credit market in Vietnam is 
characterised as a segmented and emerging market wherein the growing demand for credit by 
poor and low-income households is unmet. There are three types of credit providers: formal, 
informal and semi-formal. The formal credit sector was driven by a series of institutional 
changes and credit policies designed to cover the credit demand of rural households, 
particularly the rural poor. An increasing number of loans in formal microcredit have been 
recorded but a large proportion of the poor are still unable to borrow from the formal 
microcredit sector hence seek an alternative source of credit. The informal credit sector, 
traditionally an alternative source to formal credit, is prevalent as the alternative for many 
rural households; it exists alongside the formal credit sector. The semi-formal microcredit 
sector, dominated by NGOs and donor support funds, began in the market in late 1990s, and 
has an increasingly important role in providing microcredit and microfinance services to the 
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poor but on a small scale. Limited access to formal credit not only constrains the rural 
households from expanding their production scales but also prevents farmers from improving 
their living conditions. Credit inaccessibility in the rural areas thus impedes the development 
of the rural sector, which potentially decelerates the development of the Vietnam rural 
economy. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on accessibility to microcredit and microcredit programme 
impact on rural households. The review of literature on microcredit for both theoretical and 
empirical models suggests that asymmetric information (i.e., transaction costs) plays an 
important role in accessibility to credit and hence imposes credit rationing on borrowers. The 
government microcredit programme is designed to provide more microcredit access to the 
rural borrowers with collateral free using the third party‟s screening (i.e., the Peoples 
Committee of the village), but credit rationing still persists in lending due to third party‟s 
incentives (e.g., commission and responsibility to deal with default loans). Rural households, 
particularly the poor and landless households still have no access to many microcredit 
programmes; therefore, they seek alternative sources of credit. Informal microcredit relies on 
simple and flexible lending practices supplies credit to a large proportion of rural borrowers. 
The informal credit sector exists in the rural credit market; however, the literature shows a 
gap that there is little focus on how these two credit sectors interact to serve a wider range of 
rural borrowers. The gap is closely attributed to modelling and estimating issues. On one 
hand, including informal credit in the formal credit equation is not feasible because in the 
formal lending practice, loans are not given to a borrower based on the household‟s informal 
debt. On the other hand, specifying separate borrowing and loan amounts for both sectors in 
the model generates a multi-distributional problem in estimation.   
 
In addition, the review focusing on the impact of formal microcredit programmes on rural 
households demonstrates microcredit programme impact on households remains questionable 
due to contradictory results from empirical studies. In fact, the results of microcredit 
programme impact studies are subject to biases because of missing data problem. In general, 
impact evaluation methods such as Matching or DinD deal with either observed or 
unobserved biases. Provided there is non-experimental data in the microcredit survey, no 
single method can entirely overcome bias; a combined method, therefore, can improve 
unbiased estimators of the impact evaluation.  
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Chapter 4 discusses a number of important issues in microcredit literature including 
asymmetric information, credit constraint and credit rationing, and consumption and 
established the empirical models for the research objectives 2 and 3. Various economic 
relationships have been established for empirical estimation in the theoretical models. 
Information asymmetry including transaction cost is the core of the lending principle that 
explains why lenders always select a certain borrower to grant a loan contract and hence there 
is always a mismatch between credit supply and demand in the formal rural credit market. 
This credit rationing creates credit constraints on the rural household, particularly the rural 
poor. Subsequently, the household consumption model shows that credit helps reduce 
constraints to working capital in agricultural production or in non-farm income generating 
activities, hence, enhances the household‟s consumption growth. Following the defined 
economic relationship, different empirical models were discussed. First, the credit 
accessibility model was specified to determine factors affecting the household‟s decision to 
borrow from the formal credit sector under the conditions that the informal sector exists and 
interacts with the formal sector in the credit market. The model is expected to achieve 
consistent estimators for the determinants of the household‟s access to the formal and 
informal credit under the credit rationing assumption, selection bias and interaction between 
the informal and formal credit. Next, the PSM method and the DinD approach used to assess 
the impact of a microcredit programme on household consumption and income were also 
discussed. These estimation strategies were proposed to obtain unbiased and consistent 
estimators, depending on the types of dependent variables as well as the nature of the dataset.  
 
Chapter 5 supplements Chapters 2, 6 and 7. The description of the survey data and 
respondents provides an overview of the data obtained and used in the analysis of credit 
accessibility in chapter 6 and impact evaluation of cross sectional data in Chapter 7. 
Descriptive statistics provide variations and preliminary relationships of the explanatory 
variables in the models. Chapter 5 also provides an overview of how the rural credit market 
actually operates in the MRD. Particularly, the formal and informal lending were analysed 
based on individual, household, microcredit, and geographic factors. The descriptive analysis 
reflects the rural credit market in the MRD.  
 
The research findings were obtained from Chapters 6 and 7 where accessibility to microcredit, 
amount of formal microcredit, amount of informal microcredit, and impact evaluation of 
microcredit programmes were investigated. Different estimation strategies were used in the 
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analysis. First, to obtain the determinants of informal microcredit, credit accessibility to 
formal microcredit, and formal microcredit, the conditional mixed process was applied. We 
used the conditional mixed process method to mimic the estimation strategies of the probit 
RHS, Tobit and Heckman 2step models in which the probit RHS and Tobit strategies were 
used to account for truncated and endogenous problems of informal microcredit in the 
accessibility to formal microcredit and the Heckman 2step strategies were applied to account 
for sample selection bias in the formal microcredit. Secondly, to obtain the impact estimators, 
the PSM method and DinD approach were chosen to counter with observed and unobserved 
bias. Under the condition that bias is controlled for using the observed covariates and pre-
programme attributes, Kernel and Radius Matching were applied to estimate the impact of the 
microcredit programme on rural households using cross sectional data. To relax the 
assumption that allows both observed and unobserved factors to bias the impact estimators of 
the microcredit programme, the IV-FE model was applies on the panel dataset. Before the IV-
FE was estimated, the PSM was applied to remove bias possibly due to data issue (i.e., post-
programme implementation data). The findings from this study are summarised in the next 
section. 
 
8.2 Major Findings 
In the analysis of credit accessibility, we found that accessibility to microcredit programmes 
and informal microcredit are subject to endogeneity problems; informal microcredit positively 
influence accessibility to a formal microcredit programme. If a financially constrained 
household with high entrepreneurial skills has borrowed an informal loan, there is a higher 
probability that he or she will be able to access formal microcredit. The finding confirms the 
interaction between the formal and informal credit sectors where there is a positive 
relationship between the informal microcredit and access to formal microcredit. Given a 
particular informal debt, the household is more inclined to participate in a formal microcredit 
programme. Ignoring this interaction may result in the less desirable properties of the 
determinants that explain the households‟ decisions to participate in a microcredit 
programme.   
 
Given the credit constraint and the coexistence of two credit sectors, the use of informal 
microcredit is positively influenced by the following factors: land holding status, informal 
loan purposes, informal interest, informal loan duration, and direct road access to the village. 
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Rural households in areas with direct road access to a town centre and with land ownership 
can obtain credit from the suppliers or traders but others with a higher demand for 
consumption might borrow more from friends, relatives or moneylenders. The flexible 
informal loan duration can compensate for the high interest rate. Hence, both factors result in 
a positive relationship with the informal loan. Informal credit is a prevalent source of trade 
and consumption credit for rural households, particularly the poor and low-income 
households because informal loans are accessible for this group. The findings indicate that 
informal credit plays an important role in meeting the credit needs of rural households. This 
includes not only households that fail to obtain financial support through formal channels 
(such as VBSP‟s microcredit programme), but also those who may be able to obtain formal 
credit but choose to borrow from informal lenders due to flexible lending schemes. Therefore, 
the existence of informal credit may not simply be a result of insufficient supply of formal 
microcredit or credit rationing by formal institutions but it may result from the development 
of the rural credit market itself. As the rural credit market evolves, the informal lenders‟ 
lending practice has been adjusted to suit the demand of distinct groups of borrowers. This 
also explains the persistent co-existence of formal and informal credit sectors in Vietnam. 
 
The positive contributors to microcredit accessibility include being a local government 
employee, membership of credit group, and having a poor certificate. Working as a local 
government employee improves accessibility to formal microcredit through work relationship 
and it is considered as a bias in the selection process; improving accessibility to microcredit 
using the poor certificate is a social policy intervention. Lending through a group is 
considered a more appropriate improvement of accessibility to microcredit. Direct road access 
and ethnic concentration commune also improve accessibility to microcredit for rural 
households. These factors can be used in designing microcredit schemes that provide a good 
coverage to targeted poor household in rural areas. In addition, agricultural land ownership 
positively increases microcredit demand; capital for agricultural production results in a greater 
microcredit demand. Providing for agricultural production and education purposes are the 
main coverage of the formal microcredit programme; loans for other purposes are given but 
are of a smaller size.  
 
From the PSM estimates using the 2010 cross sectional survey, we found that the VBSP 
microcredit programme has a significant positive impact on household consumption but no 
significant impact on household income. Both Kernel and Radius matching estimators 
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displayed similar estimates that were statistically significant at different levels. The findings 
are consistent even if a lower level of credit impact and pre-treatment consumption and 
income were included in the covariates of PSM to account for possible unobserved bias. The 
matching results should be less biased than the results from the OLS regression because 
matching compares borrowers only with similar non-borrowers.  
 
Focussing on the poor, our results show a greater consumption and income impact for the 
„true poor‟ when the comparison is restricted only to the poor group. This implies the „true 
poor‟ benefit more from involvement with a microcredit programme than non-poor 
households. The findings reflect the paradox in microfinance that “Why doesn‟t capital 
naturally flow to the poor?” addressed by Aghion and Morduch (2005). This finding is 
consistent with the consensus that a well-designed credit scheme can raise the income of 
significant numbers of the poor across countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
and India (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). This suggests/provokes a need for many microcredit 
programmes in Vietnam with a poverty reduction aim to re-define their target clients.  
 
From the IV-FE models using the panel data of the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS surveys, we find a 
significant impact of VBSP microcredit on household consumption and income. Controlling 
for heterogeneity at individual, household, village, commune, and regional levels, the results 
conclude a positive and significant effect of the microcredit programme and microcredit on 
household per capita consumption and income at the national level. Greater impacts were 
found for the microcredit programme in the MRD compared to its country average, assuming 
that the endogeneity was significantly controlled for in the models. This greater impact is 
largely attributed to the observed factors at the regional level; however, unobserved factors 
such as, individual heterogeneity, are also believed to contribute to the differences. This is 
because the people in the MRD region are more business oriented than other regions, access 
to microcredit helps reduce the capital constraint, which likely improves marginal 
productivity of capital hence increases income and consumption. This occurs even in micro 
and small-scale business at the rural household level.  
 
One unexpected finding arising from this study is that the instrumental variable‟s validity is 
subject to a time varying effect. The instrumental variables used to account for unobserved 
endogeneity in impact evaluation likely change with changes of economic conditions where 
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microcredit programmes are implemented. This is particularly so when the poverty rate of the 
commune remains valid but the distance to the nearest bank is inconsistent and insignificant. 
The inconsistency of IV may cause inconsistent impact estimators from the IV-FE models 
because instruments encountering endogeneity likely face weak instrument identification. 
This time varying effect requires extra caution when IV-FE models are used to evaluate 
programme impact.  
 
8.3 Implications of the Study 
The findings provide several implications for academics and microcredit policy.  
 
8.3.1 Academic Implications 
Capital does not naturally flow from rich to poor in rural credit markets, particularly rural 
credit markets in developing countries because of market imperfection and asymmetric 
information (Aghion & Morduch, 2010; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Risk assessment toward 
borrowers defines credit accessibility which, in turn, is determined by adverse selection and 
moral hazard behaviours. Given limited credit worthiness (e.g., collateral), the poor can 
hardly borrow from formal credit institutions in the rural credit market. Pro-government 
intervention advocates that public policies are needed to correct market malfunctioning, 
expanding credit outreach; however, these theories if they stand alone cannot assure a better 
solution for the rural credit market. Pro-poor policies, starting with implementing microcredit 
programmes, face a trade-off between profit maximisation and government subsidy, and with 
third party‟s incentives in the lending practice (Adams & Vogel, 1986). Profit maximisation 
and third party‟s incentives help explain inaccessibility to microcredit programmes. Reflected 
from this study, the interlinked relationship of different parties in the rural credit market is 
embraced by different economic theories but a theory that is sufficiently robust to justify the 
rural credit market and for it to work efficiently towards the goal of poverty reduction and 
rural development needs to be evolved, together with the rural economy development.  
 
Endogenous informal microcredit in accessibility to formal microcredit reflects that the 
degree to which informal credit influence depends on its the prevalence in a particular credit 
market. Together with selection bias, coexisting credit sectors influence borrowing behaviour 
(see also Bell, 1990; Guirkinger, 2008; Heckman, 1979). Therefore, the structural relationship 
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between the informal and formal credit sectors should be considered appropriately in 
assessing accessibility to a particular microcredit programme and the programme impact. 
 
8.3.2 Policy Implications 
The results show a positive relationship between accessibility to the VBSP microcredit 
programme and its impacts on rural households‟ income and expenditure, indicating that the 
microcredit programme effectively works toward improving the rural livelihoods and poverty 
reduction. The results also reveal various factors that influence both credit accessibility and 
households‟ outcomes that includes monitoring the programme implementation. Therefore, 
different policiy implications related to improving microcredit accessibility and impacts can 
start from the government to microcredit providers and rural households. 
 
For rural households, improving microcredit accessibility can start from the household 
themselves by actively participating in a credit group and improving their education and work 
skills because education essentially builds up creditworthiness for collateral-free borrowers 
and work skills promise repayment. The poor, in this case, are physically poor due to capital 
contraint; they lack of land and working capital to generate a sufficient income level for a 
living. Given that pre-condition, microcredit shows its positive impact on the targethousehold. 
However, it isdifficult for the extremely poor to benefit from microcredit because they need 
pre-support (e.g., special aids, communinity support) to overcome internal rationing. 
Extremely poor people like people suffering from under and/or malnourishment, illnesses, 
lack of skills, etc., cannot be a target of microcreditthat aims to provide small credit for 
income generating activities. Intervention in the form of microcredit will not be an efficient 
solution but a mixture of welfare and a microcredit programme is required for this target 
group. Microcredit should always be seen as the next step after they [the poor] are able to 
work (Gibbons et al., 2000; Seibel, 1997). 
 
As the informal and formal credit sectors coexist and interact, an appropriate credit policy is 
to direct both sectors to work better towards the rural development goal. A better linkage 
between the two credit sectors would enable one sector to overcome its weaknesses by 
gaining from other‟s strengths (for example, see  Li et al., 2011; Seibel, 1997). Particularly, 
lending through group without joint-liability helps improve the participation rate of poor 
households. Expanding this lending to some informal lenders in the group would reduce the 
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transaction costs of screening but likely increase the repayment rate because the borrowers 
can roll over their loans using the available alternative credit. On the other hand, the 
government and VBSP should reinforce the lending policy on individual contracts to reduce 
the leakage rate while keeping the programme more cost effective (Nguyen, 2008).  
 
Given the persistence of asymmetric information, direct intervention of government into the 
provision of financial services is not an „optimal‟ solution because the government faces the 
same problems of asymmetric information as the financial institutions. Therefore, to make 
microcredit markets work, government and financial institutions should focus on the solutions 
to reduce the problem of asymmetric information and transaction costs associated with 
microlending (see Adams & Vogel, 1986; Bardhan & Udry, 1999). For the government, it is 
important to enhance the development of financial infrastructure and informational 
intermediation while improving physical infrastructure and providing a consistent microcredit 
policy to ensure the bottom poor have adequate access to microcredit (see Navajas et al., 
1998; Seibel, 1997). For the financial institutions, it is essential to develop and employ the 
innovations in financial technologies such as tailored lending contracts (e.g., group lending) 
or partnership based lending (e.g., with credit rating, credit scoring agencies). 
 
The downgrading strategy that separated larger scale loans from VBA to small scale loans 
from VBSP shows the effectiveness gained from adapting innovation in lending practice to 
expand credit to the rural area (see also Le, 2011; Nguyen, 2008; Pham & Izumida, 2002). 
Rural and poor households have had greater access to preferential microcredit inthe past 
decade and the positive impact of microcredit programmeshas been ducumented. However, as 
the rural credit market evolves, including the development of credit demand and credit supply, 
and other microfinance services, thereis a question of whether the VBSP setting is sustainably 
operating in the changing environment. The development strategy of VBSP operation should, 
however, reflect its predecessor‟s failure. Divesting VBA microfinance operations by setting 
up a heavily subsidised VBSP to disburse preferential loans targeting the poor contravenes the 
principles of sound banking practice and sustainable poverty alleviation. Moreover, highly 
regulated banking operataions lack the dynamics of adequately responding to the growing 
demands of vast numbers of the poor for a full range of financial services (Dufhues, 
Heidhues, & Buchenrieder, 2004; Seibel, 1997). This issue should be seriousely re-addressed 
in the long-term stragey of agricultural and rural development, and poverty reduction. 
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8.4 Limitations and Future Research 
The empirical model of microcredit accessibility relies on the assumption that informal 
microcredit is more prevalent and less rationed hence the choice of between formal and 
informal microcredit is arbitrarily defined. To our belief, this is likely true for the Vietnam 
rural credit market hence the result may also hold for other rural credit markets in developing 
countries. However, the assumption can be verified by modelling the choice between the two 
different credit sectors in which the interaction influences the borrowing decision, using an 
ordered multinomial choice model (e.g., ordered probit or logit, conditional logit) considering 
the order of decision to borrow from a certain credit sector. This research direction could 
provide an insightful explanation of the nature of accessibility and borrowing behaviour in the 
rural credit market. In addition, as lending practice evolves through the developement process 
and the financial intermediaries become more diverse in the rural market, empirical studies on 
lending mechanisms such as screening, risk assessment, and social contract will benefit rural 
development objectives, particularly in improving the accessibility of the poor as well as 
expanding financial outreach from the formal credit providers.     
 
Informal microcredit interacts with the formal microcredit sector; however, this interaction 
was not accounted for in the impact evaluation of the formal microcredit programme in our 
study. Therefore, to make the research findings generalisable, an expansion of the research 
scope that include the informal microcredit in the impact evaluation model further reduces 
bias that the outcome is potentially simultaneously attributed to informal microcredit. Another 
similar direction for future research is to investigate the heterogeneity of microcredit 
programmes. This is important because, in reality, the VBSP runs different microcredit 
programmes targeting the poor. Different microcredit programmes have different target 
clients and lending scales, and some programmes even overlap others. In our study, these 
programmes were treated homogeneously as the “VBSP microcredit programme”, therefore, 
evaluation of microcredit impact under programme heterogeneity can significantly improve 
understanding of microcredit programme impact evaluation.  
 
One limitation arises from the cross-sectional data used in the impact evaluation of the VPSB 
microcredit programme. This study used the „non-borrowers group‟ as the comparison group 
in the impact assessments and the outcomes (such as income and consumption) of non-
borrowers to approximate the counterfactual outcomes of borrowers in the absence of 
programme participation. However, over the sampling period, there were significant 
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government policy changes that may have impacted the income and/or consumption of the 
rural poor in Vietnam. For example, the government policies such as interest subsidy  and 
food price subsidy programmes implement to respond to the global financial crises may have 
influenced the rural poor. Failing to control for such potential impact in evaluating the VPSB 
microcredit programme may lead to biased estimate of the impact. The impact of such 
policies can be examined in future research. 
 
As the current study limits investigating the impact of the formal microcredit programme to 
the rural area, future research in Vietnam can expand to sample peripheral urban and urban 
areas because urbanisation has been expanding over the country along with economic 
integration. There has been concern about the increasing urban poverty and many microcredit 
programmes have also been implemented to provide credit to urban households within the 
framework of the national poverty reduction strategy. Another research direction could look at 
the dynamic impact of microcredit programmes. For example, an impact study that takes in to 
account the effect of past credit and the length of microcredit participation can be helpful 
because the impact of microcredit programme on households is believed to be attributed to 
past loans as well as different lengths of programme participation. The confirmation of the 
dynamic impact of microcredit programmes provides further evidence whether the 
programme impacts accrue beyond the participation period.      
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Appendix A-2 Tests for Heteroskedasticity and Multicollinearity 
 
Amount of 
Informal 
Microcredit 
 
Access to Formal 
Microcredit 
 
Amount of 
Formal 
Microcredit 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg   7.28 (0.007)  34.57(0.000)  7.57(0.006) 
Reject/Not reject H0 Reject at 1%  Reject at 1%  Reject at 1% 
Mean VIF for multicollinearity 1.45(<10)  1.58(<10)  1.59(<10) 
Reject/Not reject H0 Not reject 
 Not reject  Not reject  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the probability > chi2 for BP/CW test and VIF values greater than 10 might 
need further examination. 
 
 
Appendix A-3 Actual and Predicted Outcomes of Probit Models for Accessibility to 
Microcredit 
 
 
Actual Respondents  
Borrower Non-borrower Total 
Number of correct predictions 535 191 726 
% of correct predictions 88.58 34.59 81.03 
Number of incorrect predictions 69 101 170 
% of incorrect predictions 65.41 11.42 18.97 
Predicted probability (%)  70.98  
Note: The numbers are obtained from the probit model.  
 205 
Appendix B-1 Probit Results for the Propensity Scores for Household Consumption 
Impact 
Control variables 
 
Specification (C1)  Specification (C2)  Specification (C3) 
Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Constant -1.202
***
 0.350  -1.440
***
 0.363  -1.638
***
 0.382 
AGE  0.005 0.005   0.005 0.005   0.007 0.005 
GENDER  0.071 0.100   0.051 0.101   0.077 0.102 
MARRIED  0.323
*
 0.171   0.321
*
 0.171   0.350
**
 0.173 
ETHNIC  0.310
*
 0.160   0.324
**
 0.161   0.359
**
 0.162 
NO_EDUC  0.149 0.238   0.212 0.241   0.211 0.242 
PRI_SCH  0.005 0.150   0.048 0.151   0.058 0.152 
MID_SCH -0.002 0.160   0.016 0.161   0.012 0.162 
GOV_EMP  0.411
***
 0.135   0.404
***
 0.136   0.427
***
 0.137 
CRE_MEM  0.412
***
 0.148   0.401
**
 0.149   0.433
***
 0.150 
POOR_CER  0.621
***
 0.138   0.660
***
 0.140   0.695
***
 0.143 
HHSIZE  0.009 0.033  -0.006 0.033  -0.009 0.033 
NUM_CHIL  0.031 0.034   0.031 0.034   0.031 0.034 
OWN_LAND  0.391
***
 0.134   0.363
***
 0.135   0.353
***
 0.136 
MI_FARM  0.190 0.126   0.211
*
 0.126   0.262
**
 0.129 
MI_NONF  0.008 0.134   0.016 0.134   0.022 0.135 
POOR_NOEDUC -0.340 0.317  -0.369 0.314  -0.365 0.316 
URB_COM -0.229
*
 0.119  -0.210
*
 0.119  -0.207
*
 0.121 
ECO_COM  0.552
***
 0.176   0.572
***
 0.177   0.610
***
 0.178 
DRA_VIL  0.550
***
 0.150   0.577
***
 0.151   0.605
***
 0.153 
PRE_CONS     0.145
**
 0.056   0.139
**
 0.056 
ln IFL        0.085
*
 0.048 
Number of obs. 877   877   872  
Log likelihood -487.6   -484.2   -479.7  
Chi2 126.5   133.3   135.4  
Note: 
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix B-2 Probit Results for the Propensity Scores for Household Income Impact 
Variable Specification (I1)  Specification (I2)  Specification (I3) 
 Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Constant -1.202
***
 0.350  -1.228
***
 0.354  -1.438
***
 0.374 
AGE  0.005 0.005   0.005 0.005   0.006 0.005 
GENDER  0.071 0.100   0.066 0.101   0.095 0.102 
MARRIED  0.323
*
 0.171   0.323
*
 0.171   0.354
**
 0.172 
ETHNIC  0.310
*
 0.160   0.317
**
 0.161   0.352
**
 0.162 
NO_EDUC  0.149 0.238   0.160 0.239   0.157 0.240 
PRI_SCH  0.005 0.150   0.010 0.150   0.019 0.151 
MID_SCH -0.002 0.160   0.001 0.160  -0.006 0.161 
GOV_EMP  0.411
***
 0.135   0.403
***
 0.136   0.429
***
 0.137 
CRE_MEM  0.412
***
 0.148   0.412
***
 0.148   0.446
***
 0.149 
POOR_CER  0.621
***
 0.138   0.630
***
 0.139   0.667
***
 0.143 
HHSIZE  0.009 0.033   0.007 0.033   0.004 0.033 
NUM_CHIL  0.031 0.034   0.030 0.034   0.030 0.034 
OWN_LAND  0.391
***
 0.134   0.382
***
 0.136   0.374
***
 0.136 
MI_FARM  0.190 0.126   0.187 0.126   0.240
*
 0.129 
MI_NONF  0.008 0.134   0.008 0.134   0.016 0.134 
POOR_NOEDUC -0.340 0.313  -0.345 0.313  -0.343 0.314 
URB_COM -0.229
*
 0.119  -0.231
*
 0.119  -0.225
*
 0.120 
ECON_COM  0.552
***
 0.176   0.555
***
 0.177   0.595
***
 0.178 
DRA_VIL  0.550
***
 0.150   0.559
***
 0.151   0.586
***
 0.153 
PRE_INC     0.010 0.019   0.007 0.019 
ln IFL        0.089
*
 0.048 
Number of obs. 877   877   872  
Log likelihood -487.6   -487.4   -482.7  
Chi2 126.5   126.7   129.3  
Note: 
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix B-3 Probit Results for the Propensity Scores of Poor Household 
Consumption Impact 
Variable Specification (C1)  Specification (C2)  Specification (C3) 
 Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Constant  0.206 1.017  -0.150 1.053  -0.264 1.073 
AGE -0.012 0.011  -0.011 0.011  -0.009 0.012 
GENDER  0.240 0.243   0.236 0.246   0.255 0.247 
MARRIED -0.027 0.369  -0.092 0.375  -0.100 0.376 
ETHNIC  0.340 0.329   0.397 0.332   0.425 0.334 
NO_EDUC -0.293 0.702  -0.356 0.721  -0.346 0.722 
PRI_SCH -0.268 0.676  -0.319 0.695  -0.296 0.698 
MID_SCH -0.208 0.708  -0.250 0.726  -0.218 0.729 
GOV_EMP  0.368 0.334   0.386 0.339   0.408 0.340 
CRE_MEM  0.687
**
 0.343   0.644
*
 0.346   0.660
*
 0.350 
HHSIZE  0.049 0.078   0.015 0.081   0.006 0.082 
NUM_CHIL  0.038 0.080   0.033 0.082   0.035 0.082 
OWN_LAND  0.298 0.299   0.290 0.305   0.233 0.314 
MI_FARM  0.036 0.353   0.100 0.358   0.158 0.363 
MI_NONF -0.246 0.308  -0.173 0.315  -0.169 0.317 
URB_COM -0.197 0.266  -0.151 0.269  -0.194 0.276 
ECO_COM  1.076
***
 0.402   1.143
***
 0.407   1.207
***
 0.422 
DRA_VIL  1.067
***
 0.387   1.128
***
 0.391   1.163
***
 0.395 
PRE_CONS     0.394
**
 0.200   0.393
*
 0.204 
ln IFL        0.069 0.135 
Number of obs. 223   223   222  
Log Likelihood -95.30   -93.23   -92.78  
Chi2 36.41   40.54   40.99  
Note: 
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix B-4 Probit Results for the Propensity Scores of Poor Household Income 
Impact 
Variable Specification (I1)  Specification (I2)  Specification (I3) 
 Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Constant  0.206 1.017   0.263 1.018   0.038 1.046 
AGE -0.012 0.011  -0.012 0.011  -0.008 0.012 
GENDER  0.240 0.243   0.242 0.243   0.276 0.246 
MARRIED -0.027 0.369  -0.070 0.373  -0.073 0.375 
ETHNIC  0.340 0.329   0.389 0.334   0.438 0.337 
NO_EDUC -0.293 0.702  -0.337 0.710  -0.310 0.711 
PRI_SCH -0.268 0.676  -0.305 0.683  -0.253 0.686 
MID_SCH -0.208 0.708  -0.267 0.716  -0.206 0.719 
GOV_EMP  0.368 0.334   0.349 0.336   0.364 0.335 
CRE_MEM  0.687
**
 0.343   0.609
*
 0.348   0.643
*
 0.353 
HHSIZE  0.049 0.078   0.024 0.082   0.012 0.083 
NUM_CHIL  0.038 0.080   0.042 0.081   0.042 0.081 
OWN_LAND  0.298 0.299   0.291 0.301   0.219 0.310 
MI_FARM  0.036 0.353   0.018 0.355   0.076 0.360 
MI_NONF -0.246 0.308  -0.257 0.312  -0.277 0.314 
URB_COM -0.197 0.266  -0.216 0.268  -0.278 0.275 
ECO_COM  1.076
***
 0.402   1.042
***
 0.404   1.146
***
 0.419 
DRA_VIL  1.067
***
 0.387   1.048
***
 0.388   1.103
***
 0.392 
PRE_INC     0.118 0.108   0.124 0.110 
ln IFL        0.127 0.134 
Number of obs. 223   223   222  
Log Likelihood -95.30   -94.64   -94.07  
Chi2 36.41   37.72   38.39  
Note: 
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix B-5 Distributions of Propensity Scores for Consumption Impact Estimators Using the Specified Covariates 
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Appendix B-6 Distributions of Propensity Scores for Income Impact Estimators Using the Specified Covariates 
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Appendix B-7 Covariates Used in the Estimation of Propensity Score 
 
Individual factors: Age of household head, Gender of household head, Head is ethnic 
minority, Marital status of household head, Education level of household head (primary 
school, secondary school, high school, technical degree, university degree, post-grad degree).  
Household factors: Household size, Ratio of female members, Ratio of members below 16, 
Ratio of members above 60, Ratio of members working in agriculture, Ratio of members 
working in industry, Ratio of members working in services, Ratio of member with primary 
school, Ratio of members with secondary school, Ratio of members with high school, Ratio 
of member with tertiary education, Number of average sick days per member per year, Area 
of annual crop land, Area of perennial crop land, Area of aquaculture water surface, Overseas 
remittances, Domestic remittances, Pensions, Savings, Poor certificate in 2006. 
Village and commune factors: Having car road village, Having traditional village commune, 
Having car road commune, Distance to extension centre, Having nonfarm enterprises 
commune, Having primary school commune, Having secondary school commune, Having 
high school commune, Having inter-communal market commune, Having irrigation plant 
commune, Commune land area, Number of hamlet in commune, Poverty ratio, Coastal 
region, Delta region, Midland and hilly land region, Low mountainous region. 
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Appendix B-8 Results for IV Fixed Effects Models for VBSP Microcredit Impact on Household Per Capita Expenditure 
 First-Stage Regression   Second-Stage Regression 
      ln per capita Expenditure 
Variable Programme Amount of Formal 
Microcredit 
 Programme Amount of Formal 
Microcredit 
 The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam  The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam 
Participation in VBSP      2.1150
***
 1.4140
***
   
      [0.6160] [0.1630]   
ln Formal Microcredit        0.3530
**
 0.3120
***
 
        [0.1470] [0.0728] 
1. Individual factors          
AGE 0.0010 0.0029
***
 0.0051 0.0124  -0.0015 0.0010 -0.0013 0.0013 
 [0.0014] [0.0010] [0.0119] [0.0111]  [0.0041] [0.0024] [0.0049] [0.0042] 
GENDER 0.1190 0.0112 0.8210 0.0535  -0.1070 -0.0528 -0.1450 -0.0532 
 [0.0830] [0.0519] [0.7540] [0.4650]  [0.2180] [0.0941] [0.2980] [0.148] 
ETHNIC -0.0066 0.0056 -0.2560
*
 0.0364  0.0210 -0.0199
***
 0.0963 -0.0246
*
 
 [0.0237] [0.0056] [0.1440] [0.0573]  [0.0515] [0.0068] [0.0660] [0.0137] 
MARRIED -0.0355 0.0099 -0.3050 0.2540  0.0110 0.0848 0.0441 0.0148 
 [0.0444] [0.0350] [0.4490] [0.3670]  [0.1520] [0.0805] [0.2050] [0.1260] 
PRI_SCHO 0.0291 0.0209 0.3420 0.1430  -0.0787 0.0906 -0.1480 0.0849 
 [0.0517] [0.0639] [0.3700] [0.6450]  [0.2180] [0.1380] [0.2370] [0.2330] 
SEC_SCHO -0.0223 -0.0037 0.2250 -0.2990  0.0522 0.0768 -0.0758 0.1620
*
 
 [0.0429] [0.0257] [0.3550] [0.2610]  [0.1090] [0.0513] [0.1310] [0.0970] 
HIG_SCHO -0.1180 -0.0198 -0.7340 -0.2750  0.2420 0.0733 0.2480 0.1300 
 [0.0778] [0.0369] [0.7310] [0.3390]  [0.1960] [0.0666] [0.3050] [0.1150] 
TEC_DEGRE -0.1000 -0.1090
**
 -0.1400 -0.5920  0.1330 0.1410 -0.0337 0.1700 
 [0.0686] [0.0475] [0.6520] [0.4330]  [0.2010] [0.0915] [0.2600] [0.1500] 
UNI_DEGRE -0.0381 0.0260 0.3030 -1.2650  0.4710
***
 0.1450 0.2950 0.5990
**
 
 [0.0691] [0.0789] [0.5860] [1.0220]  [0.1590] [0.1670] [0.2190] [0.2790] 
POST_GRAD -0.0440 -0.2450
**
 0.7000 -1.4180  0.5470
**
 0.2730 0.2250 0.3810 
 [0.1000] [0.0953] [0.8540] [0.9370]  [0.2580] [0.1990] [0.3400] [0.3250] 
2. Household factors          
HHSIZE -0.0138 -0.0132
*
 0.0077 -0.0064  -0.0704
**
 -0.0917
***
 -0.1040
**
 -0.1100
***
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 [0.0131] [0.0069] [0.1270] [0.0789]  [0.0341] [0.0136] [0.0461] [0.0271] 
R_FEMALE 0.0076 0.0131 0.6160 0.2750  -0.4380
*
 -0.0121 -0.6410
*
 -0.0765 
 [0.1170] [0.0590] [0.9310] [0.6030]  [0.2580] [0.1170] [0.3610] [0.2050] 
R_BELOW 16 0.0857 0.0037 0.8430 0.5850  -0.4330 -0.3780
***
 -0.5570 -0.5590
***
 
 [0.1330] [0.0645] [1.1980] [0.570]  [0.2940] [0.1150] [0.4370] [0.1920] 
R_ABOVE 60 -0.0352 -0.0805 -0.9620 -0.7550  0.1280 0.1720 0.3990 0.2990 
 [0.0917] [0.0498] [0.9430] [0.4910]  [0.2390] [0.1200] [0.3540] [0.1920] 
R_WAGRI -0.0632 0.0012 -0.4620 -0.1160  0.0961 -0.0867 0.1220 -0.0486 
 [0.0651] [0.0310] [0.5670] [0.3040]  [0.1510] [0.0591] [0.2220] [0.1020] 
R_WINDUS 0.0756 0.0771
**
 0.0778 0.3850  -0.1860 0.0200 -0.0522 0.0082 
 [0.0597] [0.0376] [0.5510] [0.3600]  [0.1480] [0.0685] [0.1990] [0.1190] 
R_WSERV 0.0430 -0.0147 0.0516 0.0882  -0.1380 0.1280 -0.0688 0.08110 
 [0.0797] [0.0465] [0.6530] [0.4230]  [0.2060] [0.0898] [0.2520] [0.1470] 
R_PRI_SCHO 0.0345 -0.0127 0.7360 0.0735  0.00562 0.1460
*
 -0.1800 0.1140 
 [0.0882] [0.0443] [0.7920] [0.4520]  [0.1860] [0.0843] [0.3080] [0.1540] 
R_SEC_SCHO 0.2280
*
 0.0585 1.8140 0.4480  -0.0628 0.1970
*
 -0.2150 0.1560 
 [0.1250] [0.0568] [1.1230] [0.5630]  [0.3030] [0.1100] [0.5000] [0.1950] 
R_HIG_SCHO 0.1380 0.2690
***
 0.0382 1.9520
**
  0.5030 0.2070 0.8060
*
 -0.0080 
 [0.1220] [0.0704] [1.264] [0.731]  [0.3190] [0.1410] [0.4730] [0.2880] 
R_UNI_DEGRE 0.0818 0.3570
*
 0.4330 2.1180  -0.6230 0.2140 -0.5930 0.0849 
 [0.1390] [0.2080] [1.0130] [1.8920]  [0.4770] [0.3500] [0.5190] [0.6000] 
NUM_SDAYS -0.0037
*
 -0.0010 -0.0101 -0.0062  0.0081
*
 0.0028 0.0036 0.0031 
 [0.0019] [0.0010] [0.0159] [0.0086]  [0.0047] [0.0017] [0.0057] [0.0028] 
LAND_ACROP 8.80e-08 8.63e-07 7.62e-08 7.18e-06  3.32e-06
*
 3.08e-06
**
 3.53e-06
**
 2.15e-06 
 [2.63e-07] [8.94e-07] [2.28e-06] [7.92e-06]  [1.76e-06] [1.57e-06] [1.79e-06] [2.43e-06] 
LAND_PCROP -1.63e-06 1.68e-06
*
 7.20e-06 9.77e-06  2.52e-05
*
 2.32e-07 1.95e-05 -7.73e-08 
 [7.55e-07] [9.73e-07] [3.36e-05] [9.41e-06]  [1.45e-05] [2.41e-06] [1.50e-05] [3.23e-06] 
LAND_WSURF -8.65e-07 4.43e-07 -1.22e-05
*
 6.51e-06  1.02e-05
**
 1.01e-05
***
 1.25e-05
***
 8.73e-06
***
 
 [1.12e-07] [1.04e-06] [6.97e-06] [6.84e-06]  [3.99e-06] [2.97e-06] [3.54e-06] [3.26e-06] 
RE_OVERSEAS -1.19e-07 -8.04e-07 -1.64e-05 -8.02e-06  7.25e-06 2.97e-06
**
 1.06e-05 4.41e-06
**
 
 [1.80e-07] [7.03e-07] [1.49e-05] [6.49e-06]  [5.49e-06] [1.23e-06] [7.25e-06] [2.20e-06] 
RE_DOMESTIC 9.23e-07 -6.23e-07 -1.51e-05 -4.63e-06  2.32e-05
***
 1.31e-05
***
 3.03e-05
***
 1.37e-05
***
 
 [2.08e-06] [5.81e-07] [2.17e-05] [4.47e-06]  [4.86e-06] [3.36e-06] [8.20e-06] [3.71e-06] 
PENSSION -9.26e-06 -6.56e-06
**
 -8.97e-05 -5.56e-05  4.12e-05
**
 1.56e-05
**
 5.40e-05
**
 2.40e-05
*
 
 [8.09e-06] [2.76e-06] [6.66e-05] [3.46e-05]  [1.61e-06] [6.15e-06] [2.40e-05] [1.27e-05] 
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SAVINGS -2.40e-06 -1.14e-06 -7.90e-06 -3.81e-06  2.56e-05
**
 1.64e-05
***
 2.38e-05 1.65e-05
***
 
 [3.76e-06] [9.29e-07] [3.78e-05] [8.35e-06]  [1.24e-05] [4.56e-06] [1.69e-05] [5.62e-06] 
POOR_CER -0.0365 0.0502 0.2960 0.6150
**
  -0.0311 -0.1410
**
 -0.2160 -0.2620
**
 
 [0.0746] [0.0325] [0.7270] [0.3130]  [0.1630] [0.0533] [0.2440] [0.1090] 
3. Village and commune          
CR_COMMUNE 0.0038 0.0345 -0.3820 -0.2300  0.0662 0.1170 0.2150 0.2530 
 [0.0617] [0.0681] [0.5510] [0.4980]  [0.1410] [0.0998] [0.1980] [0.1460] 
DE_CENTER -0.0075
**
 -0.00361
**
 -0.0693
**
 -0.0265
*
  0.0102 0.0009 0.0189
*
 0.0034
*
 
 [0.0032] [0.0017] [0.0268] [0.0151]  [0.0074] [0.0027] [0.0113] [0.0052] 
NF_ENTER 0.0297 -0.0022 0.0187 -0.2850
*
  -0.0591 0.0904
***
 -0.0054 0.1740
***
 
 [0.0395] [0.0177] [0.3610] [0.1680]  [0.0990] [0.0320] [0.1300] [0.0590] 
TR_VILLA -0.0110 0.0229 0.5010
*
 0.2840  0.0410 -0.0342 -0.1520 -0.0929 
 [0.0378] [0.0265] [0.2720] [0.2450]  [0.1010] [0.0485] [0.1360] [0.0818] 
CR_VILLA 0.0367 0.0242 0.8480
**
 0.3320  0.0335 -0.0596 -0.1800 -0.1190 
 [0.0473] [0.0258] [0.4120] [0.2600]  [0.1120] [0.0507] [0.2080] [0.0931] 
Regional dummy          
GEO_CSTAL  -0.2220
**
  -0.3910   0.1920  0.3330 
  [0.1100]  [1.0750]   [0.1570]  [0.3010] 
GEO_DELTA  -0.2420
**
  0.5450   0.1270  0.1070 
  [0.1160]  [1.1040]   [0.1170]  [0.2240] 
GEO_MIDLAND  -0.1780
*
  0.4910   -0.0594  -0.0240 
  [0.0998]  [0.9550]   [0.0977]  [0.1920] 
GEO_LMOUNT  -0.1580
*
  0.2340   0.1290  0.1930 
  [0.0844]  [0.7960]   [0.0807]  [0.1570] 
4. Instrumental variables          
D_NBANK 0.0307 -0.0239
**
 0.2260 0.0683      
 [0.0272] [0.0105] [0.2120] [0.0972]      
R_POVERTY -0.8520
***
 -0.8000
***
 -4.5710
**
 -3.2730
***
      
 [0.2360] [0.0886] [2.1290] [0.7500]      
Number of observations 1,052 5,096 1,052 5,096  1,052 5,096 1,052 5,096 
Note: 1. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 
  2.
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix B-9 Results of IV Fixed Effects Models for VBSP Microcredit Impact on Household Per Capita Income 
 First-Stage Regression  Second-Stage Regression 
      ln per capita income 
Variable Programme Amount of Formal 
Microcredit 
 Programme Amount of Formal 
Microcredit 
 The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam  The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam 
Participation in VBSP      1.6660
**
 0.8370
***
   
      [0.5830] [0.1350]   
ln Formal Microcredit        0.2540
**
 0.1620
***
 
        [0.1290] [0.0459] 
1. Individual factors          
AGE 0.0007 0.0028
***
 0.0035 0.0120  0.0010 0.0006 0.0013 0.0012 
 [0.0013] [0.0010] [0.0118] [0.0111]  [0.0040] [0.0026] [0.0044] [0.0033] 
GENDER 0.1090 0.0117 0.7350 0.0580  0.0397 0.0604 0.0309 0.0592 
 [0.0814] [0.0518] [0.7410] [0.4650]  [0.2320] [0.0850] [0.2740] [0.1040] 
ETHNIC -0.0057 0.0057 -0.2480
*
 0.0369  0.0843 -0.0116 0.1370
*
 -0.0137 
 [0.0241] [0.0056] [0.1470] [0.0574]  [0.0700] [0.0088] [0.0805] [0.0115] 
MARRIED -0.0299 0.0096 -0.2580 0.2510  -0.0845 0.0210 -0.0645 -0.0129 
 [0.0437] [0.0349] [0.4400] [0.3660]  [0.1730] [0.0772] [0.2000] [0.0944] 
PRI_SCHO 0.0287 0.0208 0.3390 0.1420  0.0102 -0.0372 -0.0403 -0.0371 
 [0.0506] [0.0639] [0.3640] [0.6460]  [0.1920] [0.1100] [0.1870] [0.1490] 
SEC_SCHO -0.0260 -0.0047 0.1940 -0.3080  0.1510 0.0386 0.0562 0.0838 
 [0.0427] [0.0256] [0.3530] [0.2610]  [0.1060] [0.0458] [0.1150] [0.0664] 
HIG_SCHO -0.1180 -0.0202 -0.7350 -0.2780  0.3340
*
 0.0600 0.3200 0.0880 
 [0.0773] [0.0368] [0.7280] [0.3390]  [0.1770] [0.0587] [0.2440] [0.0771] 
TEC_DEGRE -0.0949 -0.1080
**
 -0.0965 -0.5850  0.2460 0.1230 0.1060 0.1260 
 [0.0684] [0.0475] [0.6500] [0.4330]  [0.2080] [0.0877] [0.2330] [0.1060] 
UNI_DEGRE -0.0331 0.0265 0.3450 -1.2600  0.1720 0.1630 0.0420 0.4050 
 [0.0685] [0.0789] [0.5810] [1.0190]  [0.2790] [0.1840] [0.2970] [0.2560] 
POST_GRAD -0.0466 -0.2450
**
 0.6790 -1.4160  1.3010
***
 0.1860 1.0690
***
 0.2200 
 [0.0998] [0.0954] [0.8490] [0.9370]  [0.3360] [0.1820] [0.3530] [0.2340] 
2. Household factors          
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HHSIZE -0.0146 -0.0133
*
 0.00123 -0.0071  -0.0552
*
 -0.0889
***
 -0.0819
**
 -0.1000
***
 
 [0.0130] [0.0069] [0.1260] [0.0788]  [0.0303] [0.0124] [0.0372] [0.0179] 
R_FEMALE 0.0273 0.0180 0.7810 0.3150  -0.6120
**
 -0.1200 -0.7690
**
 -0.1550 
 [0.1160] [0.0589] [0.9150] [0.6010]  [0.2420] [0.1060] [0.3040] [0.1390] 
R_BELOW 16 0.0365 -0.0063 0.4320 0.5030  -0.5230
*
 -0.3650
***
 -0.5820 -0.4560
***
 
 [0.1250] [0.0639] [1.1400] [0.5660]  [0.2720] [0.1020] [0.3430] [0.1290] 
R_ABOVE 60 -0.0455 -0.0822
*
 -1.0480 -0.7700  0.0333 0.0101 0.2340 0.0700 
 [0.0909] [0.0498] [0.9370] [0.4910]  [0.240] [0.1130] [0.2990] [0.1420] 
R_WAGRI -0.0888 -0.00436 -0.6750 -0.1620  0.1890 -0.0217 0.2100 0.0002 
 [0.0616] [0.0306] [0.5450] [0.3020]  [0.1460] [0.0533] [0.1950] [0.0677] 
R_WINDUS 0.0723 0.0756
**
 0.0504 0.3720  0.1040 0.3200
***
 0.2140 0.3230
***
 
 [0.0593] [0.0376] [0.5490] [0.3590]  [0.1500] [0.0587] [0.1730] [0.0781] 
R_WSERV 0.1030
*
 -0.0021 0.5500 0.1930  0.0909 0.3770
***
 0.1200 0.3440
***
 
 [0.0580] [0.0454] [0.4750] [0.4160]  [0.1880] [0.0805] [0.2020] [0.1000] 
R_PRI_SCHO 0.0439 -0.0101 0.8150 0.0958  0.0207 0.1850
**
 -0.1120 0.1650 
 [0.0878] [0.0442] [0.7850] [0.4520]  [0.1830] [0.0786] [0.2680] [0.1060] 
R_SEC_SCHO 0.2380
*
 0.0591 1.8990
*
 0.4530  0.1110 0.2110
**
 0.03210 0.1980 
 [0.1230] [0.0568] [1.1130] [0.5630]  [0.2950] [0.1040] [0.4290] [0.1320] 
R_HIG_SCHO 0.1440 0.2680
***
 0.0938 1.9470
***
  0.3220 0.1580 0.5680 0.0770 
 [0.1200] [0.0704] [1.2490] [0.7310]  [0.3290] [0.1320] [0.4050] [0.1940] 
R_UNI_DEGRE 0.1280 0.3590
*
 0.8180 2.1380  -1.5380
**
 0.3360 -1.5200
**
 0.3110 
 [0.1370] [0.2080] [0.9770] [1.8920]  [0.7280] [0.3480] [0.7420] [0.4150] 
NUM_SDAYS -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0043 -0.00508  0.0014 0.0006 -0.0027 0.0005 
 [0.0018] [0.0010] [0.0151] [0.00857]  [0.0042] [0.0015] [0.0045] [0.0019] 
LAND_ACROP 8.43e-08 8.57e-07 4.49e-08 7.13e-06  1.28e-05
***
 1.16e-05
***
 1.30e-05
***
 1.12e-05
***
 
 [2.61e-07] [8.91e-07] [2.38e-06] [7.89e-06]  [2.36e-06] [1.89e-06] [2.43e-06] [2.18e-06] 
LAND_PCROP -1.49e-06 1.68e-06
*
 8.36e-06 9.79e-06  2.77e-05
*
 2.44e-06 2.33e-05
*
 2.54e-06 
 [7.53e-06] [9.74e-07] [3.38e-05] [9.43e-06]  [1.67e-05] [2.67e-06] [1.21e-05] [2.06e-06] 
LAND_WSURF -1.07e-06 2.40e-07 -1.39e-05
**
 4.82e-06  5.26e-06 5.64e-06 6.99e-06
*
 5.11e-06 
 [1.19e-06] [1.07e-06] [6.84e-06] [6.83e-06]  [4.07e-06] [3.68e-06] [4.03e-06] [3.73e-06] 
RE_OVERSEAS -1.28e-06 -7.95e-07 -1.71e-05 -7.94e-06  1.47e-05
***
 1.43e-05
***
 1.69e-05
**
 1.49e-05
***
 
 [1.80e-06] [7.01e-07] [1.50e-05] [6.47e-06]  [5.47e-06] [1.44e-06] [6.94e-06] [1.58e-06] 
RE_DOMESTIC 6.35e-07 -6.31e-07 -1.75e-05 -4.69e-06  2.21e-05
***
 1.73e-05
***
 2.74e-05
***
 1.76e-05
***
 
 [2.05e-06] [5.82e-07] [2.14e-05] [4.50e-06]  [5.69e-06] [2.54e-06] [7.26e-06] [2.70e-06] 
PENSSION -8.84e-06
*
 -6.61e-07
**
 -8.62e-05 -5.60e-05  6.66e-05
***
 2.41e-05
***
 7.47e-05
***
 2.79e-05
***
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 [8.05e-06] [2.76e-06] [6.64e-05] [3.45e-05]  [1.38e-05] [5.40e-06] [1.90e-05] [7.86e-06] 
SAVINGS -2.36e-06 -1.14e-07 -7.52e-06 -3.82e-06  1.34e-05 1.64e-05
***
 1.21e-05 1.65e-05
***
 
 [3.72e-06] [9.32e-07] [3.75e-05] [8.34e-06]  [9.32e-06] [4.53e-06] [1.22e-05] [5.00e-06] 
POOR_CER -0.0396 0.0504 0.2700 0.6170
**
  0.0199 -0.1540
***
 -0.1190 -0.2120
***
 
 [0.0743] [0.0325] [0.7280] [0.3120]  [0.1470] [0.0475] [0.1980] [0.0722] 
3. Village and commune          
CR_COMMUNE 0.0052 0.0345 -0.3710 -0.2310  0.1160 0.1150 0.2300 0.1940
*
 
 [0.0607] [0.0679] [0.5450] [0.4960]  [0.1460] [0.1020] [0.1780] [0.1140] 
DE_CENTER -0.0075
**
 -0.0036
*
 -0.0693
***
 -0.0265
*
  -0.0075 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0020 
 [0.0032] [0.0017] [0.0267] [0.0151]  [0.0069] [0.0026] [0.0100] [0.00345] 
NF_ENTER 0.0292 -0.0021 0.0147 -0.2850
*
  0.0374 0.0831
***
 0.0817 0.1270
***
 
 [0.0395] [0.0177] [0.3600] [0.1680]  [0.0950] [0.0265] [0.1100] [0.0374] 
TR_VILLA -0.0123 0.0233 0.4900
*
 0.2870  0.0566 -1.11e-05 -0.0807 -0.0286 
 [0.0375] [0.0265] [0.2660] [0.2450]  [0.1030] [0.0406] [0.1240] [0.0521] 
CR_VILLA 0.0364 0.0242 0.8460
**
 0.3320  -0.0128 -0.0367 -0.1600 -0.0627 
 [0.0475] [0.0258] [0.4120] [0.2600]  [0.1130] [0.0435] [0.1830] [0.0616] 
Regional dummy          
GEO_CSTAL  -0.2210
**
  -0.3800   -0.0633  0.0040 
  [0.1110]  [1.0760]   [0.1340]  [0.1800] 
GEO_DELTA  -0.2390
**
  0.5690   -0.0785  -0.0896 
  [0.1160]  [1.1050]   [0.0914]  [0.1330] 
GEO_MIDLAND  -0.1760
*
  0.5120   -0.1840
**
  -0.1620 
  [0.0997]  [0.9550]   [0.0781]  [0.1170] 
GEO_LMOUNT  -0.1570
*
  0.2500   0.0274  0.0619 
  [0.0843]  [0.7960]   [0.0607]  [0.0937] 
4. Instrumental variables          
D_NBANK 0.0323 -0.0236
**
 0.2390 0.0702      
 [0.0272] [0.0105] [0.2110] [0.0972]      
R_POVERTY -0.8200
***
 -0.7980
***
 -4.2970
**
 -3.2530
***
      
 [0.2320] [0.0885] [2.1060] [0.7500]      
Number of observations 1,050 5,094 1,050 5,094  1,050 5,094 1,050 5,094 
Note: 1. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 
  2.
*
 ,
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix B-10 Tests for Underindentification, Endogeneity, Weak Instruments, and Weak Instrument-Robust Inference for IV Fixed Effects 
Models Using the VietnamSample 
 IV Equation Consumption Equation  Income Equation 
1. Underidentification test  Programme Chi2(2) = 88.09
***
  Chi2(3) = 87.69
***
 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
 Microcredit Chi2(2) = 19.25
***
  Chi2(2) = 19.09
***
 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
2. Test of endogeneity  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Programme Chi2(1) =111.81
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) =42.08
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Microcredit Chi2(1) =116.63
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) =39.49
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
3. Weak IV identification test: Programme    
Cragg-Donald F statistic  43.27  43.08 
 Microcredit    
Cragg-Donald F statistic   9.76   9.68 
4. Weak instrument-robust inference Programme Chi2(2)=139.53
***
  Chi2(2)=64.47
***
 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Microcredit p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
Note: 1.
  *
 ,  
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% that Ho is not true, respectively. 
          2. Critical values for the Weak IV identification tests are based on Stock and Yogo (2005) tables. 
- Given the desired maximal bias of IV estimator relative to OLS estimator (5%), Cragg-Donald F statistics reject Ho of Weak IV identification  at the 5% level for  IV fixed 
effect models of programme impact on the consumption and income equations.  
- Given the desired maximal bias of IV estimator relative to OLS estimator (20%), Cragg-Donald F statistics reject Ho of Weak IV identification at the 5% level for  IV fixed 
effect models of microcredit impact on the consumption and income equations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 219 
 
Appendix B-11 Tests for Underidentification, Endogeneity, Weak Instruments and Weak Instrument-Robust Inference for IV Fixed Effects 
Models Using the MRD Sample 
 IV Equation Consumption Equation  Income Equation 
1. Underidentification test  Programme Chi2(2) = 15.53
***
  Chi2(3) = 14.86
***
 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
 Microcredit Chi2(2) = 6.40
**
  Chi2(2) = 5.85
*
 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.041  p-value = 0.054 
2. Test of endogeneity  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Programme Chi2(1) = 33.85
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) = 19.87
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Microcredit Chi2(1) = 35.95
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) = 19.31
***
 
p-value = 0.000 
3. Weak IV identification test: Programme    
Cragg-Donald F statistic  7.27  6.80 
 Microcredit    
Cragg-Donald F statistic  2.97  2.80 
4. Weak instrument-robust inference Programme Chi2(2)= 51.78
***
  Chi2(2)= 35.16
***
 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Microcredit p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
Note: 1.
  *
 ,  
**
, and 
*** 
indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% that Ho is not true, respectively. 
          2. Critical values for the Weak IV identification tests are based on Stock and Yogo (2005) tables. 
              Given the desired maximal bias of IV estimator relative to OLS estimator (5%),  Cragg-Donald F statistics do not reject Ho of Weak IV identification  at the 5% level for  IV  
fixed effect models of programme and microcredit impact on the consumption and income equations. 
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Appendix C Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
MICROCREDIT SURVEY  
 
 
 
 
The survey data shall be kept strictly confidential and used for no other purposes than analytical basis 
for the PhD research entitled “An Empirical Analysis of Accessibility and Impact Evaluation of 
Microcredit: The Rural Credit Market in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam”. The survey 
questionnaire asks several questions about your household‟s activities over the past 2 years as we are 
trying to understand the fundamental behaviours of households activities associated with microcredit 
programmes in the rural credit market. The survey will take about 30 to 45 minutes of your time to 
complete. 
 
 
 
Instruction: For each question with brackets provided, please tick [√ ]your answer(s); otherwise, 
please follow the instructions given to answer the questions. 
 
 
 
Section 1. Accessibility to the Formal, Semi-formal, and Informal Credit in the Rural 
Credit Market (You can tick [√ ] more than one for the answers of each question)  
 
1.1 What types of rural credit providers are available in your area? 
a. State-owned commercial banks [       ] f. Non-Government Organisations [       ] 
b. Private rural commercial banks [       ] g. Money lenders [       ] 
c. Peoples Credit Fund [       ] h. Input Suppliers [       ] 
d. Women Unions [       ] k. Middlemen (fruits collectors) [       ] 
e. Farmer‟s Associations [       ] l. Others (please specify):______________ 
 
1.2 Did you need to borrow money at any one time in the last 12 months? 
a. YES [       ]  b. NO      [       ]  please skip Q.1.3 and go to Q1.4 
 
1.3 Were you able to borrow money from any source of credit providers in the last 12 
months? 
a. YES       [       ] please skip Q1.4  b. NO      [       ] 
 
1.4 If NO in Q.1.3, why not? And go to Section 3.   
a. Afraid of having a debt [       ] 
b. Interest rates were not affordable [       ] 
c. Too many required documents to submit [       ] 
d. Uncertainty in paying the loan [       ] 
e. Lack of collateral [       ] 
f. Others (please specify): _____________ 
 
1.5 Did you borrow money from banks in the last 12 months? 
a. YES       [       ]  b. NO     [ ] 
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1.6 If NO in Q1.5, why not? 
a. Lack of information [      ] 
b. Lack of collateral [      ] 
c. Lack of ability to pay back the loan [      ] 
d. Interest rates were still not affordable [      ] 
e. Too many required documents to submit [      ] 
f. Currently in debt to banks [      ] 
g. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
 
1.7 Did you borrow money from non-bank institutions in the last 12 months? 
a. YES       [       ]  b. NO     [ ] 
 
 
1.8 If NO in Q1.7, why not? 
a. Lack of information [      ] 
b. Lack of collateral [      ] 
c. Lack of ability to pay back the loan [      ] 
d. Interest rates were not affordable [      ] 
e. Too many required documents to submit [      ] 
f. Currently in debt to banks [      ] 
g. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
 
1.9 Do you have access to a formal microcredit with the preferential interest rates? 
a. YES       [       ]  b. NO     [ ]    please skip Q.1.10 and Q1.11, and go to 
Q1.12 
 
1.10 Please provide name of the microcredit programmes and year that you have participated 
in. 
Microcredit Programmes Year 
1…………………………………………………………………… ………………… 
2…………………………………………………………………… ………………… 
3…………………………………………………………………… ………………… 
 
1.1 From what source of information did you learn about the microcredit programme(s)? 
 Programme 1 Programme 2 Programme 3 
a. Public channel (newspapers, radio, TV) [       ] [       ] [       ] 
b. Local authority at commune level  [       ] [       ] [       ] 
c. Head of village [       ] [       ] [       ] 
d. Friends and relatives [       ] [       ] [       ] 
e. Other(s), please specify: _________ ________ ________ 
 
1.12 If NO in Q1.5, why not? 
a. Lack of information [      ] 
b. Lack of collateral [      ] 
c. Lack of ability to pay back the loan [      ] 
d. Interest rates were still not affordable [      ] 
e. Too many required documents to submit [      ] 
f. Currently indebted to banks [      ] 
g. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
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Section 2. Borrowing Behaviour of Household 
 A. Formal 
(Banks and People 
Credit Funds) 
B. Semi-formal  
(Non-bank 
institutions) 
2.1 What types of loans did you borrow? 
a. Individual lending [        ] [        ] 
b. Group lending [        ] [        ] 
 
2.2 What are the purposes of your loans? 
a. Production capital (farming activities) [        ] [        ] 
b. Small investment/trade (non-farm) [        ] [        ] 
c. Pay tuition fees for children education [        ] [        ] 
d. Emergencies (i.e. medical, hospitalization) [        ] [        ] 
e. Housing (i.e. repair, construction) [        ] [        ] 
f. Purchasing durable assets (TV, machine) [        ] [        ] 
g. Payment of other loans [        ] [        ] 
h. Others (please specify):_________       ____________ ____________ 
 A. Formal  
(Banks and People 
Credit Funds) 
B. Semi-formal  
(Non-bank 
institutions) 
2.3 Who did you borrow from for the largest loan?  [        ] [        ] 
 
2.4 For the largest loan, what was the loan duration? (months) ..……                       ……… 
 
2.5 What was the payment schedule for the largest loan? 
a. Weekly [       ] [       ] 
b. Monthly [       ] [       ] 
c. Semi-annually [       ] [       ] 
d. Annually [       ] [       ] 
e. Others (please specify):____________  …………………. ……………… 
 
2.6 What was the loan amount (largest loan)? ………………… ……………… 
   
2.7 Who did you borrow from for the new loan(s)? [       ] [       ] 
   
2.8 For the new loan, what was the loan duration? (months)………………         ……………… 
 
2.9 What is the payment schedule for the new loan? 
a. Weekly [       ] [      ] 
b. Monthly [       ] [       ] 
c. Semi-annually [       ] [       ] 
d. Annually [       ] [       ] 
e. Others (please specify):________________ ______________ ____________ 
 
2.10 What was the loan amount (new loan)?     ……………… …………… 
 
2.11 What is the average interest rate per month? (%)     …………… …………… 
 
2.12 What kinds of collateral did you use to obtain the loans? 
a. Land certificate [        ] [        ] 
b. Asset  [        ] [        ] 
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c. Others (please specify):_____________ ___________ __________ 
2.13 What is the status of your existing loan? 
a. Fully paid [        ] [        ] 
b. Current loan [        ] [        ] 
c. Past due [        ] [        ] 
d. Restructured [        ] [        ] 
 
2.14 How long did it take to process your loan from the formal credit provider? 
a. Less than a week [        ] [        ] 
b. 1 week  [        ] [        ] 
c. 2 weeks  [        ] [        ] 
d. 3 weeks [        ] [        ] 
e. 1 month [        ] [        ] 
f. More than a month [        ] [        ] 
 
 
2.15 What are the difficulties you face when borrowing from formal and semiformal 
institutions?  
a. Many steps in processing loan application [        ] [        ] 
b. High administration fees   [        ] [        ] 
c. Unfriendly credit officers   [        ] [        ] 
d. Being requested extra money for approval [        ] [        ] 
e. High value of collateral   [        ] [        ] 
f. Inconsistent credit rules, laws, regulations [        ] [        ] 
g. Others (please specify):________________ ___________ __________ 
C. Informal 
2.16 Did you borrow money from the informal microcredit sources (such as relatives, friends, 
and money lenders)  in the last 12 months? 
a. YES       [       ]                                    b. NO     [ ] please go to part 3 
 
2.17 What are the purposes of your loans? 
a. Production capital (farming activities) [        ] 
b. Small investment/trade (non-farm) [        ] 
c. Pay tuition fees for children education [        ] 
d. Emergencies (i.e. medical, hospitalization) [       ] 
e. Housing (i.e. repair, construction) [       ] 
f. Purchasing durable assets (TV, etc ) [       ] 
g. Payment of other loans [       ] 
h. Others (please specify)__________________________________________________ 
 
2.18 What was the loan amount?   ……………………… 
  
2.19 What is the duration of the loans(s)? (months) ………………………..  
  
2.20 What is the average interest rate per month? ……………………….. 
 
2.21 What is the schedule of payment? 
a. Weekly [        ] 
b. Monthly   [        ] 
c. Semi-annually [        ] 
d. Annually [        ] 
e. Others (please specify):____________________________ 
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2.22 What kinds of collateral did you use for the informal microcredit? 
a. Land certificate [        ] 
b. Asset  [        ] 
c. Others (please specify):______________________________ 
 
2.23 What is the status of your existing loan?  
a. Fully paid [        ] 
b. Current loan [        ] 
c. Past due [        ] 
d. Restructured [        ] 
e. Others (please specify):______________________________ 
 
2.24 How long did it take to process a loan from the informal source? 
a. Instantly [        ] 
b. Within a day [        ] 
c. 1 weeks  [        ] 
d. Others (please specify):______________________________ 
 
2.25 Why did you obtain additional loan from informal microcredit? 
a. Inadequate loans from formal credit [        ] 
b. Collateral not required  [        ] 
c. Pay tuition fees for children education  [        ] 
d. Emergencies (i.e. medical, hospitalization) [        ] 
e. Housing (i.e. repair, construction) [        ] 
f. Purchasing durable assets (e.g. TV, machine) [        ] 
g. Payment of other loans [        ] 
h. Others (please specify):____________________________ 
 225 
 
Part 3. Opinions about participating in a microcredit programme 
Below is a series of statements that pertain to your opinion towards participating in a microcredit programme. Please indicate your level of 
agreement on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means “Strongly Disagree” and 5 means “Strongly Agree” and 6 means “Not Available.” 
 
A. Credit Availability 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
N/A 
1 I am aware of formal financial institutions available in my area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 My village is classified “poor” so that I can easily obtain a formal microcredit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 There only one financial institution (VBSP) for me to obtain formal microcredit  1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 The financial institutions are able to meet my loan demand and request 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 It is easy for me to meet the microcredit officer to discuss my credit borrowing 1 2 3 4 5 6 
B. Decision to Borrow Credit       
1 I myself decide to borrow money for my family‟s need  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 My spouse and I decide to borrow money for my family‟s need 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 I make decision to borrow and use the money only for the defined purpose 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 I have to use the money for the defined purpose because I have been monitored  1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 Using money for other purposes is acceptable in formal microcredit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 
Sufficient loan helps me to generate money which can cover the interest charged and 
repay the principle 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 I do not have any opportunity to generate income because I do not have enough capital  1 2 3 4 5 6 
C. Credit Affordability       
1 Interest rates charged by formal financial institutions are reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 Costs of processing formal microcredit are reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 Formal microcredit procedure is easy for me to follow 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 Financial institutions provide assistance for me to get formal microcredit  1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 Can borrow up to 100% of the asset‟s value 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 The administrative and underwriter expenses are reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 Flexibility of formal microcredit limit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
D. Credit Conditions       
1 There are many types of formal microcredit available for me 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 There are many loan sizes of formal microcredit available for me 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 Duration of the formal microcredit is reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 Term of repayment is reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 Financial institutions need business plan to provide formal microcredit to households 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 Penalty for late repayment is reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 Renegotiating formal microcredit terms prior to the existing renewal date 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 226 
Section 3. Welfare Impact (before and after) for households have participated in the 
microcredit programme 
 
3.1 Has any formal microcredit programme helped you cope with the unexpected event(s)? 
a.   YES [        ]   b. NO [        ] 
 
3.2 If “Yes” in Q3.1, what was the event? (you may tick more than one) 
a. Serious illness   [        ] 
b. Unexpected accident  [        ] 
c. Poor harvest of crops  [        ] 
d. Other(s) please specify __________________________________________________ 
 
3.3 How did you respond to the unexpected event? (you may tick more than one) 
a. Used savings  [        ] 
b. Liquidated household assets [        ] 
c. Engaged in other income earning activities [        ] 
d. Reduced expenditure [        ] 
e. Pawned items  [        ] 
f.  Other(s) please specify__________________________________________________ 
 
3.4 Did you have a plan for saving BEFORE the formal microcredit? 
a. YES [        ] b. NO [        ] 
 
3.5 If “Yes” in Q3.4, how often did you save?   
      a. Weekly [        ]       b. Monthly [        ]       c. Yearly [        ] 
 
3.6 Do you have a plan for saving AFTER the formal microcredit? 
a. YES [        ]  b. NO [        ] 
 
3.7 If “Yes” in Q3.6, how often do you save?   
a. Weekly [        ] b. Monthly [        ] c. Yearly [        ] 
 
3.9 With the formal microcredit, I am more optimistic about the future. Do you agree with 
that statement? 
a.  Agree  [        ] b. Disagree [        ] 
 
3.10  If “Agree” in Q3.9, what are the reasons? (you can tick more than one) 
a. Formal microcredit improves my business     [ ] 
b. Formal microcredit helps me accumulate wealth    [ ]  
c. Formal microcredit increases my financial security    [ ] 
d. Formal microcredit gives me more confidence in my business 
decision making 
[ ] 
e. Others please specify _________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
3.11 If “Disagree” in Q3.9, what are the reasons? (you can tick more than one) 
a. Formal microcredit is insufficient for me to generate earnings [ ] 
b. Formal microcredit contributes only a small percentage to my 
farming   
[ ] 
c. It is hard to be positive in the current economic condition [ ] 
d. Others (please specify)________________________________________________ 
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The following questions will ask you to compare changes of your household BEFORE and 
AFTER joining the microcredit programme. If you think that AFTER joining the microcredit 
programme your household has been significantly improved then it means “Increased”, if you 
think that joining microcredit loan has significantly reduced your indicators then it means 
“Decreased”, otherwise “Unchanged”. 
 
3.12 Compared with your household‟s income without the formal microcredit, has your total 
household income(s) in the last 12 month been ________(please tick in the brackets)  
 
 Increased  Decreased  No changed 
Total Income [        ] [        ] [        ] 
a. Farming  [        ] [        ] [        ] 
b. Non-farm [        ] [        ] [        ] 
 
3.13 If your total income “Decreased” in Q3.12, what are the reasons? (you can tick more 
than one) 
a. I or other household members were sick [        ] 
b. Someone in the household lost a job  [        ] 
c. Poor harvest from farming    [        ] 
d. Increase in inflation    [        ] 
e. Others____________________________________ 
 
3.14 Compared with the household‟s assets without the formal microcredit, has your 
household‟s assets with microcredit in the past 12 months_____________ 
 Increased  Decreased  No changed 
Total Assets [       ] [       ] [       ] 
a. Land  [       ] [       ] [       ] 
b. House  [       ] [       ] [       ] 
c. Appliances [       ] [       ] [       ] 
d. Savings [       ] [       ] [       ] 
e. Cropping [       ] [       ] [       ] 
f. Livestock  [       ] [       ] [       ] 
 
3.15 If your total assets “Decreased” in Q3.14, what are the reasons? (you can tick more than 
one) 
a. Liquidated some of the household‟s assets   [        ] 
b. Livestock die       [        ] 
c. Poor harvest (flood, drought)     [        ] 
d. Low market price of farming products   [        ] 
e. Increased in inflation      [        ] 
f. Other(s) please specify____________________________ 
 
3.16 Compared with your total expenditures without the microcredit programmes, has your 
total expenditures with the microcredit programme in the last 2 years been _______    
 Increased  Decreased  No changed 
Total Expenditures [       ] [       ] [       ] 
        a. Food expenditures [       ] [       ] [       ] 
        b. Children Education  [       ] [       ] [       ] 
        c. Health care [       ] [       ] [       ] 
 
3.17 If your total expenditure “Decreased” in Q3.16, what are the reasons? (you can tick more 
than one) 
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a. Household members have been decreased    [       ] 
b. I plant vegetables and raise livestock for my family consumption [       ] 
c. My children education is free (subsidised)    [       ] 
d. Tuition fees have been incurred to the formal microcredit  [       ] 
e. Health care fees have been uncured to the formal microcredit [       ] 
e.   Others (please specify)_____________________________________________ 
 
3.18 Compared with your overall living standard without the microcredit programme, has 
your living standard been  _________  in the last 2 years   
a. Increased  [        ] 
b. Remain the same [        ] 
c.  Decreased  [        ] 
 
Section 4. Household’s Demographics and Economic Activities  
4.1 Are you the household head? (Note: Interviewers have to make sure that the participants 
are household head in order at the beginning of the survey) 
a. YES       [        ]   b.  NO  [        ] 
 
4.3 Was your household classified as a poor one of the commune/ward in the following years? 
a. YES   [        ]   (please circle the year) Year 2007    Year 2008    Year 2009  
b. NO   [        ] 
 
4.4 What is your gender?        
a. Male   [        ]   b.  Female [        ] 
   
4.5 What is your age? (Please state)__________________________ 
 
4.6 Which ethnic group are you belong to?       
a.   Vietnamese      [        ] 
b.   Khmer     [        ] 
c.   Cham      [        ] 
d.   Chinese     [        ] 
e.   Others (please specify):_____________________________ 
 
4.7 What is your marital status? 
a. Single/Never Married   [        ] 
b. Married     [        ] 
d. De factor relationship   [        ] 
e. Divorced/Separated     [        ] 
 
4.8 How many children do you have? Male:________________ Female: 
_________________ 
 
4.9 What is your highest educational or professional qualification? 
a. No education     [        ] 
b. Primary school    [        ] 
c. Middle school    [        ] 
d. High school     [        ] 
e. Vocational training    [        ] 
f. College     [        ] 
g. Other(s) please specify ______________________________ 
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4.10 What is your main occupation? (Please state)_________________________________   
 
4.11 The number of people living in your household is (please state):___________ persons 
 
4.12 The number of income earners in your household is (please state):__________ persons 
 
4.13 What is the status of your land ownership? 
a. Owned my land    [        ] 
b. Leased land     [        ] 
c. Other(s) please specify __________________________________ 
 
4.14 What is the size of your household farm land? 
a. Less than 0.1 hectare   [        ] 
b. Between 0.1 – 0.5 hectare   [        ] 
d. More than 0.5 hectare   [        ] 
e. Other(s) please specify __________________________________ 
 
4.15 What are your main crops in the past 12 months? (please tick all if applicable) 
a.  Rice      [        ] 
b. Vegetable     [        ] 
d. Perennial industrial crops   [        ] 
e. Other(s) please specify __________________________________ 
 
4.16 What is the main source of your household income?  
a. Farming/cropping    [        ] 
b. Livestock     [        ] 
c. Farm labourer     [        ] 
d. Non-farm labourer     [        ] 
e.     Family business (vendor)   [        ] 
f. Other(s) please specify __________________________________ 
 
4.17 How many months do you engage in generating the main income per year? 
a. 12 months     [        ] 
b. 9 to less than 12 months   [        ] 
c. 6 to less than 9 months   [        ] 
d. 3 to less than 6 months   [        ] 
e.     1 to less than 3 months   [        ] 
 
4.18 What is your household annual income for the years 2008 and 2009? 
Income (VND/Year) 2008 2009 
a. Farming   
b. Livestock   
c. Farm labourer   
d. Non-farm labourer   
e. Family business (vendor)   
f. Other    
Total   
 
4.19 Does your household have any subsidiary income in the past 12 months? 
a.  YES [        ] please specify: ________________VND  b. NO [        ] 
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4.20 If “Yes” in Q4.19, what are sources of subsidiary household income? (You can tick more 
than one) 
a.  Casual labour      [        ] 
b.  Handicraft       [        ] 
c.  Relief payment from government    [        ] 
d.  Remittances from other family members or relatives [        ] 
e.   Others________________________________________________ 
  
4.21 What is your household annual consumption for the years 2008 and 2009? 
Consumption (VND/Year) 2008 2009 
a. Food    
b. Drink (alcohol, coffee, etc)    
c. Children education   
d. Health care   
e. Household appliances   
f. Others    
Total   
 
 
4.22 What is your household annual farming and non-farming expenditures for the years 
2008, and 2009? 
Expenditures (VND/Year) 2008 2009 
a. Land rental    
b. Inputs for farming (seed, fertilisers, etc)     
c. Tax   
d. Health care   
e. Household appliances   
f. Others    
Total   
 
 
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and if you 
have further comments about microcredit, please feel free to comment in the space provided 
below. Once again, we assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
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